Thursday, March 6, 2014

PEREZ vs COMELEC and AGUINALDO G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999



PEREZ vs COMELEC and AGUINALDO      G.R. No. 133944.  October 28, 1999
FACTS:
                On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections.  Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,[11] dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.

ISSUE:
                Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan?

RULING:
     the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6  Effect of Disqualification Case. ¾ Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.  If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
“As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998.  The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held.  Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998.  Clearly, this could not be done.  Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed.  The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner’s action.  In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same.  Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility.  As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
When does section 6 of R.A. 6646 apply to petitions for disqualifying a candidate and when does it not apply?

In the case supra, R.A 6646, section 6 cannot be applied since there was already a decision made by COMELEC based on substantial evidence, dismissing the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan. Accordingly he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. It therefore barred further consideration of petitioner’s action.
“Petitioner’s remedies should have been:
1)      to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent;

2)      to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.”

“In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered.  The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.”
“…In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- ‘Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.  The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.  It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation.  Since private respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.”
“It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected.  From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.  Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.”

Lonzanida vs COMELEC and MULI G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999



Lonzanida vs COMELEC and MULI  G.R. No. 135150.  July 28, 1999
FACTS:
Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner.  He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof.  His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections.
On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio.  On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.  On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
ISSUES:
1)Whether or not Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time?
2)Whether or not the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections?
RULING:
ON THE FIRST ISSUE.
            This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:  
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and;
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 
It stated:
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”
“The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent… After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void… It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all[5] and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest…”
“Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.  The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.”
ON THE SECOND ISSUE:
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
“Sec. 6.  Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.  If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”
“This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered.  The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.”
“…In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- ‘Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.  The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.  It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation.  Since private respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.’”
“It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected.  From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.  Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.”
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted.

QUERY:
WHEN CAN AN ELECTED OFFICIAL BE DEEMED TO HAVE FULLY SERVED THE THREE TERM LIMIT? 

ANS:
1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and;
2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
“…the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”

MERCADO versus MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)



Dual citizenship vs. Dual allegiance case
MERCADO versus MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)

Facts:
Respondent Eduardo Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati City in the May 1998 elections.

However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by COMELEC on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held:
Yes. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Makati. The COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. 

According to Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance; as such dual allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.


MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)



Disqualification case on the ground of “fugitive from justice”
MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)


Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”.

Held:
No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.