Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in ARMM, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,¹ placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places.

Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273)² "transferring" supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the former, by "delegating" instead of "transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.³

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials,⁴ filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize the regional government’s powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.⁵

Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers.⁶ Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.

In its comment for the respondents,⁷ the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places.⁸ She issued the proclamation pursuant to her "calling out" power⁹ as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.¹⁰ She must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads.

On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.¹¹ The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.¹² Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers.¹³

Although normalcy has in the meantime returned to the places subject of this petition, it might be relevant to rule on the issues raised in this petition since some acts done pursuant to Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A could impact on the administrative and criminal cases that the government subsequently filed against those believed affected by such proclamation and orders.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and

3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.

The Rulings of the Court

We dismiss the petition.

One. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region.

But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12,¹⁴ of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.¹⁵ In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

Two. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.¹⁶ But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

Three. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.¹⁷

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power,¹⁸ it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,¹⁹ it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.²⁰

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.²¹

But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the President’s decision to call out the armed forces, as follows:

The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.

Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.

x x x x

The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped with about two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have been accounted for. x x x

As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two hundred (200) firearms. x x x

Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus.

What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs).

One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial dispute between the said RAG and the Ampatuan family.

x x x x

On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The said faction is a force to reckon with because the group is well capable of launching a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the people and the authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x

In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has the strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two (372) firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction has the strength of about four hundred (400) persons and three hundred (300) firearms and was reported to be moving towards Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its armed fight against the Ampatuans.²²

In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.²³ Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported²⁴ that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice	ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice	LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice	MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice	JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Rollo, p. 34.

² Id. at 36.

³ Id. at 80.

⁴ Ampatuan, Adiong and Sahali-Generale were, respectively, the Governor, Vice-Governor and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the ARMM at that time.

⁵ Rollo, pp. 14-17.

⁶ Id. at 20-22.

⁷ Id. at 63.

⁸ Id. at 85, 87, 95.

⁹ Id. at 98.

¹⁰ Id. at 76.

¹¹ Id. at 95.

¹² Id. at 78.

¹³ Id. at 110.

¹⁴ SEC. 12. Succession to Regional Governorship in Cases of Temporary Incapacity. – In case of temporary incapacity of the regional Governor to perform his duties on account of physical or legal causes, or when he is on official leave of absence or on travel outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, the Regional Vice-Governor, or if there be none or in case of his permanent or temporary incapacity or refusal to assume office, the Speaker of the Regional Assembly shall exercise the powers, duties and functions of the Regional Governor as prescribed by law enacted by the Regional Assembly or in the absence thereof, by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.

¹⁵ http://services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20100707-279759.

¹⁶ Rollo, p. 22.

¹⁷ See SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 509-510 (2004).

¹⁸ Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001).

¹⁹ 392 Phil. 618, 635 (2000).

²⁰ Id. at 643-644.

²¹ Rollo, pp. 20-21.

²² Id. at 101-105.

²³ Id. at 105.

²⁴ http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/video/nation/regions/11/23/10/state-emergency-maguindanao-stays;

http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/aquino-state-emergency-maguindanao-stays;

http://www.bomboradyo.com/index.php/news/top-stories/29331-state-of-emergency-sa-c-mindanao-mananatili; http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/26011-State-of-emergency-in-Maguindanao-remains.html

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.

How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other?

Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development.

Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: — the environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, — likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. ¹

Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:

Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in force;

(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery projects;

(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of the Authority;

(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;

(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board. ²

To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".

Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:

Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.

Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)

It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:

Sec 41. Definition of Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.

Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:

Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.

(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.

(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:

(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . .

(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters.

xxx xxx xxx

Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.

To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:

In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:

1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.

2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.

3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.

All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.

One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.

Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.

The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:

(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;

(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;

(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.

By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned.

Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.

We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." ³

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. ⁴

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.

We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one — which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."

"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."

"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." ⁵

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."

On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. ⁶ It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.

In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled.

The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.

