ADMINISTRATIVE and ELECTION LAW blog

Sunday, January 22, 2012

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition¹ for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335,² otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations³ (IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.

The Facts

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005.

In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima⁴ (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:

RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.⁵

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR was published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard, and became effective fifteen (15) days later.⁶

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President, Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In its petition, BOCEA made the following averments:

Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance Contracts⁷ (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently provided:

x x x x

WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.

x x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree and so agreed to perform the following:

x x x x

2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further accepts/commits to meet the said target under the following conditions:

a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and

b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31, 2008.

x x x x⁸

BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The majority of them, however, did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.

In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of Formal Entry Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during command conferences to make them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy Commissioner Umali) individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said personnel were threatened that if they do not sign their respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating status. Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance Contracts.

BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan approached Deputy Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter merely said that he would look into the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel wrote the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist from implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-and-file employees of the BOC and BIR to sign Performance Contracts.⁹ In his letter-reply¹⁰ dated February 12, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He also defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law. Finally, Pagulayan and BOCEA’s counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of the Performance Contract from Deputy Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy.¹¹

This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.

In their Comment,¹² respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.

In its Reply,¹³ BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are unreasonable to achieve its stated objectives; that the law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon their shoulders when the Government itself has adopted measures that make collection difficult such as reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and tax exemption of big businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC employees. BOCEA manifested that only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact that they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue. Moreover, despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests,¹⁴ BOC continually refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on how such reward was distributed.

Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion to Consolidate¹⁵ the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However, pending action on said motion, the Court rendered its decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the consolidation of this case with Abakada was rendered no longer possible.¹⁶

In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, declared Section 12¹⁷ of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13¹⁸ of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.¹⁹

Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our Resolution²⁰ dated February 10, 2009, requiring them to submit their respective Memoranda.

The Issues

BOCEA raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;]

III.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]

V.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A PARTICULAR GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL.²¹

BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its petition, events unfolded showing the patent unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No. 9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue target of P196 billion which they surpassed by as much as P2 billion for that year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made advance tax payments to BOC. Moreover, BOC employees were given their "reward" for surpassing said target only in 2008, the distribution of which they described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the hard task of collecting, received a mere pittance of around P8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target but the higher management gave out to the employees a measly sum of P8,500.00 while the top level officials partook of millions of the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information revealed by a newspaper showing the list of BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward.²² It claims that the recipients thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a dentist, who performed no collection functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection, distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the failure of R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines.²³

In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting five BOC officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied with the provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these officials for attrition without proper investigation was nothing less than arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’ promulgation of issuances and the Government’s accession to regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of the tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse, subjected them to attrition.²⁴

BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following grounds:

1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process because the termination of employees who had not attained their revenue targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with the requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision negates the remedies available to an employee as provided under the CSC rules.

2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to equal protection of the law because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of other revenue generating government agencies like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, Department of Transportation and Communication, the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to attrition.

3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to security of tenure because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure afforded to government employees. The law likewise created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of revenue collection target, which is not provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.

4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the manner of allocating targets, the distribution of rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of collection, which is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.

5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official functions of a public officer.²⁵

On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the classification of BIR and BOC employees as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and substantial distinction since the revenue generated by the BIR and BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State, while the revenue produced by other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their governmental functions; that in view of their mandate, and for purposes of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335 complies with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests for the permissive delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the Board exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy laid down in the law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in order that the Board may identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains that there was no encroachment of judicial power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of attainder since R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process, actually serves as a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the possible consequences of failing to meet the same. More, there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the unfavorable decision of dismissal.²⁶

In essence, the issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;

2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process; and

3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.²⁷

However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.

It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being challenged. The Court already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which attained finality on September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this case.

We resolve the first issue in the negative.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.²⁸ Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.²⁹ However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,³⁰ one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.

The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,³¹ to wit:

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.³²

Thus, in Abakada, we held,

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets."

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:

"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection [Over] the Revenue Targets		Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below	—	15%
More than 30%	—	15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.

x x x x x x x x x"

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

x x x x x x x x x"

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.³³

We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 5³⁴ of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that "[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a)³⁵ of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board.

Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.³⁶1awphil

Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;

(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and

(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

x x x x x x x x x"

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:

(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;

(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;

(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;

(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;

(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

x x x x x x x x x"

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.³⁷

As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the security of tenure of affected BIR and BOC officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:

Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.³⁸

In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.³⁹ BOCEA’s apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.⁴⁰ The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors⁴¹ that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner, exemptions⁴² were set, contravening BOCEA’s claim that its members may be removed for unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of him.⁴³ In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.

We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court proceeds to resolve the last, but new issue raised by BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22,⁴⁴ Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.⁴⁵1avvphi1

In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,⁴⁶ Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the roots of a Bill of Attainder, to wit:

Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at times enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. x x x⁴⁷

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.

A final note.

We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution and receipt of rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular and in the government in general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not actually pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, but rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate these pernicious acts of graft and corruption.⁴⁸ As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language thereof.⁴⁹ Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.⁵⁰ We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	(On official leave) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.^* Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice	ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice	LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice	ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice	JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice	BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

^* On official leave.

¹ Rollo, pp. 3-58.

² Entitled "An Act to Improve the Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Through the Creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and of a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board and for Other Purposes."

³ Entitled "Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 9335, otherwise known as the ‘Attrition Act of 2005.’"

⁴ G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.

⁵ Id. at 267-268, citing Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 12 of R.A. No. 9335.

⁶ Id. at 281, 299.

⁷ Rollo, pp. 90-93.

⁸ Id. at 91-92. Emphasis supplied.

⁹ Id. at 97-102.

¹⁰ Id. at 103-104.

¹¹ Id. at 105 and 106.

¹² Id. at 139-160.

¹³ Id. at 163-180.

¹⁴ Id. at 182-185.

¹⁵ Id. at 135-138.

¹⁶ Id. at 197-198.

¹⁷ Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. — There is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.

¹⁸ Section 13 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.

¹⁹ Supra note 4 at 294-299.

²⁰ Rollo, pp. 360-361.

²¹ Id. at 499-500.

²² Rollo, pp. 432-436, 435. The CHIP-IN Bulletin in its July 2008 issue named the recipients of rewards, the top five of which were:

1. Napoleon L. Morales Commissioner/OCOM P 5,293,000.00;

2. Suansing, Jr., Horacio P. District Collector P 1,011,000.00;

3. Dir. Reynaldo V. Umali Acting Director P 908,000.00;

4. Bernardo V. Sales Officer-in-Charge, IAG P 908,000.00;

5. Atty. Reynaldo S. Nicolas Deputy Commissioner/AOCG P 908,000.00.

²³ Id. at 491-495.

²⁴ Id. 495-499.

²⁵ Id. at 505-543.

²⁶ Id. at 448-471.

²⁷ See Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308, 317.

²⁸ See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936).

²⁹ Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 115-116.

³⁰ The recognized exceptions to this principle are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, id. at 117; Santiago v. Comelec, 336 Phil. 848, 897-898 (1997), citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law 87 (1996).

³¹ G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696.

³² Id. at 719-720.

³³ Supra note 4 at 277-281. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.

³⁴ Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 5. Incentives to District Collection Offices. – In the event that the BIR or the BOC fails to meet its revenue target by less than ten percent (10%), the revenue districts, in the case of the BIR, or the collection districts, in the case of the BOC, which exceed their respective allocations of the revenue target (allocated target), shall be entitled to rewards and incentives (district incentive) amounting to ten percent (10%) of the excess over its allocated target: Provided, however, That any BIR revenue district or BOC collection office which deliberately foregoes any revenue collection in a given year as part of a scheme to avoid a higher allocated target for the subsequent year shall not be entitled to a district incentive in such subsequent year notwithstanding its having exceeded its allocated target: Provided further, That the allocated target of any such district shall have been reported to and validated by the DBCC as required in the immediately preceding section.

The district reward shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released in the same fiscal year.

The allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

³⁵ Sec. 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund due to the agency as provided for in Sections 4 and 5 of this Act: Provided, That the rewards under this Act may also take the form of non-monetary benefits;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

³⁶ Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 167.

³⁷ Supra note 4 at 275-277. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.

³⁸ Id. at 280-281. Citations omitted and underscoring supplied.

³⁹ Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 158000, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 701, 717, citing National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission (4th Division), G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 348, 354 and NFD International Manning Agents v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116629, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 239, 246.

⁴⁰ Supra note 33.

