Monday, January 13, 2014

Administrative law prelim



Administrative law prelim

Instruction; Each question is worth 5%.The passing mark is 75%, hence you need to answer correctly at least 15 questions. Answer responsively and briefly. If you know the case, cite and you get an extra 3%.

1. State whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in the following cases:

            a. The Housing Land Use Regulatory board issues a memorandum stating that effective January 1, 2006, all housing units with unpaid premium for two years, shall be deemed foreclosed and shall be sold at public auction. John’s house is affected, and he questions the validity of said memorandum.
            b.The Kapisanan ng mga Konserbatibong Linang, a non-governmental organization which monitors the flooding incidents in Quezon City, files a complaint before the RTC to cancel all Timber Licensing Agreements issued for the past five years, as they caused the flash floods. They questioned the DENR’s passivity and inaction on the matter, despite the pendency of the administrative complaints, which they filed in the said office.
            c. The DAR declared John’s riceland as covered under the Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to PD 27.John received the valuation, which he objected as it was very low. The DAR informed him that he can appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform about the matter. John did not take heed. He filed his complaint directly to the Regional Trial Court.
            d. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform ruled that the coverage of X’s land under agrarian reform was validly undertaken by the DAR Provincial Director. Not agreeing thereto, he filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary.
            e. Jose Mabini, the principal of Olingan Elementary School was dismissed and ousted by the Superintendent of Schools by reason of abuse of authority, gross immorality and corruption. He was then replaced by Maria Bonifacio.He filed a quo warranto proceeding before the RTC.

2. Aquilino Larin was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in 1995.He was charged with malversation before the Sandiganbayan and was convicted. Meanwhile the BIR Commissioner furnished the President of the copy of the Sandiganbayan decision. The president then organized a committee and on the basis of the committee’s recommendation, dismissed Larin from the service.
            Larin appealed his Sandiganbayan conviction to the Supreme Court, which reversed the conviction.
            Larin wrote a letter to the president praying that he should be reinstated with backwages, as the Supreme Court acquitted him of the criminal charge.
            The president denied his prayer. She argued that the criminal case is different from the administrative case, and besides, pursuant to her control powers, she had already reorganized the bureaus and appointed another assistant commissioner in Larin’s stead. The president emphasized that Larin has no more place in the bureaucracy.
            You are hired as Larin’s counsel, how would you argue his cause for reinstatement.

3. At the height of an oil crisis, the Energy Regulatory Board approved without any hearing the application of SHELL, PETRON and GRANEX to increase oil prices to 20%, on the basis of the unrebutted applications filed by the said companies. The people complained as said increases spelled in capital letters their hardships. Senator Pangmasa filed a petition in Court to stop the increases, reasoning that the same are violations of administrative due process, as no hearing, consultations, or even an opportunity to be heard was even made.
            Comment on the validity of the contention of Senator Pangmasa.

4. The administrative Code provides for a definition of some of the president’s powers such as the ordinance and residual powers. What is your understanding regarding these powers?

5.What do you mean by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies? State at least five exceptions to the doctrine.

6.Distinguish quasi-judicial power from quasi-legislative power.

7.State the requirements of procedural due process in administrative investigations.


8. [G.R. No. 86695.  September 3, 1992.]The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE C-1) ** was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 1
Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.
In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project.
On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818. 
The decree reads pertinently as follows:
Section 1.         No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

QUESTION: Is the issuance of the TRO by the Judge improper? Explain your answer.
9. [G.R. No. 122338.  December 29, 1995.] In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."  5 Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.  6
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Secretary of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment  against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntiniupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment thru a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Secretary of Justice and the President gravely abused their discretion in ordering his arrest without due notice and hearing.
            Question: Is the contention of  Wilfredo Sumulong Torres correct? Explain your answer.
10. [G.R. No. 87977.  March 19, 1990.]Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action against him?  Would your ruling be the same in a civil action for damages against him? Explain your answer.


11. [G.R. No. L-23523.  November 18, 1967.]The record shows that on March 7, 1963, Guadalupe C. Adaza, then Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, instituted Administrative Case No. 3 against Roberto P. Poculan who was then serving on his first term of office as municipal mayor of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, charging the latter with abuse of authority, oppression and maladministration. Basis for the charge was an incident that took place on February 23, 1963, during which, allegedly, the mayor, "with grave abuse of authority and taking advantage of his position, with intent to oppress, did then and there, wilfully, illegally, and feloniously, assault, maul and attack with the use of his fist and a home-made gun, locally known as `paliuntod,' one ANTONIO ARAPOC," inflicting upon him physical injuries which caused his death two days later.
On the same day, Governor Adaza issued Executive Order No. 1, ordering the suspension from office of Mayor Poculan for thirty days, pursuant to sections 2188-2189 of the Revised Administrative Code. After the lapse of said period of suspension, however, the mayor was reinstated.
At the close of Mayor Poculan's term of office, the administrative case against him was still pending, the Provincial Board having failed to act upon it to its finality.
Then came the 1963 local elections. Poculan was re-elected mayor of the municipality of Rizal. Felipe Azcuna was elected governor, replacing Adaza, and there was also a change in the composition of the Provincial Board.
The new members of the Provincial Board proceeded to investigate the administrative case against Poculan, and on February 14, 1964, rendered decision and passed Resolution No. 42-A, ordering his suspension for a period of two years. The decision was appealed by the Mayor to the President on March 6 of that year. On March 13, the Provincial Governor issued Executive Order No. 7 supplementing Resolution No. 42-A, designating the Vice Mayor to act as Mayor of Rizal. On the same day also, the governor directed the commander of the Philippine Constabulary unit detailed in the province to serve his order upon the suspended Mayor.
Meanwhile, Mayor Poculan had filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte an action for Prohibition, later amended, for Certiorari and Mandamus, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, to restrain the Provincial Board from enforcing its resolution. The petition, however, was dismissed on the ground, among others, that it was not the proper remedy.
Whereupon, Mayor Poculan filed the present action for Injunction, praying once more that the Provincial Board be restrained from enforcing its order of suspension. As prayed for, a preliminary injunction writ was issued at the commencement of the proceedings. The case was submitted for decision on the pleadings. On July 3, 1964, the court, finding the petition to be meritorious, rendered judgment declaring null and void the Board's resolution suspending the Mayor, on the principle that his reelection had purged him of the administrative charges filed against him during his first term of office. Motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, the Provincial Board filed the instant petition.
The issue raised in this appeal is whether or not the Provincial Board of Zamboanga del Norte may proceed with the administrative investigation of reelected mayor Roberto P. Poculan for misconduct, allegedly committed by the latter during his prior term of office.
Resolve said issue.
12.  [G.R. No. 83578.  March 16, 1989.]Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force. — The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall have the following powers and authority:
a)         Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;
b)         To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation;
c)         To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, oath oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;
d)         To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and To adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx                    xxx                    xxx
"f.        After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20%) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40%) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force." 

