The MMDA is not vested with police power.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:

You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days.

Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of apprehension.¹

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter² to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint³ with application for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.

For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.⁴

The MMDA also refuted Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.

Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary driver's license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondent's driver's license.

On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision⁵ in favor of the herein respondent and held that:

a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of driver's licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.

b. The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his driver's license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating driver's license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

In filing this petition,⁶ the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:

1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,

2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, or

3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower court's finding that it had not was based on a "misapprehension of facts," which the petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.

Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.⁷

It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers' licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the Court's need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.

The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers' licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner's future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:

1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.

The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal⁸ on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry⁹ and Oposa v. Factoran¹⁰ on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao¹¹ on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.

Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex. Rel. Sullivan,¹² which states in part that, "the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions."

Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk,¹³ to the effect that: "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power."

The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways.

2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.

In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,¹⁴ we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.

The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.

Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.

We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991.¹⁵ A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs."¹⁶ Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters."

….

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. ¹⁷ (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.

3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136¹⁸ and P.D. No. 1605¹⁹ to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.²⁰

This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.

This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,²¹ and is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.²²

A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management,²³ and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

¹ Records, p. 10.

² Id., p. 11.

³ Id., p. 1.

⁴ Memorandum for Defendants, Records, pp. 178 -185.

⁵ Id., pp. 187-190, penned by Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort.

⁶ Records, pp. 197-225.

⁷ Sec. 7, Mem. Circ. No. 04, Series of 2004.

⁸ 56 Phil 123 (1931).

⁹ G.R. No. L-24548, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 302.

¹⁰ G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

¹¹ G.R. No. L-22766, 30 August 1968, 24 SCRA 898.

¹² 63 P. 2d 653, 108 ALR 1156, 1159.

¹³ 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (108 ALR 1161).

¹⁴ G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 836, penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.

¹⁵ Sec. 16 of Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:

General Welfare.-Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

¹⁶ Supra, Note 18, p. 844, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 95-98 [1996], citing UP Law Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, "Improvement of Local Government Administration for Development Purpose," Journal of Local Administration Overseas 135 [July 1962].

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 849-860.

¹⁸ Entitled "An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a Land Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes," approved on 20 June 1964. Sec. 29 thereof states:

Confiscation of driver's license.- Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by the Commissioner shall, in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission therefore which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension and revocation of his license. (emphasis supplied)

¹⁹ Entitled "Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Certain Powers Related to Traffic Management and Control in Metropolitan Manila, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes," dated 21 November 1978.

SEC. 5.- In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veteran's Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. (emphasis supplied)

²⁰ Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 7924.

²¹ Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. dela Serna, (G.R. No. 82805, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 524) we upheld the grant of concurrent jurisdiction between the Secretary of Labor or its Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters to pass upon money claims, among other cases, "the provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding," as enunciated in Executive Order No. 111. Holding that E.O. 111 was a curative law intended to widen worker's access to the Government for redress of grievances, we held,"…the Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction, '[t]he provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding,' it would have rendered such a proviso - and the amendment itself - useless to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it." (See also Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor, G.R. No. 117169, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 393.)

²² In Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, (G.R. No. 60549, 26 October 1983, 125 SCRA 221) we upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain municipalities in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The law granted the Philippine Tourism authority the right to expropriate 282 hectares of land to establish a resort complex notwithstanding the claim that certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents had already been issued to them thereby making the lands expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2, and that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the health and physical well-being of the people, and that property already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use. We held that, "(t)he petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree whose avowed purpose is the legislative perception of the public good. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to rebut the presumption of validity, the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424)."

In the same manner, we upheld in Dumlao v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392) the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected is disqualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Invoking the need for the emergence of younger blood in local politics, we affirmed that the constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. (See also Tropical Homes, Inc, v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 July 1987 152 SCRA 540; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47791, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 55; People v. Vera, GR No. 45685, 65 Phil 56 [1937].)