⁴¹ Section 19 of the IRR provides:

SEC. 19. Relevant Factors Affecting Collection. – For purposes of Section 7(a) of the Act and Section 18 of this Rule, the Board shall consider the following, among others, as relevant factors affecting the level of collection: Provided, That these factors were not taken into account in setting BESF targets:

(a) Enactment of a law that repeals revenue measures, reduces tax and tariff rates, grants tax exemptions, or otherwise results in the diminution of the tax base or of taxable transactions and activities, including the entry into force of a treaty or an international agreement that the Philippines entered into resulting in preferential treatment for certain taxpayers or transactions: Provided, That the Board shall have the final authority to determine the affected District or Districts as well as the amount of revenues deemed foregone due to such enactment or entry into force;

(b) Reduction by the President of tariff rates under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines; and

(c) Exercise by the President of the power to open or close any port of entry under Section 702 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

⁴² Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x x

(1) Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and

(2) Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board. (Emphasis supplied.)

⁴³ Section 9 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 9. Right to Appeal. — An official or employee whose employment is terminated by virtue of the decision of the Board may appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Office of the President (OP), whichever is applicable, in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.

Moreover, Section 20 of the IRR pertinently provides:

SEC. 20. Right to Appeal. An official or employee whose employment is terminated by virtue of the decision of the Board may appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Office of the President (OP), as the case may be, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the Board.

For officials who are Presidential appointees, appeal may be filed with the Office of the President. All other officials and employees may appeal with the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, however, the decision of the Board shall be immediately executory.

Provided, however, that officials and employees affected by the decision may initially file a motion for reconsideration with the Board within [fifteen] (15) days from receipt of such decision.

Decisions of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no motion or appeal has been filed.

⁴⁴ Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

⁴⁵ Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648, 659.

⁴⁶ No. L-70484, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 613.

⁴⁷ Id. at 625. Emphasis supplied.

⁴⁸ Section 8 of R.A. No. 9335 provides:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. — The officials, examiners, and employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

⁴⁹ Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 450, 481.

⁵⁰ Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. Nos. 152895 & 153151, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136, 142, citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 263 (1999).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

While I concur with the rest of the Court in dismissing this Rule 65 Petition, I wish to highlight a very important species of argument that petitioner, could have, but was unable, to develop as a viable ground for granting this Petition. I refer to the contradiction that government has created — by fostering low-tariff regimes which in turn has created a low customs revenue base, while at the same time increasing customs revenue collection targets that has been rendered unattainable because of the low revenue base. I highlight this contradiction only because it shows how terribly askew certain government actions might have gone, and how the state of ship can possibly start to set aright.

A fundamental requirement for the constitutionality of a statute is for it to pass the test of reasonableness. Applied to this Petition, the question being asked in effect by petitioner is this: Is Republic Act No. 9335 (R.A. 9335) constitutionally reasonable, considering that the Government has been embarking on low-tariff regimes embodied in various regional and bilateral trade agreements, as well as in unilateral tariff-reduction programs?

The argument of reasonableness is not, strictly speaking of the means-versus-ends kind. Rather, it is akin to the requirement of reasonableness imposed by Article 1186 of the Civil Code, which reads: "The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfilment." This article accomplishes two things in civil cases: (1) it punishes the obligee by deeming the condition fulfilled despite non-compliance by the obligor because the obligee voluntarily prevented compliance with the condition; and (2) it lifts the burden from the shoulders of the obligor by not requiring the latter to fulfill a condition which, even though not inherently impossible, cam no longer be fulfilled because of a voluntary act of the obligee. If we transpose these effects to this Petition, in the case of customs revenue collections, the State who is the obligee, is denied by law the right to exact compliance with the revenue targets from the customs employees who are the obligors, because the State prevented the increase in customs revenue collections, by lowering the revenue base which consists of the customs duties from which such collection increases could have been sourced.

There is one inherent difficulty in this argument, however. While attacks on constitutionality can be more easily launched against statutes that contain material internal inconsistencies, the inconsistency in this instance is between, on the one hand, certain sections of R.A. 9335¹ and the corresponding implementing rules and regulations² and, on the other, a series of executive orders lowering the tariffs on an array of imported goods. As it is, it would be quite difficult to satisfy the level of proof required to demonstrate how presidential actions have resulted in the lowering of customs duties as to materially affect the ability of petitioner to comply with collection targets and as to endanger its members’ security of tenure.