            QUESTION: After reading the above-outlined powers : (a) Is the anti-dollar Salting Task force a quasi-judicial body? (b) Would you consider it of co-equal rank to the Regional Trial Court? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

13.  [G.R. No. 81510.  March 14, 1990.] Facts:      On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
"04.      T:         Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay.
            S:         Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang akmg PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05.       T:         Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
            S:         Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06.       T:         Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
            S:         Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag-9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko.
.On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."
            On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
"HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1)        No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2)        Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
 This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987."
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.) However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

QUESTIONS: (a) Is the act of the team in confiscating the assorted costumes valid?
                        (b) would you consider the ORDER of closure and seizure issued by ACHACOSO valid?
                        ( c) If you were the counsel of Horty Salazar, what would you do to protect her interests?

14. In the case of Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission (1995) it was held that the Civil Service Commission cannot abolish the Career Executive Service Board. What is the ratiocination of the Supreme Court regarding said ruling?


15.Give the meaning of the following latin maxims as applied in administrative law:

a.       ex dolo malo non oritus actio
b.      in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus
c.       ubi jus, ubi remedum
d.      quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibitur et per obluquum
e.       in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis


16. [G.R. No. 112497.  August 4, 1994.]The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila (A)revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, (B) it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.
QUESTION: Is the decision of the RTC of Manila valid? Explain.


17. (A)Does the ombudsman have the power to prosecute public officers who have committed election offenses?
 (B)Does it have the power to investigate the President, Chief Justice  and Comelec Chairman for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment?
 (C) Does it have the power to prosecute before the Sandiganbayan the Chairman of the COA?

18. In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner Delano Padilla seeks to set aside the resolution  1 of public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) which confirmed the decision of respondent Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) dismissing petitioner from the service after finding him guilty of the charges in the administrative complaint filed by the Land Transportation Office (LTO) of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Resolution No. 92-1849 dated November 17, 1992 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration is likewise assailed here.
The relevant antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On November 2, 1988, an administrative complaint  2 for gross dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties and gross violation of the law, rules and reasonable office regulations was filed against petitioner Delano Padilla, former officer-in-charge of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) of Bacolod City. It was alleged that petitioner succeeded in having caused and approved the registration and/or transfer of ownership of twelve (12) carnapped and stolen vehicles despite prior knowledge that existing laws, rules and regulations were violated in the registration and transfer thereof. As contended by complainant LTO, petitioner failed to require confirmation of the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipts corresponding to the subject vehicles from the LTO district offices which issued the same. Had he done so, no registration and/or transfer of the vehicles would have been possible because all the supporting documents pertinent to them were spurious. LibLex
Petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt thereof to answer the charges filed against him.
Accordingly, petitioner filed his answer  3 dated December 26, 1988 vehemently denying the charges against him. He contended that the twelve (12) motor vehicles were covered by proper clearances, certificates and similar documents issued by the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG). He claimed that the charges were baseless and were filed only to maliciously taint his good name and reputation.
The matter was set for hearing on April 20, 1989. However, only prosecutor Ramon Cuyco and his witness, Alfonso Alianza, were present. Petitioner and his counsel failed to appear despite due notice. Consequently, the case was heard ex-parte and was considered submitted for decision.
After considering the evidence on record, respondent Administrative Action Board (AAB) of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) through then DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes rendered a decision,  4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing respondent Delano T. Padilla is hereby found guilty of the charges filed against him, and accordingly sentenced as follows:
(a)        That he is hereby dismissed from the service;
(b)        That he is disqualified for reemployment in the government service;
(c)        That his leave credits and retirement benefits are hereby declared forfeited; and
(d)        That his civil service eligibility is hereby recommended to be cancelled.

Petitioner contends that his constitutional right to due process or administrative due process was violated when on April 20, 1989 the scheduled hearing proceeded despite his, and his counsel's absence. He claims that nobody testified during the hearing and that the supporting documents were not presented or marked in evidence.
Rule on the contention of petitioner: was there a violation of due process?

19. [G.R. No. L-76633.  October 18, 1988.] The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates.
Question: Is the move of the Solicitor General correct? Explain.
20. Given the following  terms:

"public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, the "sense and experience of men"  in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.

What do you have in mind when confronted with such terms? What is their relevance in administrative law?

 21.  In the case of Corona v. UHPA, an issue was raised on the validity of  the PPA Administrative Order which limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. It is claimed that said order (1) violates due process because it was issued without prior consultation or hearing and (2) it amounted to deprivation of property rights. State how the Supreme Court ruled on the two issues.


Friday, January 10, 2014


REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995
(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.
1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of appellate review.
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and superseded by this Circular.
16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.
May 16, 1995.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Tuesday, December 17, 2013


The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter.  Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.”  These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

what kind of administrative body is the Boy Scout of the Philippines?



EN BANC


BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
                    Petitioner, 









- versus -









COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
                    Respondent.

G.R. No.  177131

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.


Promulgated:

June 7, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:


          The jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA) over the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is the subject matter of this controversy that reached us via petition for prohibition[1] filed by the BSP under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.  In this petition, the BSP seeks that the COA be prohibited from implementing its June 18, 2002 Decision,[2] its February 21, 2007 Resolution,[3] as well as all other issuances arising therefrom, and that all of the foregoing be rendered null and void. [4]

Antecedent Facts and Background of the Case

This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011[5] on August 19, 1999 (“the COA Resolution”), with the subject “Defining the Commission’s policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.  In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission,[6] the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a “government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution”; and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.”[7]  The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).  Finally, the COA Resolution reads:

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the COMMISSION PROPER HAS RESOLVED, AS IT DOES HEREBY RESOLVE, to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and express an opinion on whether the financial statements which include the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the Statement of Cash Flows present fairly its financial position and results of operations.

x x x x

BE IT RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit supervision, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines shall be classified among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector under the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit approach.[8] (Emphases supplied.)


The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter[9] dated November 26, 1999 signed by the BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, who is now the Vice President of the Republic, wherein he wrote:

It is the position of the BSP, with all due respect, that it is not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction on the following grounds:

1.    We reckon that the ruling in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 80767) classifying the BSP as a government-controlled corporation is anchored on the “substantial Government participation” in the National Executive Board of the BSP. It is to be noted that the case was decided when the BSP Charter is defined by Commonwealth Act No. 111 as amended by Presidential Decree 460.

However, may we humbly refer you to Republic Act No. 7278 which amended the BSP’s charter after the cited case was decided. The most salient of all amendments in RA No. 7278 is the alteration of the composition of the National Executive Board of the BSP.

The said RA virtually eliminated the “substantial government participation” in the National Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines and executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education, as members thereof; and (ii) the appointment and confirmation power of the President of the Philippines, as Chief Scout, over the members of the said Board.