²³ Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 7924.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110379 November 28, 1997

HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; John Doe (not his real name), in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O. BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C. KU, MARRISA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B. CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F. LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal.

Statement of the Case

This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision ¹ of the Court of Appeals ² in CA-G.R.. SP No. 29107 which affirmed the trial court's decision, ³ as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED.

The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cariño and henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case.

SO ORDERED. ⁴

The Antecedent Facts

The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows:

On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.

On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations, to wit:

1. grave misconduct;

2. gross neglect of duty;

3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations;

4. refusal to perform official duty;

5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

6. absence without leave (AWOL)

At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension.

The charges were subsequently amended by John Doe (not his real name)on November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike.

Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees' counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later, however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.

On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a restraining order.

They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers.

On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia of the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene, alleging that he was in the same situation as petitioners since he had likewise been charged and preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cariño for the same grounds as the other petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder the burden of proving his innocence under the committee's guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and allowed him to intervene.

On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS Secretary. In the main he contended that, in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings.

The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to intervene in the case.

Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.

On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied on September 11, 1991.

The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court's order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees' action, even as it ordered the latter's reinstatement pending decision of their case.

Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case for hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads:

As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be set for pre-trial conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño, as the principal respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before this Court on said date and time, with a warning that should he fail to show up on said date, the Court will declare him as IN DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not recognize any representative of his.

By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset on June 26, 1992. However, Secretary Cariño failed to appear in court on the date set. It was explained that he had to attend a conference in Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the court just the same declared them as in default. The Solicitor General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cariño could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cariño was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. But the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated:

The "Motion For Reconsideration" dated July 3, 1992 filed by the respondents thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears too obvious that respondents simply did not want to comply with the lawful orders of the Court.

The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the "Manifestation and Motion," dated July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby DENIED due course.

SO ORDERED.

On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion.

The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.

On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it stated:

The Court is in full accord with petitioners' contention that Rep. Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers" is the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. Act No. 4670 has already been superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec. Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded as having been replaced by a general law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the same is manifest. A perusal of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals no such intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No. 4670 stands. In the event that there is conflict between a special and a general law, the former shall prevail since it evidences the legislator's intent more clearly than that of the general statute and must be taken as an exception to the General Act. The provision of Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No. 807 in the composition and selection of the members of the investigating committee. Consequently, the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever.

Anent petitioners' claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal investigation, the Court, after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the case, finds such claim meritorious. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner, the same is not sufficient reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair play. The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality. It is a dismissal without due process. While there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte.

The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the teacher's right to due process. Due process must be observed in dismissing the teachers because it affects not only their position but also their means of livelihood.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED and all the questioned orders/decisions of the respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE.

The reinstatement of the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority and promotional rights is hereby ORDERED.

The payment, if any, of all the petitioners' back salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other benefits and emoluments which may have accrued to them during the entire period of their preventive suspension and/or dismissal from the service is hereby likewise ORDERED.

SO ORDERED. ⁵

From this adverse decision of the trial court; former DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the following grounds:

I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in default.

II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper substitution of parties.

III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers", should govern the conduct of the investigation conducted.

IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal of the teachers are without due process. ⁶

As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them.

Hence, this petition for review. ⁷

The Issues

Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:

I

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents were denied due process of law.

II

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the provision of R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the investigating committee.

III

Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial court's decision. ⁸

These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single question: whether private respondents were denied due process of law.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law.

Denial of Due Process

At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to determine whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative proceedings against herein private respondents. We note the Solicitor General's extensive disquisition that government employees do not have the right to strike. ⁹ On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, ¹⁰ has recently pronounced, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, ¹¹ the Court explained the schoolteachers' right to peaceful assembly vis-a-vis their right to mass protest:

Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time — recess, after classes, weekends or holidays — to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court — could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable. ¹²

In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed.

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. ¹³

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670 read:

Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. — Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have:

a: the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;

b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;

c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative of his choice and/or by his organization, adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and

d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher during the pendency of his case.