Footnotes

1 Section 1, PD No. 813.

2 At pages 64-65.

3 Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phils. 225; National Power Corporation vs. Arca, 25 SCRA 935; Province of Misamis Oriental vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., 181 SCRA 43.

4 Fajardo vs. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 89135, December 21, 1989.

5 Petition, under caption, "Nature of Petition".

6 Section 3 (k), Presidential Decree No. 813.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86117 May 7, 1990

DIMANGADAP DIPATUAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALEEM HOSAIN AMANODDIN, ALEEM ABBAS MOHAMMAD HABIB, HADJI SALIC IMAM, IBRA P. BALI, MAMENTAL NAGA, CADAR G. USMAN, MAGAUNDAR AMEROL, ALI MANGANDA, HOSARI ALOYOD, YUNOS MALIK, respondents.

Pedro Q. Quadra for petitioner.

Ariraya P. Corot, Linang D. Mandangan, Mangorsi A. Mindalano and Tingaraan Bangkero for private respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Dimangadap Dipatuan asks us to set aside the decision dated 8 November 1988 of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) Second Division which ordered the inclusion of election returns from two (2) precincts (Precincts Nos. 15 and 17) of the Municipality of Bacolod Grande, Province of Lanao del Sur, in the canvass of votes cast in the 1988 local elections, as well as the decision of the Comelec En Banc dated 22 December 1988, affirming the decision of the Comelec Second Division.

Petitioner Dipatuan and private respondent Aleem Hosain Amanoddin were candidates for Mayor of Bacolod Grande in the 1 February 1988 special local elections in Lanao del Sur. The other private respondents were candidates for Vice-Mayor and Councilors in the same municipality.

On 21 February 1988, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod Grande, chaired by Samuel Minalang, finished canvassing the votes but did not proclaim the winning candidates. It did so on 29 February 1988, when private respondent Amanoddin was proclaimed winner and elected Mayor.

Earlier, on 25 February 1988, petitioner Dipatuan was proclaimed Mayor by a separate Board of Canvassers headed by one Mamacaog Manggray, after the said Board had excluded the election returns from Precincts Nos. 15, 17 and 21 from its canvass.

The Comelec En Banc set aside both (a) the proclamation made by the Minalang Board for being premature, the candidates not having been given the opportunity to appeal, and (b) the proclamation by the Manggray Board on the ground that the latter Board had not been properly constituted. A Special Board of Canvassers ("Special Board") was therefore convened in Manila by the Comelec to recanvass the election returns from Bacolod Grande, Lanao del Sur.

On 21 June 1988, during the recanvass, petitioner objected to the inclusion of the election returns from Precincts Nos. 15 and 17, contending that the returns from the two (2) precincts were spurious and manufactured". In this connection, petitioner seasonable converted his oral objection into written form and submitted certified copies of the voting records and voter's affidavits and affidavits of witnesses. The petitioner claimed that the questioned returns were "obviously manufactured" within the eaning of Section 243 (c) of the Omnibus Election Code and that therefore a pre-proclamation controversy existed which must be resolved before proclamation of the winning candidates Petitioner contended the following irregularities had attended at the Bacolod Grande local elections:

1. In Precinct No. 15. of the 248 persons who actually voted, 187 arrived in the precinct and voted, according to the voting list, precisely in alphabetical and chronological order; of the 187 voters who voted in alphabetical and chronological order, 811 were illiterates as reflected in their respective voter's affidavits,. but had suddenly learned how to write their names in the voting list; many persons whose faces were covered by veils were allowed to vote without their identities being verified.

2. In Precinct No. 17, 93 voters are listed as having voted in alphabetical and chronological order, i.e., in the precise sequence of their listing in the voting records: 45 illiterate voters suddenly learned to write their names in the voting records; many persons with their faces covered were allowed to vote without confirmation of their identities.