The BSP believes that the cited case has been superseded by RA 7278. Thereby weakening the case’s conclusion that the BSP is a government-controlled corporation (sic). The 1987 Administrative Code itself, of which the BSP vs. NLRC relied on for some terms, defines government-owned and controlled corporations as agencies organized as stock or non-stock corporations which the BSP, under its present charter, is not.

Also, the Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds invested in the BSP. What RA 7278 only provides is that the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies and instrumentalities can from time to time donate and contribute funds to the BSP.

x x x x

Also the BSP respectfully believes that the BSP is not “appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code” as stated in the COA resolution. As defined by Section 2(10) of the said code, instrumentality refers to “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.”

The BSP is not an entity administering special funds. It is not even included in the DECS National Budget. x x x

It may be argued also that the BSP is not an “agency” of the Government. The 1987 Administrative Code, merely referred the BSP as an “attached agency” of the DECS as distinguished from an actual line agency of departments that are included in the National Budget. The BSP believes that an “attached agency” is different from an “agency.” Agency, as defined in Section 2(4) of the Administrative Code, is defined as any of the various units of the Government including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or controlled corporation or local government or distinct unit therein.

Under the above definition, the BSP is neither a unit of the Government; a department which refers to an executive department as created by law (Section 2[7] of the Administrative Code); nor a bureau which refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department (Section 2[8], Administrative Code).[10]

Subsequently, requests for reconsideration of the COA Resolution were also made separately by Robert P. Valdellon, Regional Scout Director, Western Visayas Region, Iloilo City and Eugenio F. Capreso, Council Scout Executive of Calbayog City.[11]

In a letter[12] dated July 3, 2000, Director Crescencio S. Sunico, Corporate Audit Officer (CAO) I of the COA, furnished the BSP with a copy of the Memorandum[13] dated June 20, 2000 of Atty. Santos M. Alquizalas, the COA General Counsel.  In said Memorandum, the COA General Counsel opined that Republic Act No. 7278 did not supersede the Court’s ruling in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, even though said law eliminated the substantial government participation in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP.  The Memorandum further provides:

Analysis of the said case disclosed that the substantial government participation is only one (1) of the three (3) grounds relied upon by the Court in the resolution of the case. Other considerations include the character of the BSP’s purposes and functions which has a public aspect and the statutory designation of the BSP as a “public corporation”. These grounds have not been deleted by R.A. No. 7278. On the contrary, these were strengthened as evidenced by the amendment made relative to BSP’s purposes stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 7278.

On the argument that BSP is not appropriately regarded as “a government instrumentality” and “agency” of the government, such has already been answered and clarified. The Supreme Court has elucidated this matter in the BSP case when it declared that BSP is regarded as, both a “government-controlled corporation with an original charter” and as an “instrumentality” of the Government. Likewise, it is not disputed that the Administrative Code of 1987 designated the BSP as one of the attached agencies of DECS. Being an attached agency, however, it does not change its nature as a government-controlled corporation with original charter and, necessarily, subject to COA audit jurisdiction. Besides, Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that COA shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[14]


Based on the Memorandum of the COA General Counsel, Director Sunico wrote:

In view of the points clarified by said Memorandum upholding COA Resolution No. 99-011, we have to comply with the provisions of the latter, among which is to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.[15]


In a letter dated November 20, 2000 signed by Director Amorsonia B. Escarda, CAO I, the COA informed the BSP that a preliminary survey of its organizational structure, operations and accounting system/records shall be conducted on November 21 to 22, 2000.[16]

Upon the BSP’s request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the COA.  This was denied by the COA in its questioned Decision, which held that the BSP is under its audit jurisdiction.  The BSP moved for reconsideration but this was likewise denied under its questioned Resolution.[17]

This led to the filing by the BSP of this petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the COA.

The Issue

As stated earlier, the sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction.




The Parties’ Respective Arguments

The BSP contends that Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission is inapplicable for purposes of determining the audit jurisdiction of the COA as the issue therein was the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission over a case for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice filed by certain BSP employees.[18]

While the BSP concedes that its functions do relate to those that the government might otherwise completely assume on its own, it avers that this alone was not determinative of the COA’s audit jurisdiction over it.  The BSP further avers that the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission simply stated x x x that in respect of functions, the BSP is akin to a public corporation” but this was not synonymous to holding that the BSP is a government corporation or entity subject to audit by the COA. [19]

The BSP contends that Republic Act No. 7278 introduced crucial amendments to its charter; hence, the findings of the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission are no longer valid as the government has ceased to play a controlling influence in it.  The BSP claims that the pronouncements of the Court therein must be taken only within the context of that case; that the Court had categorically found that its assets were acquired from the Boy Scouts of America and not from the Philippine government, and that its operations are financed chiefly from membership dues of the Boy Scouts themselves as well as from property rentals; and that “the BSP may correctly be characterized as non-governmental, and hence, beyond the audit jurisdiction of the COA.”  It further claims that the designation by the Court of the BSP as a government agency or instrumentality is mere obiter dictum.[20]

The BSP maintains that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7278 suggest that “governance of BSP has come to be overwhelmingly a private affair or nature, with government participation restricted to the seat of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports.”[21]  It cites Philippine Airlines Inc. v. Commission on Audit[22] wherein the Court declared that, “PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA.”[23]  Claiming that the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7278 constituted a supervening event that changed the BSP’s corporate identity in the same way that the government’s privatization program changed PAL’s, the BSP makes the case that the government no longer has control over it; thus, the COA cannot use the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission as its basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the issuance of COA Resolution No. 99-011.[24]  The BSP further claims as follows:

It is not far-fetched, in fact, to concede that BSP’s funds and assets are private in character. Unlike ordinary public corporations, such as provinces, cities, and municipalities, or government-owned and controlled corporations, such as Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines, the assets and funds of BSP are not derived from any government grant. For its operations, BSP is not dependent in any way on any government appropriation; as a matter of fact, it has not even been included in any appropriations for the government. To be sure, COA has not alleged, in its Resolution No. 99-011 or in the Memorandum of its General Counsel, that BSP received, receives or continues to receive assets and funds from any agency of the government. The foregoing simply point to the private nature of the funds and assets of petitioner BSP.

x x x x

As stated in petitioner’s third argument, BSP’s assets and funds were never acquired from the government. Its operations are not in any way financed by the government, as BSP has never been included in any appropriations act for the government. Neither has the government invested funds with BSP. BSP, has not been, at any time, a user of government property or funds; nor have properties of the government been held in trust by BSP. This is precisely the reason why, until this time, the COA has not attempted to subject BSP to its audit jurisdiction. x x x.[25]


To summarize its other arguments, the BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the government.