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. — Administrative charges against teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintended is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of the statute; that is, to promote the "terms of employment and career prospects" of schoolteachers.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. ¹⁴

Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA 4670, because "all the teachers who were members of the various committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation" ¹⁵ and are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers' organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.

We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers' organization as its representative in said committee.

Contrary to petitioners' asseverations, ¹⁶ RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that "repeals by implication are not favor. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence." ¹⁷ Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law, "unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." ¹⁸

The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents' right to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est recedendum.

Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court, perceptively and correctly stated:

Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been superseded by the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that pursuant to the latter law the head of a department, like the DECS secretary, or a regional director, like the respondent-appellant John Doe (not his real name), can file administrative charges against a subordinate, investigate him and take disciplinary action against him if warranted by his findings. Respondent-appellants cite in support of their argument the following provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807).

Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. —

xxx xxx xxx

b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities. . . shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. . . .

Sec. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. —

a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department or officer of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons.

There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Although the Civil Service Decree gives the head of department or the regional director jurisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such power is exercised through committees. In cases involving public school teachers, the Magna Carta provides that the committee be constituted as follows:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. — Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, that where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondly and elementary school teachers, and consultants. But there was no representative of a teachers organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the provision for the representation of a teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges.

There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way inconsistent with the Civil Service Decree insofar as procedures for investigation is concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by providing that the respondent in an administrative case may ask for a "formal investigation," which was what the teachers did in this case by questioning the absence of a representative of a teachers organization in the investigating committee.

The administrative committee considered the teachers to have waived their right to a hearing after the latter's counsel walked out of the preliminary hearing. The committee should not have made such a ruling because the walk out was staged in protest against the procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers' counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. Its predisposition to find petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in fact noted by the Supreme Court when in its resolution in G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated:

The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al. G.R. No. 100206, August 22, 1961.

As in the Cariño v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department of Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in this case Secretary Cariño, without awaiting formal administrative procedures and on the basis of reports and "implied admissions" found the petitioners guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated May 16, 1997 and August 6, 1991. The teachers went to court. The Court dismissed the case. ¹⁹

Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is not our function "to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide." ²⁰

It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed to reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents and the payment of them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or dismissal. ²¹ Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be reinstated ²² and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. ²³ This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 44-57.

2 Third Division, composed of J. Vicente V. Mendoza (now an associate justice of the Supreme Court), ponente and Chairman; and JJ. Jorge S. Imperial and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., concurring.

3 Penned by Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

4 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 14; rollo, p. 57.

5 Ibid, pp. 1-7; rollo, pp. 44-50.

6 Ibid, p. 8; rollo, p. 51.

7 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of Petitioner's Memorandum on July 16, 1996.

8 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 16-17, rollo, pp. 271-272.

9 Ibid., pp. 17-30, rollo, pp. 272-285.

10 G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997.

11 Merlinda Jacinto et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

12 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

13 Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489, 492, April 29, 1971, per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

14 See Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 108, (1996).

15 Petition, p. 30; rollo, p. 37.

16 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 35-38; rollo, pp. 290-293.

17 Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500, 512, December 1, 1995, per Panganiban, J.

18 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 56, December 7, 1995, per Hermosisima, Jr., J.

19 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 10-13; rollo, pp. 53-56.

20 South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744, 749, June 2, 1995, per Vitug, J.

21 See Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 6; rollo, p. 84.

22 See Paragraph 4, Section 26, E.O. No. 292.

23 See also Miranda vs. Commission on Audit, 200 SCRA 657, 662, August 16, 1991, per Paras, J.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180055 July 31, 2009