3. In both Precincts Nos. 15 and 17, there were discrepancies between the signatures of voters appearing in the voter's affidavits and the signatures appearing in the voting record; and members of the Boards of Election Inspectors falsified the voting records by making it appear that many or most of the registered voters had voted when in fact they had not.

The Special Board denied petitioner's objections and ordered the inclusion of the questioned returns from Precincts Nos. 15 and 17 in the canvass.

On appeal, the Comelec Second Division sustained the Special Board's action, dismissed petitioner's appeal and ordered the Special trial Board to proclaim the winning candidates. On 22 December 1988, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the decision of the Comelec Second Division Land denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence the instant Petition for Certiorari, filed on 23 December 1988, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoy proclamation of private respondent Amanoddin as elected Mayor of Bacolod Grande.

On 10 January 1989, the, Court. issued a Temporary Restraining Order requiring Comelec to cease and desist from proclaiming private respondents as the duly elected municipal officials of Bacolod Grande. It attorney out, however, that pursuant to the Comelec decision of 22 December 1988 and upon notice to petitioner, the Special Board had on 28 December 1988 already proclaimed private respondent Amanoddin and the, other private respondents as the elected Municipal Mayor and Councilors of Bacolod Grande.

The Court, acting on petitioner's Motion to Annul Proclamation and/or Suspend Effects of Proclamation and on the Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor's Urgent Request for Clarificatory Order, issued a Resolution on 2 February 1989 directing that, pending resolution on the merit of the instant Petition for Certiorari, private respondent Amanoddin, having been procIaimed Municipal Mayor on 28 December 1988, should be recognized as such Mayor and authorized to discharge the functions and duties of that office.

The central issue here posed is whether or not the questioned returns from Precincts Nos. 15 and 17 in the Municipality of Bacolod Grande, Province of Lanao del Sur, were "obviously manufactured" such that the propriety or legality of their inclusion in the canvass by the Special Board presented a pre-proclamation controversy to be resolved before proclamation of this writing candidates.

Both the Comelec Division and the Comelec En Banc, in sustaining the Special Board's action ordering the inclusion of the questioned returns in the recanvass, held that the assailed returns were not "obviously manufactured" such that petitioner's contentions had not generated a pre-proclamation controversy and that petitioner's proper recourse was rather the bringing of an election contest where his contentions in respect of the assailed returns could be properly ventilated and examined in detail.

1. We start by noting that the Comelec (both Second Division and the Commission En Banc) correctly emphasized that, under the regime of the Omnibus Election Code, pre-proclamation controversies are properly limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before such Board of Canvassers, and not the Board of Election Inspectors nor proceedings before such latter Board ¹ and that such challenges should relate to particular election returns to which petitioner should have made specific verbal objection subsequently confirmed in writing. ² In a pre-proclamation controversy it is axiomatic that the Comelec is not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel the Comelec to pierce the veil, so to speak, of election returns prima facie regular, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. By their nature, and given the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in summary proceedings. ³ The delicate policy equilibrium here involved was explained by the Court in the following terms in Alonto v. Commission on Elections: ⁴

[P]re-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible . . . [and that the Comelec and the courts should guard both against proclamation grabbing through tampered returns as well as against attempts to paralyze canvassing and proclamation in order to prolong hold-overs.

2. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code provides, in relevant part:

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The following shall be the proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in principle, the issues raised by petitioner do constitute issues properly raised in pre-proclamation controversies. That the assailed returns were "obviously manufactured" must, however, be evident from the face of the election returns themselves. In the case at bar, petitioner does not claim that the election returns from Precincts Nos. 15 and 17 had not been made or issued by the Board of Election Inspectors or that they had been manufactured by some unknown third party or parties; petitioner does not, in other words, claim that the returns themselves were not authentic. What petitioner in effect contends is that where election returns, though genuine or authentic in character, are reflective of fraudulent acts done before or carried out by the Board of Election Inspectors, the returns should be deemed as "obviously manufactured."