In its Comment,[26] the COA argues as follows:

1.             The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936, and whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The manner of creation and the purpose for which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is a government agency.

2.             Being a government agency, the funds and property owned or held in trust by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of respondent Commission on Audit pursuant to Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.

3.             Republic Act No. 7278 did not change the character of the BSP as a government-owned or controlled corporation and government instrumentality.[27]


The COA maintains that the functions of the BSP that include, among others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under the Constitution and discussed by the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission.  The COA contends that any attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be incomprehensible since no less than the law which created it had designated it as a public corporation and its statutory mandate embraces performance of sovereign functions.[28]

The COA claims that the only reason why the BSP employees fell within the scope of the Civil Service Commission even before the 1987 Constitution was the fact that it was a government-owned or controlled corporation; that as an attached agency of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the BSP is an agency of the government; and that the BSP is a chartered institution under Section 1(12) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, embraced under the term government instrumentality.[29] 

The COA concludes that being a government agency, the funds and property owned or held by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of the COA pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution.

In support of its arguments, the COA cites The Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) v. Reyes,[30] wherein the Court held that among the reasons why the VFP is a public corporation is that its charter, Republic Act No. 2640, designates it as one.  Furthermore, the COA quotes the Court as saying in that case:

In several cases, we have dealt with the issue of whether certain specific activities can be classified as sovereign functions. These cases, which deal with activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign functions, upheld the public sovereign nature of operations needed either to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country.

x x x x

Petitioner claims that its funds are not public funds because no budgetary appropriations or government funds have been released to the VFP directly or indirectly from the DBM, and because VFP funds come from membership dues and lease rentals earned from administering government lands reserved for the VFP.

The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to the VFP does not prove that it is a private corporation. The DBM indeed did not see it fit to propose budgetary appropriations to the VFP, having itself believed that the VFP is a private corporation. If the DBM, however, is mistaken as to its conclusion regarding the nature of VFP's incorporation, its previous assertions will not prevent future budgetary appropriations to the VFP. The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.[31] (Citations omitted.)


The COA points out that the government is not precluded by law from extending financial support to the BSP and adding to its funds, and that “as a government instrumentality which continues to perform a vital function imbued with public interest and reflective of the government’s policy to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, the BSP’s funds from whatever source are public funds, and can be used solely for public purpose in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. [7278].”[32]

The COA claims that the fact that it has not yet audited the BSP’s funds may not bar the subsequent exercise of its audit jurisdiction.

The BSP filed its Reply[33] on August 29, 2007 maintaining that its statutory designation as a “public corporation” and the public character of its purpose and functions are not determinative of the COA’s audit jurisdiction; reiterating its stand that Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission is not applicable anymore because the aspect of government ownership and control has been removed by Republic Act No. 7278; and concluding that the funds and property that it either owned or held in trust are not public funds and are not subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.

Thereafter, considering the BSP’s claim that it is a private corporation, this Court, in a Resolution[34] dated July 20, 2010, required the parties to file, within a period of twenty (20) days from receipt of said Resolution, their respective comments on the issue of whether Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Republic Act No. 7278, is constitutional.

In compliance with the Court’s resolution, the parties filed their respective Comments.

In its Comment[35] dated October 22, 2010, the COA argues that the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, is not determinative of the resolution of the present controversy on the COA’s audit jurisdiction over petitioner, and in fact, the controversy may be resolved on other grounds; thus, the requisites before a judicial inquiry may be made, as set forth in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals,[36] have not been fully met.[37]  Moreover, the COA maintains that behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.[38]  The COA likewise argues that contrary to the BSP’s position, repeal of a law by implication is not favored.[39]  Lastly, the COA claims that there was no violation of Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution with the creation or declaration of the BSP as a government corporation.  Citing Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit,[40] the COA further alleges:

The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. x x x.[41]


For its part, in its Comment[42] filed on December 3, 2010, the BSP submits that its charter, Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Republic Act No. 7278, is constitutional as it does not violate Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution.  The BSP alleges that “while [it] is not a public corporation within the purview of COA’s audit jurisdiction, neither is it a private corporation created by special law falling within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition x x x.”[43]  The BSP further alleges:

Petitioner’s purpose is embodied in Section 3 of C.A. No. 111, as amended by Section 1 of R.A. No. 7278, thus:

x x x x

A reading of the foregoing provision shows that petitioner was created to advance the interest of the youth, specifically of young boys, and to mold them into becoming good citizens. Ultimately, the creation of petitioner redounds to the benefit, not only of those boys, but of the public good or welfare. Hence, it can be said that petitioner’s purpose and functions are more of a public rather than a private character. Petitioner caters to all boys who wish to join the organization without any distinction. It does not limit its membership to a particular class of boys. Petitioner’s members are trained in scoutcraft and taught patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, preparing them to become model citizens and outstanding leaders of the country.[44]

The BSP reiterates its stand that the public character of its purpose and functions do not place it within the ambit of the audit jurisdiction of the COA as it lacks the government ownership or control that the Constitution requires before an entity may be subject of said jurisdiction.[45]  It avers that it merely stated in its Reply that the withdrawal of government control is akin to privatization, but it does not necessarily mean that petitioner is a private corporation.[46]  The BSP claims that it has a unique characteristic which “neither classifies it as a purely public nor a purely private corporation”;[47] that it is not a quasi-public corporation; and that it may belong to a different class altogether.[48]

The BSP claims that assuming arguendo that it is a private corporation, its creation is not contrary to the purpose of Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution; and that the evil sought to be avoided by said provision is inexistent in the enactment of the BSP’s charter,[49] as, (i) it was not created for any pecuniary purpose; (ii) those who will primarily benefit from its creation are not its officers but its entire membership consisting of boys being trained in scoutcraft all over the country; (iii) it caters to all boys who wish to join the organization without any distinction; and (iv) it does not limit its membership to a particular class or group of boys.  Thus, the enactment of its charter confers no special privilege to particular individuals, families, or groups; nor does it bring about the danger of granting undue favors to certain groups to the prejudice of others or of the interest of the country, which are the evils sought to be prevented by the constitutional provision involved.[50]

Finally, the BSP states that the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment prevails absent any clear showing of its repugnancy to the Constitution.[51]

The Ruling of the Court

After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.

The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled “An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes” created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the following public interest or purpose:

Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts.