FRANKLIN M. DRILON as President and in representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (LP), AND HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, HON. WAHAB M. AKBAR, HON. MARIA EVITA R. ARAGO, HON. PROCESSO J. ALCALA, HON. ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, HON. MARY MITZI CAJAYON, HON. FREDENIL H. CASTRO, HON. GLENN ANG CHONG, HON. SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, HON. PAUL RUIZ DAZA, HON. ANTONIO A. DEL ROSARIO, HON. CECILIA S. LUNA, HON. MANUEL M. MAMBA, HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, HON. ALVIN SANDOVAL, HON. LORENZO R. TAÑADA III, HON. REYNALDO S. UY, HON. ALFONSO V. UMALI JR., HON. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA JR. in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, SR., in his official capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, in his official capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, ATTY. MA. GEMMA D. ASPIRAS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, HON. PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, HON. EDGARDO C. ZIALCITA, HON. ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, HON. JOSE CARLOS V. LACSON, HON. EILEEN R. ERMITA-BUHAIN, HON. JOSE V. YAP, HON. RODOLFO T. ALBANO III, HON. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, HON. CONRADO M. ESTRELLA III, HON. RODOLFO "OMPONG" PLAZA, HON. EMMYLOU J. TALIÑO-MENDOZA and HON. EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, in their individual official capacities as "elected" members of the Commission on Appointments, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 183055 July 31, 2009

SENATOR MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL, Petitioner,
vs.
SENATOR MANUEL VILLAR in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, REPRESENTATIVE PROSPERO NOGRALES in his capacity as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA).

The contingent in the Senate to the CA was composed of the following senators with their respective political parties:

Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal PDP-Laban

Sen. Joker Arroyo KAMPI

Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano Lakas-CMD

Sen. Panfilo Lacson UNO

Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada PMP

Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile PMP

Sen. Loren Legarda NPC

Sen. Richard Gordon Lakas-CMD

Sen. Mar Roxas LP

Sen. Lito Lapid Lakas-CMD

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago PRP

The members of the contingent of the House of Representatives in the CA and their respective political parties were as follows:

Rep. Prospero C. Nograles Lakas-CMD

Rep. Eduardo C. Zialcita Lakas-CMD

Rep. Abdullah D. Dimaporo Lakas-CMD

Rep. Jose Carlos V. Lacson Lakas-CMD

Rep. Eileen R. Ermita-Buhain Lakas-CMD

Rep. Jose V. Yap Lakas-CMD

Rep. Rodolfo T. Albano III KAMPI

Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas KAMPI

Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. Plaza NPC

Rep. Conrado M. Estrella NPC

Rep. Emmylou J. Taliño-Mendoza NP

Rep. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva CIBAC Party List

In the second week of August 2007, petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand.¹

During the session of the House of Representatives on September 3, 2007, petitioner in the first petition, Representative Tañada, requested from the House of Representatives leadership² one seat in the CA for the Liberal Party.³ To his request, Representative Neptali Gonzales II⁴ begged the indulgence of the Liberal Party "to allow the Legal Department to make a study on the matter."⁵

In a separate move, Representative Tañada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary General of the House of Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.⁶ Representative Tañada also brought the matter to the attention of then Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the position that since there were at least 20 members of the Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, the party should be represented in the CA.⁷

As of October 15, 2007, however, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days.⁸

In reply, Atty. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the House of Representatives informed Representative Tañada that the department was constrained to withhold the release of its legal opinion because the handling lawyer was directed to secure documents necessary to establish some of the members’ party affiliations.⁹

Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of the first petition by petitioner former Senator Franklin M. Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, against then Speaker De Venecia, Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, Senator Manuel B. Villar in his capacity as ex officio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma. Gemma D. Aspiras in her capacity as Secretary of the CA, and the individual members of the House of Representatives contingent to the CA.¹⁰ The petition in G.R. No. 180055 raises the following issues:

a. WHETHER THE LIBERAL PARTY WITH AT LEAST TWENTY (20) MEMBERS WHO SIGNED HEREIN AS PETITIONERS, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO ONE (1) SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.

b. WHETHER THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ RESPONDENTS HAVE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTING THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL CONSTITUTION BY DEPRIVING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO ONE (1) SEAT THEREIN.