Petitioner's contention does not persuade. In Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, et al., ⁵ petitioner Ututalum (represented by the same counsel who, in the Petition at bar, represents petitioner) contended that the issues he had raised before the Comelec actually referred to "obviously manufactured returns", a subject matter proper for a pre-proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the Comelec. Petitioner Ututalum claimed that the questioned election returns had been based upon a List of Voters which was subsequently nullified by the Comelec "on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and that the Comelec then ordered a new registration of voters for the local elections of February 1988. In dismissing the Petition, the Court, said, through Mme. Justice Herrera

That the padding of the of Voters may constitute fraud or that the Board of Election) Inspectors may have fraudulently conspired in its preparation, would nut be a valid Basis for a pre-proclamation controversy either. For whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted, the proper course of action is an election protest.

Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper ground in an election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of the (electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and terrorism (GAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665). ⁶

3. In the case at bar, the Comelec Second Division held that the apparent alphabetical and chronological sequence in the voting was not necessarily proof of fraud that would justify the exclusion of the assailed returns. The Comelec Second Division explained

1. Mere alphabetical and chronological voting does not itself constitute sufficient evidence to establish fraud that would justify the setting aside of election returns. As counsel for appellant had occasion to assert in Lucman v. Dirripio SPC No. 87-190, October 15, 1987, "[I]t is unfair to conclude that alphabetical voting is indicative of fraud." and "[l]n some precise of Lanao, alphabetical voting is imposed to promote an orderIy election," We do not take such factual finding here. But the evidence is ambiguous and is susceptible of several interpretations. For this reason we are bound by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Rule 131, Sec. 5 (m) Rules of Court. ⁷

In the case of Lucman v. Dimaporo (SPC 87-190), petitioner Lucman raised before the Comelec the same issue here raised by petitioner Dipatuan. Counsel for candidate Dimaporo (again, the same counsel for petitioner Dipatuan) defended the same chronological and alphabetical voting in the following comments:

It is unfair to conclude that alphabetical voting in Lanao del Sur is indicative of fraud. There is evidence on record from the testimony of Lucman's own witness Elsa Sarip that alphabetical voting is an honest procedure adopted by some Boards of Election Inspectors in Lanao.

In some Precincts in Lanao del Sur, alphabetical voting is imposed to promote an orderly election. Usually in the morning the bulk of the voters gather in the precincts What the Board of Election Inspectors do is to call one by one the names of the voters in alphabetical order to avoid overcrowding in the precincts. This procedure finds corroboration in the very testimony of Lucman's witness Elsa Sarip. ⁸

Private respondents in the case at bar explained that Precincts Nos. 15 and 17 of Bacolod Grande, Lanao del Sur, were located in the poblacion. Early in the morning of election day, 1 February 1988, voters of the two (2) precincts converged on their respective polling places ready to cast their votes as soon as the precincts opened. In order to avoid trouble, since everyone wanted to vote ahead of the others, the Boards of Election inspectors of the two (2) precincts adopted voting by alphabetical order, calling out the names of voters in the same sequence listed in the List of Voters. ⁹

4. Petitioner's complaints about supposed irregularities involving illiterate voters appear to assume that it is improper or unlawful for a third person — e.g., the assistor who had helped the illiterate to cast his vote ¹⁰ — write the name of the assisted illiterate in the voting record. As the Comelec pointed out, however, the proper procedure for indicating that illiterate voters have cast their votes has not been specifically set out in the Omnibus Election Code:

2. The citation of signatures of alleged illiterate voters is not clear. For the procedure that the Board of Election Inspectors followed with respect to them is not established. The law itself is not too clear as to how it is to record the fact that an illiterate voter actually votes, i.e., to do so by thumbmarking the voting record, or to allow the assistor to sign the name of the illiterate voter. Sec. 196, B.P. Blg. 881. Again, the evidence is ambiguous and we are bound by law to presume regularity. In addition, it must be pointed out that the illiterate voters in the two questioned precincts are outnumbered by literate voters whose valid votes will be invalidated by the setting aside of the returns. The disenfranchisement of voters through the misdeeds of a few should be avoided. Grand Alliance for Democracy v. Commission on Elections, supra. ¹¹