Presidential Decree No. 460, approved on May 17, 1974, amended Commonwealth Act No. 111 and provided substantial changes in the BSP organizational structure. Pertinent provisions are quoted below:

Section II. Section 5 of the said Act is also amended to read as follows:

The governing body of the said corporation shall consist of a National Executive Board composed of (a) the President of the Philippines or his representative; (b) the charter and life members of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines; (c) the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine Scouting Foundation; (d) the Regional Chairman of the Scout Regions of the Philippines; (e) the Secretary of Education and Culture, the Secretary of Social Welfare, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Youth and Sports, and the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development; (f) an equal number of individuals from the private sector; (g) the National President of the Girl Scouts of the Philippines; (h) one Scout of Senior age from each Scout Region to represent the boy membership; and (i) three representatives of the cultural minorities. Except for the Regional Chairman who shall be elected by the Regional Scout Councils during their annual meetings, and the Scouts of their respective regions, all members of the National Executive Board shall be either by appointment or cooption, subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout, who shall be the Head of State. Vacancies in the Executive Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining members, subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout. The by-laws may prescribe the number of members of the National Executive Board necessary to constitute a quorum of the board, which number may be less than a majority of the whole number of the board. The National Executive Board shall have power to make and to amend the by-laws, and, by a two-thirds vote of the whole board at a meeting called for this purpose, may authorize and cause to be executed mortgages and liens upon the property of the corporation.


Subsequently, on March 24, 1992, Republic Act No. 7278 further amended Commonwealth Act No. 111 “by strengthening the volunteer and democratic character” of the BSP and reducing government representation in its governing body, as follows:

Section 1. Sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act. No. 111, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. The said corporation shall have the powers of perpetual succession, to sue and be sued; to enter into contracts; to acquire, own, lease, convey and dispose of such real and personal estate, land grants, rights and choses in action as shall be necessary for corporate purposes, and to accept and receive funds, real and personal property by gift, devise, bequest or other means, to conduct fund-raising activities; to adopt and use a seal, and the same to alter and destroy; to have offices and conduct its business and affairs in Metropolitan Manila and in the regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays of the Philippines, to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the laws of the Philippines, and generally to do all such acts and things, including the establishment of regulations for the election of associates and successors, as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act and promote the purposes of said corporation: Provided, That said corporation shall have no power to issue certificates of stock or to declare or pay dividends, its objectives and purposes being solely of benevolent character and not for pecuniary profit of its members.

"Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts." 

Sec. 2. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, is hereby repealed and in lieu thereof, Section 4 shall read as follows:

"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall be the Chief Scout of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines."

Sec.  3. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, are hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 5. The governing body of the said corporation shall consist of a National Executive Board, the members of which shall be Filipino citizens of good moral character. The Board shall be composed of the following:

"(a) One (1) charter member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines who shall be elected by the members of the National Council at its meeting called for this purpose;

"(b) The regional chairmen of the scout regions who shall be elected by the representatives of all the local scout councils of the region during its meeting called for this purpose: Provided, That a candidate for regional chairman need not be the chairman of a local scout council; 

"(c) The Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports

 "(d) The National President of the Girl Scouts of the Philippines; 

"(e) One (1) senior scout, each from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao areas, to be elected by the senior scout delegates of the local scout councils to the scout youth forums in their respective areas, in its meeting called for this purpose, to represent the boy scout membership; 

"(f) Twelve (12) regular members to be elected by the members of the National Council in its meeting called for this purpose;

"(g) At least ten (10) but not more than fifteen (15) additional members from the private sector who shall be elected by the members of the National Executive Board referred to in the immediately preceding paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) at the organizational meeting of the newly reconstituted National Executive Board which shall be held immediately after the meeting of the National Council wherein the twelve (12) regular members and the one (1) charter member were elected. 

x x x x

"Sec. 8. Any donation or contribution which from time to time may be made to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines by the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies or instrumentalities or by a foreign government or by private, entities and individuals shall be expended by the National Executive Board in pursuance of this Act.


The BSP as a Public Corporation under Par. 2, Art. 2 of the Civil Code

There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification.  Article 44 reads: 

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (Emphases supplied.)


The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)


The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:

ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.



Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.

The BSP’s Classification Under the Administrative Code of 1987

The public, rather than private, character of the BSP is recognized by the fact that, along with the Girl Scouts of the Philippines, it is classified as an attached agency of the DECS under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, which states:

TITLE VI – EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS

Chapter 8 – Attached Agencies

SEC. 20. Attached Agencies. – The following agencies are hereby attached to the Department:

x x x x

(12) Boy Scouts of the Philippines;

(13) Girl Scouts of the Philippines.


The administrative relationship of an attached agency to the department is defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 as follows:

BOOK IV

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Chapter 7 – ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP

SEC. 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. – Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:

x x x x

(3) Attachment. – (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.  The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency. (Emphasis ours.)


            As an attached agency, the BSP enjoys operational autonomy, as long as policy and program coordination is achieved by having at least one representative of government in its governing board, which in the case of the BSP is the DECS Secretary.  In this sense, the BSP is not under government control or “supervision and control.”  Still this characteristic does not make the attached chartered agency a private corporation covered by the constitutional proscription in question.

Art. XII, Sec. 16 of the Constitution refers to “private corporations” created by government for proprietary or economic/business purposes


At the outset, it should be noted that the provision of Section 16 in issue is found in Article XII of the Constitution, entitled “National Economy and Patrimony.”  Section 1 of Article XII is quoted as follows:

SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.


The scope and coverage of Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution can be seen from the aforementioned declaration of state policies and goals which pertains to national economy and patrimony and the interests of the people in economic development. 

Section 16, Article XII deals with “the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations,”[52] which should be done through a general law enacted by Congress, provides for an exception, that is: if the corporation is government owned or controlled; its creation is in the interest of the common good; and it meets the test of economic viability.  The rationale behind Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution was explained in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[53] in the following manner:
 
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.[54] (Emphasis added.)


It may be gleaned from the above discussion that Article XII, Section 16 bans the creation of “private corporations by special law.  The said constitutional provision should not be construed so as to prohibit the creation of public corporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to serve a public interest or purpose, which should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, but according to the public interest or purpose it serves as envisioned by paragraph (2), of Article 44 of the Civil Code and the pertinent provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987. 

The BSP is a Public Corporation Not Subject to the Test of Government Ownership or Control and Economic Viability

The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter.  Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.”  These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

Classification of Corporations Under Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony


            The dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, citing a line of cases, insists that the Constitution recognizes only two classes of corporations: private corporations under a general law, and government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. 

We strongly disagree.  Section 16, Article XII should not be construed so as to prohibit Congress from creating public corporations.  In fact, Congress has enacted numerous laws creating public corporations or government agencies or instrumentalities vested with corporate powers.  Moreover, Section 16, Article XII, which relates to National Economy and Patrimony, could not have tied the hands of Congress in creating public corporations to serve any of the constitutional policies or objectives.
         
In his dissent, Justice Carpio contends that this ponente introduces “a totally different species of corporation, which is neither a private corporation nor a government owned or controlled corporation” and, in so doing, is missing the fact that the BSP, “which was created as a non-stock, non-profit corporation, can only be either a private corporation or a government owned or controlled corporation.” 