c. WHETHER AS A RESULT OF THE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDENTS, THE WRITS PRAYED FOR IN THIS PETITION BE ISSUED NULLIFYING THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, RESTRAINING THE CURRENT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS FROM SITTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, OUSTING THE AFFECTED RESPONDENTS WHO USURPED, INTRUDED INTO AND UNLAWFULLY HELD POSITIONS IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AND REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS TO RECONSTITUTE AND/OR REELECT THE MEMBERS OF SAID COMMISSION.¹¹ (Italics in the original)

And it prays that this Court:

a. Immediately upon the filing of the instant Petition, issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction, enjoining all Respondents and all persons under their direction, authority, supervision, and control from further proceeding with their actions relating to the illegal and unconstitutional constitution of the Commission on Appointments and to the unlawful exercise of its members’ functions, contrary to the rule on proportional representation of political parties with respect to the House of Representatives contingent in the said Commission;

b. After careful consideration of the merits of the case, render judgment making the injunction permanent and ordering Respondents and all persons under their direction, authority, supervision, and control;

x x x x

c. Declare Respondents’ action in not allotting one (1) seat to Petitioners null and void for being a direct violation of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution;

d. Declare the proceedings of the Commission on Appointments null and void, insofar as they violate the rule on proportional representation of political parties in said Commission;

e. Oust the affected respondents, whoever they are, who usurped, intruded into and have unlawfully held positions in the Commission on Appointments and

f. Require Respondents to alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with proportional representation based on the actual numbers of members belonging to duly accredited and registered political parties who were elected into office during the last May 14, 2007 Elections by, at the very least, respecting and allowing Congressman Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. as the duly nominated Commission on Appointments member of the Liberal Party of the Philippines to sit therein as such.¹²

Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary Aspiras filed their Comment¹³ on December 6, 2007, moving for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds:

I. THE POWER TO ELECT MEMBERS TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS BELONGS TO EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION. AS SUCH, THE PETITION IS NOT DIRECTED AT THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS.

II. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE COMMISSION MUST HAVE COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP IN ORDER THAT IT CAN FUNCTION. WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS THAT THERE MUST AT LEAST BE A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR IT TO VALIDLY CONDUCT ITS PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACT ITS BUSINESS.¹⁴ (Emphasis in the original)

Then Speaker De Venecia and Representative Defensor filed their Comment and Opposition¹⁵ on February 18, 2008, moving too for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds:

I. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDAMUS.¹⁶

II. THE LIBERAL PARTY DOES NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS THAT WOULD ENTITLE THE PARTY TO A SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. IT IS, THEREFORE, NOT THE PROPER PARTY TO INSTITUTE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO.¹⁷

III. THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO EXHAUST THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM.¹⁸

IV. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE AFFILIATION OF THE MEMBERS NEED TO BE SETTLED IN A TRIAL.¹⁹ (Emphasis in the original)

Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters of April 17, 2008 to Senator Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation for the following reasons:

1. PMP has two representatives in the CA although it only has two members in the Senate and thus [is] entitled only to one (1) seat.

2. KAMPI has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA.

3. PRP has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and yet it is represented in the CA.

4. If Senators Richard Gordon and Pilar Juliana Cayetano are Independents, then Sen. Gordon cannot be a member of the CA as Independents cannot be represented in the CA even though there will be three Independents in the CA.

5. If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now NP, he still can sit in the CA representing NP.²⁰

She also claimed that the composition of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation for the following reasons:

1. Lakas-CMD currently has five (5) members in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled only to four (4) representatives and thus [is] in excess of a member;

2. KAMPI currently has three (3) members in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled only to two (2) representatives and thus is excess of a member;

3. Liberal Party is not represented in the Commission on Appointments although it is entitled to one (1) nominee; and

4. Party-List CIBAC has a representative in the Commission on Appointments although it only has two members in the House of Representatives and therefore [is] not entitled to any seat.²¹