5. Turning to the Affidavits relied upon by the petitioner Dipatuan, we need note only that they do not appear to be the direct and conclusive evidence required in Pimentel v. Comelec, ¹² considering that said Affidavits had been executed by affiants allegedly closely connected to petitioner and therefore expected to support his position, rather than by independent and impartial witnesses. In any case, as pointed out in the decision of the Comelec Second Division, to require the comparison of signatures and thumbmarks appearing in the voting records and the voter's list and voter's affidavits would necessitate, not a summary pre-proclamation proceeding, but a regular election protest. In so ruling, the Comelec correctly relied upon the ruling of this Court in Dianalan v. Comelec. ¹³

We must conclude that petitioner has not shown any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on part of the Comelec in rendering the decisions dated 8 November 1988 and 22 December 1988.

WHEREFORE, this Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Grand Alliance for Democracy v. Commission on Elections, 150 SCRA 665 (1987); Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, 153 SCRA 67 (1987).

2 Section 245, Omnibus Election Code; Pausing v. Yorac, et al., G.R. No. 82700, 4 August 1988; Endique v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 82020-21, 22 November 1988.

3 Section 246, Omnibus Election Code; Espaldon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 78987, 25 August 1987; Pasion v. Commission on Elections, 109 SCRA 238 (1981); Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 78994, 10 March 1988.

4 22 SCRA 878, 884-886 (1968).

5 G.R. Nos. 84843-44, 22 January 1990.

6 Id., at 9-10.

7 Rollo, p. 61; Emphasis supplied.

8 As quoted in the Comment of Private Respondents dated 9 February 1989 in G.R. No. 86117, p. 14; emphasis in the original.

9 Comment for Private Respondent, p. 14.

10 Section 196, Omnibus Election Code expressly provides for assistance to a voter who is illiterate or physically unable to prepare his ballot by himself, by a relative by affinity or consanguinity within the 4th civil degree, or by a person of his confidence belonging to the same household, or by a member of the Board of Election Inspectors.

11 Rollo, p. 62; emphasis supplied.

12 140 SCRA 126 (1987).

13 G.R. No. 79712, 12 November 1987.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159369 March 3, 2004

NANCY SORIANO BANDALA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NEW BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR OROQUIETA CITY and ALEJANDRO G. BERENGUEL, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Election cases involve not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to whom shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift.¹

Thus, election cases are imbued with public interest. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.²

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution³ dated August 14, 2003 rendered by the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPC No. 01-277, entitled "Alejandro G. Berenguel, Candidate for City Mayor, Oroquieta City vs. Board of Canvassers, Oroquieta City and Nancy Soriano Bandala, Candidate for City Mayor, Oroquieta City."

The antecedents of the present petition are as follows:

Nancy Soriano Bandala, herein petitioner, and Alejandro G. Berenguel, herein respondent, were mayoralty candidates in Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental during the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.

During the canvass of the election returns conducted by the City Board of Canvassers of Oroquieta City, respondent objected to the inclusion of eighty (80) election returns on the following grounds: (1) that seventy-one (71) election returns were not secured with inner paper seals; (2) that seven (7) election returns do not indicate the party affiliation of the watchers-signatories; and (3) that two (2) election returns have missing pages which contain the list of the local city candidates.

In an Omnibus Ruling dated May 19, 2001, the City Board of Canvassers overturned the objection of respondent and included in its canvass the contested election returns.

On June 30, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Oroquieta City.