Note that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the BSP, under its former charter, was regarded as both a government owned or controlled corporation with original charter and a “public corporation.”  The said case pertinently stated:

While the BSP may be seen to be a mixed type of entity, combining aspects of both public and private entities, we believe that considering the character of its purposes and its functions, the statutory designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and the substantial participation of the Government in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution.

 We are fortified in this conclusion when we note that the Administrative Code of 1987 designates the BSP as one of the attached agencies of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). An "agency of the Government" is defined as referring to any of the various units of the Government including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or -controlled corporation, or local government or distinct unit therein.  "Government instrumentality" is in turn defined in the 1987 Administrative Code in the following manner:

Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

The same Code describes a "chartered institution" in the following terms:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the State.

We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987 Administrative Code.

It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. x x x.[55] (Emphases supplied.)


The existence of public or government corporate or juridical entities or chartered institutions by legislative fiat distinct from private corporations and government owned or controlled corporation is best exemplified by the 1987 Administrative Code cited above, which we quote in part:

 Sec. 2.  General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

x x x x

(10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

x x x x

(12) "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.

(13) "Government-owned or controlled corporation" refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.


Assuming for the sake of argument that the BSP ceases to be owned or controlled by the government because of reduction of the number of representatives of the government in the BSP Board, it does not follow that it also ceases to be a government instrumentality as it still retains all the characteristics of the latter as an attached agency of the DECS under the Administrative Code.  Vesting corporate powers to an attached agency or instrumentality of the government is not constitutionally prohibited and is allowed by the above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code and the 1987 Administrative Code.

Economic Viability and Ownership and Control Tests Inapplicable to Public Corporations


As presently constituted, the BSP still remains an instrumentality of the national government.  It is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the DECS pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987.  It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law.


The dissent of Justice Carpio also submits that by recognizing “a new class of public corporation(s)” created by special charter that will not be subject to the test of economic viability, the constitutional provision will be circumvented. 

However, a review of the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Convention reveals the intent of the framers of the highest law of our land to distinguish between government corporations performing governmental functions and corporations involved in business or proprietary functions:

            THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Foz is recognized.

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I support the proposal to insert “ECONOMIC VIABILITY” as one of the grounds for organizing government corporations. x x x.

MR. OPLE. Madam President, the reason for this concern is really that when the government creates a corporation, there is a sense in which this corporation becomes exempt from the test of economic performance. We know what happened in the past. If a government corporation loses, then it makes its claim upon the taxpayers’ money through new equity infusions from the government and what is always invoked is the common good. x x x

Therefore, when we insert the phrase “ECONOMIC VIABILITY” together with the “common good,” this becomes a restraint on future enthusiasts for state capitalism to excuse themselves from the responsibility of meeting the market test so that they become viable. x x x.

x x x x

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Quesada is recognized.

MS. QUESADA. Madam President, may we be clarified by the committee on what is meant by economic viability?

THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.

MR. MONSOD. Economic viability normally is determined by cost-benefit ratio that takes into consideration all benefits, including economic external as well as internal benefits. These are what they call externalities in economics, so that these are not strictly financial criteria. Economic viability involves what we call economic returns or benefits of the country that are not quantifiable in financial terms. x x x.

x x x x

MS. QUESADA. So, would this particular formulation now really limit the entry of government corporations into activities engaged in by corporations?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because it is also consistent with the economic philosophy that this Commission approved – that there should be minimum government participation and intervention in the economy.

MS. QUESDA. Sometimes this Commission would just refer to Congress to provide the particular requirements when the government would get into corporations. But this time around, we specifically mentioned economic viability. x x x.

MR. VILLEGAS. Commissioner Ople will restate the reason for his introducing that amendment.

MR. OPLE. I am obliged to repeat what I said earlier in moving for this particular amendment jointly with Commissioner Foz. During the past three decades, there had been a proliferation of government corporations, very few of which have succeeded, and many of which are now earmarked by the Presidential Reorganization Commission for liquidation because they failed the economic test. x x x.

x x x x

MS. QUESADA. But would not the Commissioner say that the reason why many of the government-owned or controlled corporations failed to come up with the economic test is due to the management of these corporations, and not the idea itself of government corporations? It is a problem of efficiency and effectiveness of management of these corporations which could be remedied, not by eliminating government corporations or the idea of getting into state-owned corporations, but improving management which our technocrats should be able to do, given the training and the experience.

MR. OPLE. That is part of the economic viability, Madam President.

MS. QUESADA. So, is the Commissioner saying then that the Filipinos will benefit more if these government-controlled corporations were given to private hands, and that there will be more goods and services that will be affordable and within the reach of the ordinary citizens?

MR. OPLE. Yes. There is nothing here, Madam President, that will prevent the formation of a government corporation in accordance with a special charter given by Congress. However, we are raising the standard a little bit so that, in the future, corporations established by the government will meet the test of the common good but within that framework we should also build a certain standard of economic viability.

x x x x

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.

MR. PADILLA. This is an inquiry to the committee. With regard to corporations created by a special charter for government-owned or controlled corporations, will these be in the pioneer fields or in places where the private enterprise does not or cannot enter? Or is this so general that these government corporations can compete with private corporations organized under a general law?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, x x x. There are two types of government corporations – those that are involved in performing governmental functions, like garbage disposal, Manila waterworks, and so on; and those government corporations that are involved in business functions. As we said earlier, there are two criteria that should be followed for corporations that want to go into business. First is for government corporations to first prove that they can be efficient in the areas of their proper functions. This is one of the problems now because they go into all kinds of activities but are not even efficient in their proper functions. Secondly, they should not go into activities that the private sector can do better.

MR. PADILLA. There is no question about corporations performing governmental functions or functions that are impressed with public interest. But the question is with regard to matters that are covered, perhaps not exhaustively, by private enterprise. It seems that under this provision the only qualification is economic viability and common good, but shall government, through government-controlled corporations, compete with private enterprise?

MR. MONSOD. No, Madam President. As we said, the government should not engage in activities that private enterprise is engaged in and can do better. x x x.[56] (Emphases supplied.)


          Thus, the test of economic viability clearly does not apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions, to which category the BSP belongs.  The discussion above conveys the constitutional intent not to apply this constitutional ban on the creation of public corporations where the economic viability test would be irrelevant.  The said test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government.

          It is undisputed that the BSP performs functions that are impressed with public interest.  In fact, during the consideration of the Senate Bill that eventually became Republic Act No. 7278, which amended the BSP Charter, one of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Joey Lina, described the BSP as follows:

Senator Lina. Yes, I can only think of two organizations involving the masses of our youth, Mr. President, that should be given this kind of a privilege – the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and the Girl Scouts of the Philippines. Outside of these two groups, I do not think there are other groups similarly situated.