Senator Madrigal thus requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions of [the] CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional."²²

By letter of May 13, 2008, Senator Madrigal again wrote Senator Villar as follows:

Today, I was advised that the Committee on Budget and Management of Senator Mar Roxas has endorsed the ad interim appointment of Rolando G. Andaya as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management for approval by the CA in the plenary. I believe it is imperative that the serious constitutional questions that I have raised be settled before the plenary acts on this endorsement by the Committee on Budget and Management. Otherwise, like Damocles’ sword, a specter of doubt continues to be raised on the validity of actions taken by the CA and its committees.²³

Still later or on May 19, 2008, Senator Madrigal sent another letter to Senator Villar declaring that she "cannot in good conscience continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA, until such time as [she] get[s] a response to [her] letters and until the constitutional issue of the CA’s composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission,"²⁴ and that without any such resolution, she would be forced to invoke Section 20 of the CA rules against every official whose confirmation would be submitted to the body for deliberation.²⁵

The CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, by letter-comment of May 26, 2008, opined that the CA has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them.²⁶

By letter of May 28, 2008, Senator Villar advised Senator Madrigal as follows:

x x x x

Noting your position that you will not continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA … "until the constitutional issue of the CA’s composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission" x x x, the Secretary of the Commission, upon my instructions, transmitted the same to the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions. It was my intention to have the Committee study and deliberate on the matter and to recommend what step/s to take on your request that "all actions of the Commission be held in abeyance" x x x.

In view however, of your manifestation during the May 26, 2008 meeting of the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, and of the written comment of Sen. Arroyo that "If there is a complaint in the election of a member or members, it shall be addressed to the body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House," I have given instructions to transmit the original copies of your letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate so that your concerns may be addressed by the Senate in caucus and/or in plenary.²⁷ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Undaunted, Senator Madrigal, by letter of June 2, 2008 addressed to Senator Villar, reiterated her request that all actions of the CA be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents.²⁸

Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13, 2008 the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA,²⁹ alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

A. . . . IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS;

B. . . . IN CONTINUOUSLY CONDUCTING HEARINGS AND PROCEEDINGS ON THE APPOINTMENTS DESPITE THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMPOSITION WHICH MUST BE PROHIBITED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT; and

C. . . . IN FAILING, DESPITE REPEATED DEMANDS FROM PETITIONER, TO RE-ORGANIZE THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, WHICH REQUIREMENT MUST BE ENFORCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.³⁰ (Emphasis in the original)

She thus prayed for the

1. . . . issu[ance of] a temporary restraining order/a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Respondents from proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officials and members of the Commission on Appointments which composition is unconstitutional, pending resolution of the instant Petition;

2. Declar[ation that] the composition of the Commission on Appointments [is] null and void insofar as it violates the proportional party representation requirement mandated by Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution;

3. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Prohibition against respondents Senate President Manuel Villar, Speaker Prospero Nograles and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to desist from further proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officers of the Commission on Appointments, the composition of which is null and void for being violative of the proportional party representation requirement under Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution; and

4. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Mandamus commanding respondents Senate President Manuel Villar, Speaker Prospero Nograles and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to reorganize and reconstitute the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the 1987 Constitution.³¹

The Court consolidated G.R. No. 180055³² and G.R. No. 183055 on July 1, 2008.

Petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, later filed on August 15, 2008 a Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition,³³ alleging that with the designation of Representative Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the Liberal Party as a member of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA in replacement of Representative Eduardo M. Gullas of KAMPI, their petition had become moot and academic.

In his Comment of August 19, 2008 on the second petition, respondent Senator Villar proffered the following arguments:

I.

Petitioner has no standing to file [the] petition.

II.

Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort. Each House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the composition of its own contingent to the CA.

III.

Petitioner is estopped.

IV.

Presumption of regularity in the conduct of official functions.

V.