Upon appeal, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued a Resolution dated September 5, 2002 affirming the Omnibus Ruling of the City Board of Canvassers, holding that:

Lack of inner seal of an election return does not necessarily mean that the same is spurious and/or was tampered with. Such tampering, or its being spurious must appear on the face of the election return itself. It is the ministerial function of the board of canvassers to count the results as they appear in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities. [Cf. Balindong vs. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 567]

In the canvassing of election returns, the Board of Canvassers, which is an ad hoc body, need not look beyond or behind the returns or do an act which would necessitate the piercing of the returns and the presentation of evidence aliunde. [Cf. Usman vs. Commission on Elections, 42 SCRA 667]

Significantly, we observe that what the petitioner has presented were just affidavits mostly executed by his supporters, the nature of which has been ruled by the Supreme Court as self-serving. [Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 627] We cannot just rely on this kind of evidence because what is at stake is the paramount interest of the electorate.

Finally, our General Instructions for the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) [COMELEC Resolution No. 3742] does not require the indication by the poll watchers of their respective political party/candidate being represented. What the rule instructs is this:

"SEC. 45. Preparation of election returns and tally board. – The boards shall prepare in their own handwriting the election returns and tally board simultaneously with the counting of votes in their respective polling places. The election returns shall be prepared in seven (7) copies. x x x

After all the ballots have been read:

a) x x x

d) The watchers if any, shall affix their signatures and imprint their thumb marks on the right hand portion of the election returns and the tally board; and

x x x"

Clearly, nothing in the afore-quoted rule requires the poll watcher to indicate the party/candidate he represents.⁴

Respondent then filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion for reconsideration.

On August 14, 2003, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution reversing and setting aside the Second Division's Resolution. The dispositive portion of which reads:

"ACCORDINGLY, the Commission en banc hereby renders judgment to:

1. EXCLUDE the one hundred one (101) election returns found without the inner paper seals enumerated in the Canvassing Report of the City Board of Canvassers of Oroquieta City dated 24 May 2001, from the canvass;

2. NULLIFY the proclamation of Oppositor Nancy Soriano Bandala made on 30 June 2001;

3. CONSTITUTE a New City Board of Canvassers for Oroquieta City composed of Atty. Nelia Aureus as Chairman; Atty. Allen Francis Abaya as Vice-Chairman; and, Atty. Norina Tangaro as member-Secretary;

4. DIRECT the City Election Officer of Oroquieta City to BRING to the Commission at Manila all the election returns and other election documents subject of and pertaining to the canvass made by the Board and TURN-OVER the same under receipt to the New City Board of Canvassers for Oroquieta City; and,

5. DIRECT the New City Board of Canvassers for Oroquieta City to CONVENE with notice to the parties, upon finality of this Resolution, CANVASS the election returns and, thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Mayor of Oroquieta City.

6. The aforenamed BEIs, with the exception of the BEI of Precinct No. 134A of Barangay Dolipos Alto, composed of Catalina J. Bajade as Chairman, Emma J. Aganos as Poll Clerk, and Rosenda P. Baloncio as Third Member and the Chairperson, Margie B. Lamparas of the BEI of Precinct No. 145A1 of Barangay Upper Lamac, are recommended to be charged administratively before the Department of Education.

7. Atty. Francisco G. Pobe is hereby suspended from Office with forfeiture of salary from the promulgation of this resolution until after the lections of 10 May 2004 with stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

8. The Law Department, this Commission, is hereby DIRECTED to file the appertaining information for violation of Section Z (15) and (21), and Section 212, both of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) against these BEIs and Mr. Filoteo C. Alngohuro, Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Oroquieta City, there being strong prima facie case against them.

SO ORDERED."

Hence, this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On August 27, 2003, we issued a status quo ante order.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion (1) in excluding 101 election returns based on a formal defect of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns; and (2) in nullifying her proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor of Oroquieta City.

The petition is impressed with merit.

I

May the ground of lack of inner paper seals in the election returns be considered a proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy?

There is a need to emphasize the definition of a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

"SEC. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns."

The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are enumerated in Section 243 of the same Code, thus:

"SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates."