The Boy Scouts of the Philippines has a long history of providing value formation to our young, and considering how huge the population of the young people is, at this point in time, and also considering the importance of having an organization such as this that will inculcate moral uprightness among the young people, and further considering that the development of these young people at that tender age of seven to sixteen is vital in the development of the country producing good citizens, I believe that we can make an exception of the Boy Scouting movement of the Philippines from this general prohibition against providing tax exemption and privileges.[57]


          Furthermore, this Court cannot agree with the dissenting opinion which equates the changes introduced by Republic Act No. 7278 to the BSP Charter as clear manifestation of the intent of Congress “to return the BSP to the private sector.”  It was not the intent of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 7278 to give up all interests in this basic youth organization, which has been its partner in forming responsible citizens for decades.

          In fact, as may be seen in the deliberation of the House Bills that eventually resulted to Republic Act No. 7278, Congress worked closely with the BSP to rejuvenate the organization, to bring it back to its former glory reached under its original charter, Commonwealth Act No. 111, and to correct the perceived ills introduced by the amendments to its Charter under Presidential Decree No. 460.  The BSP suffered from low morale and decrease in number because the Secretaries of the different departments in government who were too busy to attend the meetings of the BSP’s National Executive Board (“the Board”) sent representatives who, as it turned out, changed from meeting to meeting.  Thus, the Scouting Councils established in the provinces and cities were not in touch with what was happening on the national level, but they were left to implement what was decided by the Board.[58]

          A portion of the legislators’ discussion is quoted below to clearly show their intent:

HON. DEL MAR. x x x I need not mention to you the value and the tremendous good that the Boy Scout Movement has done not only for the youth in particular but for the country in general. And that is why, if we look around, our past and present national leaders, prominent men in the various fields of endeavor, public servants in government offices, and civic leaders in the communities all over the land, and not only in our country but all over the world many if not most of them have at one time or another been beneficiaries of the Scouting Movement. And so, it is along this line, Mr. Chairman, that we would like to have the early approval of this measure if only to pay back what we owe much to the Scouting Movement. Now, going to the meat of the matter, Mr. Chairman, if I may just – the Scouting Movement was enacted into law in October 31, 1936 under Commonwealth Act No. 111. x x x [W]e were acknowledged as the third biggest scouting organization in the world x x x. And to our mind, Mr. Chairman, this erratic growth and this decrease in membership [number] is because of the bad policy measures that were enunciated with the enactment or promulgation by the President before of Presidential Decree No. 460 which we feel is the culprit of the ills that is flagging the Boy Scout Movement today. And so, this is specifically what we are attacking, Mr. Chairman, the disenfranchisement of the National Council in the election of the national board. x x x. And so, this is what we would like to be appraised of by the officers of the Boy [Scouts] of the Philippines whom we are also confident, have the best interest of the Boy Scout Movement at heart and it is in this spirit, Mr. Chairman, that we see no impediment towards working together, the Boy Scout of the Philippines officers working together with the House of Representatives in coming out with a measure that will put back the vigor and enthusiasm of the Boy Scout Movement. x x x.[59] (Emphasis ours.)


The following is another excerpt from the discussion on the House version of the bill, in the Committee on Government Enterprises:

HON. AQUINO: x x x Well, obviously, the two bills as well as the previous laws that have created the Boy Scouts of the Philippines did not provide for any direct government support by way of appropriation from the national budget to support the activities of this organization. The point here is, and at the same time they have been subjected to a governmental intervention, which to their mind has been inimical to the objectives and to the institution per se, that is why they are seeking legislative fiat to restore back the original mandate that they had under Commonwealth Act 111.  Such having been the experience in the hands of government, meaning, there has been negative interference on their part and inasmuch as their mandate is coming from a legislative fiat, then shouldn’t it be, this rhetorical question, shouldn’t it be better for this organization to seek a mandate from, let’s say, the government the Corporation Code of the Philippines and register with the SEC as non-profit non-stock corporation so that government intervention could be very very minimal.  Maybe that’s a rhetorical question, they may or they may not answer, ano. I don’t know what would be the benefit of a charter or a mandate being provided for by way of legislation versus a registration with the SEC under the Corporation Code of the Philippines inasmuch as they don’t get anything from the government anyway insofar as direct funding. In fact, the only thing that they got from government was intervention in their affairs.  Maybe we can solicit some commentary comments from the resource persons.  Incidentally, don’t take that as an objection, I’m not objecting. I’m all for the objectives of these two bills. It just occurred to me that since you have had very bad experience in the hands of government and you will always be open to such possible intervention even in the future as long as you have a legislative mandate or your mandate or your charter coming from legislative action.

x x x x

MR. ESCUDERO: Mr. Chairman, there may be a disadvantage if the Boy Scouts of the Philippines will be required to register with the SEC. If we are registered with the SEC, there could be a danger of proliferation of scout organization. Anybody can organize and then register with the SEC. If there will be a proliferation of this, then the organization will lose control of the entire organization. Another disadvantage, Mr. Chairman, anybody can file a complaint in the SEC against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and the SEC may suspend the operation or freeze the assets of the organization and hamper the operation of the organization. I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, how you look at it but there could be a danger for anybody filing a complaint against the organization in the SEC and the SEC might suspend the registration permit of the organization and we will not be able to operate.

HON. AQUINO: Well, that I think would be a problem that will not be exclusive to corporations registered with the SEC because even if you are government corporation, court action may be taken against you in other judicial bodies because the SEC is simply another quasi-judicial body. But, I think, the first point would be very interesting, the first point that you raised. In effect, what you are saying is that with the legislative mandate creating your charter, in effect, you have been given some sort of a franchise with this movement.

            MR. ESCUDERO: Yes.
           
            HON. AQUINO: Exclusive franchise of that movement?
           
            MR. ESCUDERO: Yes.
           
            HON. AQUINO: Well, that’s very well taken so I will proceed with other issues, Mr. Chairman. x x x.[60] (Emphases added.)


Therefore, even though the amended BSP charter did away with most of the governmental presence in the BSP Board, this was done to more strongly promote the BSP’s objectives, which were not supported under Presidential Decree No. 460.  The BSP objectives, as pointed out earlier, are consistent with the public purpose of the promotion of the well-being of the youth, the future leaders of the country.  The amendments were not done with the view of changing the character of the BSP into a privatized corporation.  The BSP remains an agency attached to a department of the government, the DECS, and it was not at all stripped of its public character.

          The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation like the BSP.  To reiterate, the relationship of the BSP, an attached agency, to the government, through the DECS, is defined in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.  The BSP meets the minimum statutory requirement of an attached government agency as the DECS Secretary sits at the BSP Board ex officio, thus facilitating the policy and program coordination between the BSP and the DECS.
         
Requisites for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Not Met in this Case

          The dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio improperly raised the issue of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of the BSP Charter. Even if the parties were asked to Comment on the validity of the BSP charter by the Court, this alone does not comply with the requisites for judicial review, which were clearly set forth in a recent case:

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[61] (Emphasis added.)