The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not available to the Petitioner.³⁴ (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

In his Comment and Opposition³⁵ filed on September 3, 2008, Speaker Nograles proffered the following arguments:

A. WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE PETITIONS HAVE ALREADY BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE ALFONSO V. UMALI, JR., MEMBER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY, TO THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.³⁶

B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY THE

HONORABLE COURT AND THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION.³⁷

C. THE REMEDY OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO RECONSTITUTE THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS RESTS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.³⁸

D. CONSIDERING THE AFOREMENTIONED FACTS AND JURISPRUDENCE, IT IS SUBMITTED THAT SENATOR MADRIGAL HAS NO STANDING TO PURSUE THE INSTANT CASE.

E. THE PETITION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AS REQUIRED BY RULE 65 SECTIONS 2 AND 3 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.

As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails.

Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of.³⁹ Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.

Senator Madrigal’s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court.⁴⁰ Senator Villar’s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken, as is the following observation of Speaker Nograles, citing Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:⁴¹

In order that the remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed of, there must be "no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law".lavvph!1

It is worth recalling that, in the 11th Congress, Senator Aquilino Pimentel advocated the allocation of a position in the Commission on Appointments for the Party-List Representatives. Just like the Petitioner in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first wrote to the Senate President, requesting that the Commission on Appointments be restructured to conform to the constitutional provision on proportional representation. xxx Without awaiting final determination of the question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme Court. In the said case, the Honorable Court ruled:

"The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.

xxxx

Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is premature.

Following the ruling in Pimentel, it cannot be said that recourse was already had in the House of Representatives. Furnishing a copy of Petitioner’s letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further, it is the Members of the House who claim to have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments that must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the Commission on Appointments. Just like Senator Pimentel, demanding seats in the Commission on Appointments for Congressmen, who have not even raised the issue of its present composition in the House, is not Senator Madrigal’s affair.⁴² (Italics, underscoring, and emphasis supplied by Representative Nograles)

It bears noting that Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of Senator Madrigal’s letters to the Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to address her concerns. Senator Madrigal’s filing of the second petition is thus premature.

Senator Madrigal’s suggestion – that Senators Pilar Juliana Cayetano and Richard Gordon be considered independent senators such that the latter should not be allowed to be a member of the CA,⁴³ and that Senator Alan Peter Cayetano be considered a member of the NP such that he may sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle his party to one seat – involves a determination of party affiliations, a question of fact which the Court does not resolve.

WHEREFORE, the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 180055 is GRANTED. The Petition is WITHDRAWN. The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice	ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice	RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION* Associate Justice	DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

^* On official leave.

¹ Vide rollo (G.R. No. 180055), pp. 23-24.

² Vide id. at 14.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In what capacity he replied to Representative Tañada is not mentioned in the rollo.

⁵ Rollo (G.R. No. 180055), p. 14.

⁶ Id. at 25.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Id. at 14-15.

⁹ Id. at 53.

¹⁰ Id. at 3-44.

¹¹ Id. at 26.

¹² Id. at 35-36.

¹³ Id. at 69-77.

¹⁴ Id. at 71, 73.

¹⁵ Id. at 111-181.

¹⁶ Id. at 113.

¹⁷ Id. at 125.

¹⁸ Id. at 133.

¹⁹ Id. at 137.

²⁰ Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 34-35.

²¹ Id. at 37.

²² Id. at 37-38.

²³ Id. at 39.

²⁴ Id. at 42.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Id. at 43.

²⁷ Id. at 44.

²⁸ Id. at 46.

²⁹ Id. at 3-29.

³⁰ Id. at 12.

³¹ Id. at 26-27.

³² Id. at 106.

³³ Id. at 245-257.

³⁴ Id. at 133.

³⁵ Id. at 158-184.

³⁶ Id. at 163.

³⁷ Id. at 164.

³⁸ Id. at 174.

³⁹ Vide David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 327.

⁴⁰ Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 441 Phil. 492, 503 (2002).

⁴¹ Id. at 497-498, 500-503.

⁴² Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 175-176.

⁴³ Id. at 18-19.