Regardless of the difficulty of demonstrating the lowering of tariffs and its impact on customs revenue collections, it must ultimately be performed by the government for several important reasons.

First, although Petitioner was not able to adduce sufficient proof for the magnitude of the impact of lowered tariff rates on customs collections, it can be readily seen, nonetheless, how it would be intuitively wrong and unfair to petitioner for the Government to embark on a policy of lowering tariff duties while increasing customs collection targets, and then to penalize failure to meet those targets without first estimating the negative revenue impact of the lowered tariff duties.

Second, it must be done simply because the revenue and expenditures estimates of Government must, to the extent possible, be fact-based and scientifically done. Otherwise, the important constitutional goals of the economy under Article XII, Section 1, cannot be satisfied. These economic goals largely depend on a supportive, not a destructive, revenue-raising program — part of which includes customs duties.

A final observation. Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

For the longest time, Congress has not made its voice heard on this matter and has simply allowed the President to determine tariff rates by one executive order after another. From the above language, it would seem that delegated presidential tariff rate setting powers has been designed to be exercised only as an exception, and not as the norm. Congress must revisit this constitutional provision and weigh the question of whether it has wrongly and excessively defaulted on the exercise of this constitutional duty to set tariffs in favor of the President.³

I vote to deny the Petition. I would also suggest that the Clerk of Court furnish a copy of the Decision to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Let a copy of this Concurring Opinion also be served to the said officials.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

¹ SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliances with substantive and procedural due process. Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

x x x

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to non-performance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities, force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executor: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; x x x (R.A. 9335)

² SECTION 25. Powers and Functions. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of the Act;

x x x

(e) To perform such other functions as are necessary or incidental to its mandated functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations, circulars, memoranda, interpretations and rulings and coordinate with each other and provide support, whenever necessary, for the proper conducts of its functions; x x x (Implementing Rules and Regulations)

³ A profound discourse on the subject matter can be seen in the article of Former Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, "Deconstruction of Constitutional Limitations and the Tariff Regime of the Philippines: The Strange Persistence of a Martial Law Syndrome," 84 Phil. L.J. 311 (2009).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Confronting us is an undesignated petition¹ filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,² Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),³ specifically:

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively;

(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of every member thereof;

(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and

(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal.

Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the "appointment of additional personnel."

Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC⁴ which peripherally declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as directed in our Resolution dated April 6, 2010, filed a Comment⁵ thereon. At the outset, the OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in its preparation x x x is a violation of the well known rules of practice and pleading in this jurisdiction."

In all, the OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court:

I

WHETHER x x x PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION.

II

WHETHER x x x THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III

WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AS MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.⁶

In his Reply,⁷ petitioner maintains that:

1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental importance of the issues raised therein;

2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and

3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

We winnow the meanderings of petitioner into the singular issue of whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

But first, we dispose of the procedural issue of whether petitioner has standing to file the present petition.

The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy;

2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.⁸

On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.⁹ The dust has long settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr:¹⁰ "whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions."¹¹ Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the complainant is not clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.

Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo¹² illuminate:

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a" citizen" or "taxpayer."

x x x x

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

x x x x

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a generalized interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues. Paragraph 2 of the petition reads:

2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioner’s humble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the legal standing to file this petition.

But even if his submission is valid, petitioner’s standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,¹³ because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above, requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.¹⁴ Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution.

Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.

Prior to petitioner’s appearance as counsel for then protestee Macapagal-Arroyo, we had occasion to affirm the grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the auspicious case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections.¹⁵ Thus -

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more categorical:

The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed.¹⁶

Similarly, in her separate opinion, Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez declared:

G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the majority opinion that these petitions should be dismissed outright for prematurity. The Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to entertain said petitions.

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.¹⁷

Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),¹⁸ cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections¹⁹ is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.

Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his contention that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. And although he concedes that the Supreme Court may promulgate its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution of the PET is unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it allows the Court to appoint additional personnel for the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision.

Petitioner’s pastiche arguments are all hurled at the Court, hopeful that at least one might possibly stick. But these arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed to promulgate. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very restrictive. Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioner’s opinion, we are guided by well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration²⁰ instructs:

As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution.²¹ In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied.²² Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.

Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:²³

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

We had earlier expounded on this rule of construction in Chiongbian v. De Leon, et al., ²⁴ to wit:

[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.

On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view – one which really does not offer a solution.

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Before we resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of judicial power mapped out in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.

We recall the unprecedented and trailblazing case of Marcos v. Manglapus:²⁵

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government."

The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable.

The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article on the executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission. On the exercise of this Court’s judicial power as sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential election contests, and to promulgate its rules for this purpose, we find the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission most instructive:

MR. DAVIDE. On line 25, after the words "Vice-President," I propose to add AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This refers to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. This is also to confer on the Supreme Court exclusive authority to enact the necessary rules while acting as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.

MR. REGALADO. My personal position is that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court with respect to its internal procedure is already implicit under the Article on the Judiciary; considering, however, that according to the Commissioner, the purpose of this is to indicate the sole power of the Supreme Court without intervention by the legislature in the promulgation of its rules on this particular point, I think I will personally recommend its acceptance to the Committee.²⁶

x x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x.

With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the Committee has also created an Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a Commission on Appointments which may cover membership from both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee report does not indicate which body should promulgate the rules that shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies?

MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and promulgate its rules because it is a body distinct and independent already from the House, and so with the Commission on Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own rules.²⁷

On another point of discussion relative to the grant of judicial power, but equally cogent, we listen to former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?

MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.

MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.

MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions.

MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.²⁸

Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court, Justice Florenz D. Regalado²⁹ and Fr. Joaquin Bernas³⁰ both opined:

MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President.

I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. On page 2, the fourth paragraph of Section 4 provides:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.

May I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of determining the outcome of the contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President is purely a political matter and, therefore, should not be left entirely to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted provision not impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the judicial departments of the government?

MR. REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that would be a problem. This is a new provision incidentally. It was not in the 1935 Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution.

MR. VILLACORTA. That is right.

MR. REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding.

MR. VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes Republic Act 7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?

FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by their nature, judicial. Therefore, they are cognizable only by courts. If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on an electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as composed, that cannot be given jurisdiction over contests.

So, the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The Gentleman will remember that in that election, Lopez was declared winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because there was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and the answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions."

Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between two presidential candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.³¹

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.³²

Consequently, we find it imperative to trace the historical antecedents of the PET.

Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections – from the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.

The omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by the absence of a similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of the United States. Rather, the creation of such tribunal was left to the determination of the National Assembly. The journal of the 1935 Constitutional Convention is crystal clear on this point:

Delegate Saguin. – For an information. It seems that this Constitution does not contain any provision with respect to the entity or body which will look into the protests for the positions of the President and Vice-President.

President Recto. – Neither does the American constitution contain a provision over the subject.

Delegate Saguin. – But then, who will decide these protests?

President Recto. – I suppose that the National Assembly will decide on that.³³

To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were tasked to sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended to retired Supreme Court Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill, absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members.

The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding presidential and vice-presidential contests and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon courts of justice, including the issuance of subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance, production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish contemptuous acts and bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and employees necessary for the efficient performance of its functions.

R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary government.

With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, while the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.

In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually, the Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed anew.

These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were divided equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang Pambansa.

Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or accomplishing of election returns.

The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was empowered to appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the subordinate officers were strictly employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were merely designated to the tribunal.

After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon Aquino as President, civil liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed.

With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature:

FR. BERNAS. x x x.

x x x. So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.³⁴

Clearly, petitioner’s bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His arguments that: (1) the Chief Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and "Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal; (3) the Chairman is authorized to appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further attention by the Court.

Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. The following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission should provide enlightenment:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein it is provided, and I quote:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.

Are we not giving enormous work to the Supreme Court especially when it is directed to sit en banc as the sole judge of all presidential and vice-presidential election contests?

MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner Concepcion.

MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme Court was able to dispose of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how the present Supreme Court would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who else would hear the election protests.

MR. SUAREZ. We are asking this question because between lines 23 to 25, there are no rules provided for the hearings and there is not time limit or duration for the election contest to be decided by the Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the historical background that when R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21, 1957, at least three famous election contests were presented and two of them ended up in withdrawal by the protestants out of sheer frustration because of the delay in the resolution of the cases. I am referring to the electoral protest that was lodged by former President Carlos P. Garcia against our "kabalen" former President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the vice-presidential election contest filed by the late Senator Gerardo Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in 1965.

MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in mind. But when that protest of Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the results were already available. Senator Roxas did not want to have a decision adverse to him. The votes were being counted already, and he did not get what he expected so rather than have a decision adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case.

x x x x

MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme Court this matter of resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests?

MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?

MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.

MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.

MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions.

MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this contest for President is dependent upon they key number of teams of revisors. I have no experience insofar as contests in other offices are concerned.

MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme Court is mandated to sit en banc?

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. SUAREZ. I see.

MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before teams of three, generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the "protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams are organized. Of course, that can be expensive, but it would be expensive whatever court one would choose. There were times that the Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the objections, the kind of problems, and the court would only go over the objected votes on which the parties could not agree. So it is not as awesome as it would appear insofar as the Court is concerned. What is awesome is the cost of the revision of the ballots because each party would have to appoint one representative for every team, and that may take quite a big amount.

MR. SUAREZ. If we draw from the Commissioner’s experience which he is sharing with us, what would be the reasonable period for the election contest to be decided?

MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Supreme Court always manages to dispose of the case in one year.

MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.³⁵

Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.³⁶ We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),³⁷ which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.³⁸

Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but not separate therefrom.

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?

x x x x

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.³⁹

The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna⁴⁰ and Regalado E. Maambong⁴¹ is schooled by our holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:⁴²

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:

"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines."

has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes case for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others.

Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts and, appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC⁴³ involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."

The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" ⁴⁴ is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."⁴⁵ The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.

At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial – exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review – via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.⁴⁶

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,⁴⁷ Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,⁴⁸ the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland⁴⁹ proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.

One final note. Although this Court has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate a word of caution against the filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Court’s docket. The petition in the instant case belongs to that classification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice	DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice	(On Official Leave) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO^* Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice	MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice	JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice
Associate Justice	Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

^* On official leave.

¹ Rollo, pp. 3-9.

² Paragraph 7.

³ On May 4, 2010, the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2010 PET Rules) took effect.

⁴ 465 Phil. 800, 810 (2004).

⁵ Rollo, pp. 12-38.

⁶ Id. at 15-16.

⁷ Id. at 42-58.

⁸ Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 257.

⁹ Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 456.

¹⁰ 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

¹¹ Gov. Mandanas v. Hon. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806 (2004).

¹² G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 216-221. (Citations omitted.)

¹³ Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005, 454 SCRA 142.

¹⁴ Cruz, Philippine Politcal Law, 1998 ed., p. 263.

¹⁵ G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, and 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277, 324-325. (Emphasis supplied.)

¹⁶ Id. at 363.

¹⁷ Id. at 431-432.

¹⁸ Atty. Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586 (2003).

¹⁹ Supra at note 15.

²⁰ No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 423.

²¹ McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (Wheat.), 1819.

²² In the Philippine context, see Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.

²³ Id. at 330-331.

²⁴ 82 Phil. 771, 775 (1949).

²⁵ G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668, 688-689. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

²⁶ Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 433. (Emphasis supplied.)

²⁷ Id. at 87-88. (Emphasis supplied.)

²⁸ Id. at 420-421. (Emphasis supplied.)

²⁹ Supreme Court.

³⁰ A Roman Catholic Priest of the Jesuit Order.

³¹ Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 407-408. (Emphasis supplied.)

³² See Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13, 1996, 253 SCRA 559; Tecson v. COMELEC, supra at note 15.

³³ Constitutional Convention Record, Vol. X, pp. 471-472.

³⁴ Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 408.

³⁵ Id. at 420-421. (Emphasis supplied.)

³⁶ McCulloch v. State of Maryland, supra note 21.

³⁷ CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17.

³⁸ Sen. Defensor-Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 294 (1998), citing Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390 (1988); Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 780.

³⁹ Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 111-112. (Emphasis supplied.)

⁴⁰ Supreme Court.

⁴¹ Court of Appeals.

⁴² No. L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756, 762-765. (Emphasis supplied.)

⁴³ Supra note 4.

⁴⁴ Javellana v. Executive Secretary, et al., 151-A Phil. 36, 131 (1973).

⁴⁵ CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, second paragraph.

⁴⁶ See Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 38; Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, supra note 38.

⁴⁷ 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

⁴⁸ See Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659, 665; Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051 (1957); Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924).

⁴⁹ Supra note 21.