          Thus, when it comes to the exercise of the power of judicial review, the constitutional issue should be the very lis mota, or threshold issue, of the case, and that it should be raised by either of the parties.  These requirements would be ignored under the dissent’s rather overreaching view of how this case should have been decided.  True, it was the Court that asked the parties to comment, but the Court cannot be the one to raise a constitutional issue. Thus, the Court chooses to once more exhibit restraint in the exercise of its power to pass upon the validity of a law.

Re: the COA’s Jurisdiction

Regarding the COA’s jurisdiction over the BSP, Section 8 of its amended charter allows the BSP to receive contributions or donations from the government.  Section 8 reads:

Section 8. Any donation or contribution which from time to time may be made to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines by the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies or instrumentalities shall be expended by the Executive Board in pursuance of this Act.


The sources of funds to maintain the BSP were identified before the House Committee on Government Enterprises while the bill was being deliberated, and the pertinent portion of the discussion is quoted below:

MR. ESCUDERO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The question is the sources of funds of the organization. First, Mr. Chairman, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines do not receive annual allotment from the government. The organization has to raise its own funds through fund drives and fund campaigns or fund raising activities. Aside from this, we have some revenue producing projects in the organization that gives us funds to support the operation. x x x From time to time, Mr. Chairman, when we have special activities we request for assistance or financial assistance from government agencies, from private business and corporations, but this is only during special activities that the Boy Scouts of the Philippines would conduct during the year. Otherwise, we have to raise our own funds to support the organization.[62]


The nature of the funds of the BSP and the COA’s audit jurisdiction were likewise brought up in said congressional deliberations, to wit:

            HON. AQUINO: x x x Insofar as this organization being a government created organization, in fact, a government corporation classified as such, are your funds or your finances subjected to the COA audit?

            MR. ESCUDERO: Mr. Chairman, we are not. Our funds is not subjected. We don’t fall under the jurisdiction of the COA.
           
            HON. AQUINO: All right, but before were you?
           
            MR. ESCUDERO: No, Mr. Chairman.
           
            MR. JESUS: May I? As historical backgrounder, Commonwealth Act 111 was written by then Secretary Jorge Vargas and before and up to the middle of the Martial Law years, the BSP was receiving a subsidy in the form of an annual… a one draw from the Sweepstakes. And, this was the case also with the Girl Scouts at the Anti-TB, but then this was… and the Boy Scouts then because of this funding partly from government was being subjected to audit in the contributions being made in the part of the Sweepstakes. But this was removed later during the Martial Law years with the creation of the Human Settlements Commission. So the situation right now is that the Boy Scouts does not receive any funding from government, but then in the case of the local councils and this legislative charter, so to speak, enables the local councils even the national headquarters in view of the provisions in the existing law to receive donations from the government or any of its instrumentalities, which would be difficult if the Boy Scouts is registered as a private corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Government bodies would be estopped from making donations to the Boy Scouts, which at present is not the case because there is the Boy Scouts charter, this Commonwealth Act 111 as amended by PD 463.

x x x x
           
HON. AMATONG: Mr. Chairman, in connection with that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, Gentleman from Zamboanga.

HON. AMATONG: There is no auditing being made because there’s no money put in the organization, but how about donated funds to this organization? What are the remedies of the donors of how will they know how their money are being spent?

MR. ESCUDERO: May I answer, Mr. Chairman?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, gentleman.

MR. ESCUDERO: The Boy Scouts of the Philippines has an external auditor and by the charter we are required to submit a financial report at the end of each year to the National Executive Board. So all the funds donated or otherwise is accounted for at the end of the year by our external auditor. In this case the SGV.[63]


Historically, therefore, the BSP had been subjected to government audit in so far as public funds had been infused thereto.  However, this practice should not preclude the exercise of the audit jurisdiction of COA, clearly set forth under the Constitution, which pertinently provides:


Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. x x x. [64]


Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.      

SO ORDERED.




                                               TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
                                                                   Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:




RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice





See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
I join J. Carpio’s dissent
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice












PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice












ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice












LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice












ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice










I join the dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice












I join the dissent of J. Carpio
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice


C E R T I F I C A T I O N


          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.





RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice








[1]               With prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
[2]               Rollo, pp. 35-38; COA Decision No. 2002-107.
[3]               Id. at 39-41; COA Decision No. 2007-008.
[4]               Id. at 29.
[5]               Id. at 42-43.
[6]               G.R. No. 80767, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 176.
[7]               Rollo, p. 42.
[8]               Id. at 42-43.
[9]               Id. at 44-46.
[10]             Id. at 44-46.
[11]             Id. at 8.
[12]             Id. at 47.
[13]             Id. at 48-50.
[14]             Id. at 49-50.
[15]             Id. at 47.
[16]             Id. at 51.
[17]             Id. at 9.
[18]             Id. at 11.
[19]             Id. at 13.
[20]             Id. at 15-16.
[21]             Id. at 18.
[22]             314 Phil. 896 (1995).
[23]             Id at 903.
[24]             Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[25]             Id. at 21-22.
[26]             Id. at 61-82.
[27]             Id. at 67.
[28]             Id. at 70-71.
[29]             Id. at 72-73.
[30]             G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 426.
[31]             Id. at 553-556.
[32]             Rollo, p. 76.
[33]             Id. at 86-104.
[34]             Id. at 129-130.
[35]             Id. at 143-159.
[36]             G.R. No. 44007, March 20, 1991, 195 SCRA 444.
[37]             Rollo, pp. 147-148.
[38]             Id. at 149.
[39]             Id. at 152.
[40]             G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 112.
[41]             Id. at 132.
[42]             The BSP’s Comment, filed on December 3, 2010, has yet to be incorporated in the rollo.
[43]             Id. at 2.
[44]             Id. at 3.
[45]             Id. at 4.
[46]             Id. at 6.
[47]             Id. at 7.
[48]             Id. at 8.
[49]             Id.
[50]             Id. at 9.
[51]             Id. at 13, citing 16 Am Jur 2d 645 and 647.
[52]             Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, August 13, 1986, p. 260.
[53]             464 Phil. 439 (2004).
[54]             Id. at 454, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 1181 (2003).
[55]             Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 6 at 186-187.
[56]             Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, August 22, 1986, pp. 623-626.
[57]             Record of the Senate, Monday, November 5, 1990, p. 1533.
[58]             Committee on Government Enterprises, February 13, 1991, pp. 8-11.
[59]             Id. at 5-8.
[60]             Id. at 35-37.
[61]             Hon. Luis Mario M. General v.  Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011,  citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632 (2000).
[62]             Committee on Government Enterprises, February 13, 1991, p. 16.
[63]             Id. at 37-39.

[64]          1987 Constitution, Article IX (D).