Lonzanida vs COMELEC and MULI G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999

Lonzanida vs COMELEC and MULI  G.R. No. 135150.  July 28, 1999

FACTS:

Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner.  He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof.  His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections.

On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio.  On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.  On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

ISSUES:

1)Whether or not Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time?

2)Whether or not the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections?

RULING:

ON THE FIRST ISSUE.

            This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:  

1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and;

2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 

It stated:

“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”

“The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent… After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void… It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all^[5] and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest…”

“Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.  The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.”

ON THE SECOND ISSUE:

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6.  Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.  If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

“This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered.  The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.”

“…In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- ‘Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.  The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.  It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation.  Since private respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.’”

“It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected.  From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.  Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.”

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted.

QUERY:

WHEN CAN AN ELECTED OFFICIAL BE DEEMED TO HAVE FULLY SERVED THE THREE TERM LIMIT? 

ANS:

1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and;

2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms.

“…the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”

MERCADO versus MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)

Dual citizenship vs. Dual allegiance case

MERCADO versus MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)

Facts:

Respondent Eduardo Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati City in the May 1998 elections.

However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by COMELEC on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held:

Yes. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Makati. The COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. 

According to Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance; as such dual allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Disqualification case on the ground of “fugitive from justice”

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Facts:

Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification.

The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.

Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”.

Held:

No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

MELITON C. GERONIMO, petitioner, vs. JULIAN PENDRE, AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Permanent Vacancy in the Office of the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor Rule

G.R. No. L-60591 May 14, 1985

MELITON C. GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN PENDRE, AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Facts:

On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turncoatism.

After hearing the petition, the COMELEC on January 19. 1980 issued Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Meliton C Geronimo. On January 22, 1980, Geronimo filed a motion to reconsider the said resolution, and on January 28, 1980 or two days before the elections, he filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to restrain the COMELEC from implementing its resolution. Or. the same day, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against the COMELEC.

In the elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo obtained a margin of 325 votes when he garnered 2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera's 2,370 votes. On March 11, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the proclamation made earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for mayor but the proclamation was declared temporary subject to the decision of this Court on the petition for certiorari filed by Geronimo.

On September 26, 1981, this Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 52413, entitled "Meliton C. Geronimo v. Commission on Elections and Julian C. Pendre", dismissing the petition for certiorari and ordering the lifting of the restraining order of January 28, 1980. We ruled that Geronimo was disqualified to run as a candidate for mayor for being a political turncoat. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied with finality on January 19, 1982.

On February 15, 1982, the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution No. 82-428 which set aside the temporary proclamation of Geronimo "it appearing that the disqualification of said respondent Geronimo had been finally decided by the Supreme Court ..." and which further provided for the following:

1. To declare the certificate of candidacy of Meliton C. Geronimo for the position of Mayor in the January 30, 1980 elections null and void from the beginning;

2. To declare all votes cast for Meliton C. Geronimo for Mayor in the January 30, 1980 elections as "STRAY" votes;

3. To proclaim Bayani A. Ferrera, who garnered 2,370 votes, as the duly elected Mayor of Baras, Rizal in the January 30, 1980 elections:

4. To direct Meliton C. Geronimo to turn over to Bayani A. Ferrera the position and office of Municipal Mayor of Baras, Rizal.

The petitioner maintains that the COMELEC exceeded its power and jurisdiction when it proclaimed Bayani A. Ferrera as mayor of Baras, Rizal, in spite of the fact that he did not obtain the plurality of votes in the January 30, 1980 municipal elections.

Issue:

            Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave error when it proclaimed the defeated candidate, Bayani Ferrera, elected to the office of mayor.

Held:

           

Yes. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

Section 48 of the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Big. 337, which provides:

SEC. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the Office of the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor.. — (l) In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor, city or municipal mayor refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, as the case may be, shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former.

xxx xxx xxx

It is, therefore, patent that the COMELEC committed a grave error when it proclaimed the defeated candidate, Bayani Ferrera, elected to the office of mayor. After the ineligibility of Geronimo had been ascertained and after his proclamation was set aside, the COMELEC should have proclaimed the vice-mayor as entitled to the office and not Ferrera who failed to obtain the plurality of votes in the election.

The resolution of the Commission on Elections proclaiming Bayani A. Ferrera duly elected mayor of Baras, Rizal is SET ASIDE. A permanent vacancy having arisen in the Office of Mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume the office after taking his oath and qualifying.

BORJA versus COMELEC

Succession to an office or by operation of law under the three consecutive terms limitation

BORJA versus COMELEC

Facts:

Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992.  On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.  For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor. 

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections.  Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Carpo’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

COMELEC ruled in favour of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that “In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.” Carpo won the election case against Borja. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution.

Held:

No. The court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other.