There being no inner paper seals pasted on 101 election returns coming from numerous polling precincts, the COMELEC en banc then concluded that the election returns in question appear to be obviously falsified and/or manufactured, the results of which certainly affected the standing of respondent. According to the COMELEC en banc, this is an issue (under Sec. 243 (b) in the enumeration) that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.

The lack of inner paper seals in the election returns does not justify their exclusion from the canvassing. Indeed, it is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.

In the Matter of the Petition to Exclude Election Returns contained in Nine (9) Ballot Boxes, Amelita S. Navarro vs. Commission on Election,⁵ we held:

"While the aforesaid grounds (lack of inner and outer paper seals and lack of signatures of watchers, among others) may, indeed, involve a violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing. The grounds for objection to the election returns made by petitioners are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious."

Likewise, in Baterina vs. COMELEC,⁶ we ruled:

"The grounds raised by petitioners for the exclusion of the election returns from the canvassing, as stated in their 'Appeal Memorandum' before the COMELEC x x x refer to the failure to close the entries with the signatures of the election inspectors; lack of inner and out papers seals; canvassing by the BOARD of copies not intended for it; lack of time and date of petitioners' watchers; and lack of authority of person receiving the election returns.

"While the aforesaid grounds may, indeed, involve a violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from canvassing. The grounds for objection to the election returns made by petitioners are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious. x x x. On the basis of formal defects alone, such palpable irregularity cannot be said to have been established herein."

II

May the COMELEC look beyond the election returns and receive evidence aliunde in a pre-proclamation controversy?

Assuming that the ground of lack of inner paper seals in election returns is a proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC cannot investigate and receive evidence to determine why those inner paper seals are missing.

A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face and the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate the alleged election irregularities.⁷

In Matalam vs. Commission on Elections,⁸ we stressed that "in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities."

Thus, the COMELEC acted beyond its jurisdiction when it directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Misamis Occidental to investigate and receive evidence "to determine once and for all the mystery behind the missing inner paper seal of the subject election returns" or the failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) to paste the inner seals of the election returns.

III

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse in discretion in nullifying the proclamation of petitioner as mayor of Oroquieta City?

In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc held that the City Board of Canvassers acted without authority when it arbitrarily proclaimed petitioner herein as the duly elected mayor of Oroquieta City, in gross violation of Section 20 (i) of Republic Act 7166 which reads:

"Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. -

x x x

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election."

Suffice it to state that the above provision applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy, not where, as in the present case, it raises or deals with no such controversy.⁹ It bears reiterating that the lack of inner paper seals in the election returns is not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy. Respondent's recourse should have been to file an election protest. Where a party raises issues, the resolution of which would compel the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear prima facie regular on their face, his proper remedy is an election protest. In this proceeding, the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues raised by them in as much detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.¹⁰

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the COMELEC en banc in SPC No. 01-277 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the COMELEC Second Division is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

¹ Sanchez vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78461, August 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 76, citing Vda. De Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 (1966).

² See Malabaguio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 142507, December 1, 2000, 346 SCRA 699, 712, citing Alberto vs. Comelec, 311 SCRA 215 (1999).

³ Annex "A", Petition for Certiorari, Rollo at 30-44.

⁴ Id. at 62-63.

⁵ G.R. No. 150799, February 3, 2003, citing Baterina vs. Commission on Elections, 205 SCRA 1 (1992).

⁶ G.R. Nos. 95347-49, January 6, 1992, 205 SCRA 1.

⁷ In the Matter of the Petition to Exclude Election Returns contained in Nine (9) Ballot Boxes, Amelita S. Navarro vs. Commission on Election, ibid.

⁸ G.R. No. 123230, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 733, 745.

⁹ In the Matter of the Petition to Exclude Election Returns contained in Nine (9) Ballot Boxes, Amelita S. Navarro vs. Commission on Election, ibid.

¹⁰ Matalam vs. Commission on Elections, ibid. at 747, citing Dimaporo vs. Comelec, 186 SCRA 769 (1990).