camasura

A.M. No. P-10-2833* December 14, 2010 RETIRED EMPLOYEE, Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu, Complainant, vs. MERLYN G. MANUBAG, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu, Respondent.

Facts:

Respondent Merlyn G. Manubag, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court, Sibonga, Cebu (MTC), ) was administratively charged with: (1) Falsification of Public Documents, for allegedly submitting a fake diploma and falsifying her school records; (2) Immorality, for allegedly living with a certain Boy Alicaya and having a son who was registered and baptized with Boy Alicaya as the father, while still legally married to her husband, Sergio Manubag; and (3) Gambling during Office Hours, for playing mahjong during office hours.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Manubag be found guilty of Dishonesty and be dimissed from the service, effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.

Issue:

Whether or not the incorrect entries made by Manubag in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constituted dishonesty by misrepresentation and falsification of an official document.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Respondent Merlyn G. Manubag was dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Under Section 52 (A)(1) and (A)(6), Rule IV of the "Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" (Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999), respondent’s act of making untruthful declarations in her PDS renders her administratively liable for falsification of public document and dishonesty which are classified as grave offenses and, thus, warrant the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service even if either of them is respondent’s first offense. Section 58 of Rule IV thereof states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

In Adm. Case for Dishonesty & Falsification Against Luna,SC emphasized that "every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court's good name and standing."

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

Facts:

Petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission protesting against the Circular No.22  as contradictory to Circular No. 7, expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

The Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.

Issue:

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

Ruling:

A distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body is that, when an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.

Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows:

(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:

(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.

It will be seen that prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed.

Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

The Resolution appealed from was affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc

G.R. No. 108524 November 10, 1994

Mendoza, J.

Facts:

            Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.

It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax (VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.

The petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of Health and not the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products. It cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible. The respondents, on the contrary, argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect.

Likewise, petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers.

Thus, the present petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization.

Issues:

1.                  Is copra an agricultural food product for purposes of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), thus exempting the petitioner from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)?

2.                  Whether or not the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be accorded respect in interpreting the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.

3.                  Is RMC No. 47-91 violative of the equal protection clause?

4.                  Are oil millers exempt from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)?

Held:

1.         In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of Section 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.

Under Section 103(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under Section 103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is.

The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

2.         The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In interpreting Section 103(a) and (b) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.

Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."

3.         The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently.

4.         It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Internal Revenue Code, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under Section 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the producer.

            WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

sumingcan

Philippine Fisheries Development Authority
Vs
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Lucena City, City of Lucena, Lucena City Assessor and Lucena City Treasurer

FACTS:

Lucena Fishing Port Complex (LFPC) is one of the fishery infrastructure projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fish Port Package.
The Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) was created by virtue of P.D. 977 as amended by E.O. 772, with powers to manage, operate and develop the Navotas Fishing Port Complex and such other fishing port complexes that may be established by the Authority. PFDA took over the management and operation of LFPC in February, 1992.
On October 26, 1999 in a letter addressed to PFDA, the City Government of Lucena demanded payment of realty taxes on the LFPC property for the period from 1993 to1999 in the total amount of P39, 397,880.000. This was received by PFDA on November 24, 1999.
On October 17, 2000 another demand letter was sent by the Government of Lucena City on the same LFPC property, this time in the amount of P45, 660, 080.00 covering the period from 1993 to 2000.
PFDA filed its Appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Lucena City, which was dismissed for lack of merit. It filed its Motion for Reconsideration and this was denied by the Local Board. It appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) and the latter dismissed the appeal for same lack of merit. The Court of Tax Appeals denied PFDA’s petition for review and affirmed the Decision of the CBAA.
According to the Court of Tax Appeals, PFDA is a government-owned or controlled corporation, and is therefore subject to the real property tax imposition by the Local Government Units pursuant to Section 232 in relation to Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) is a government instrumentality or a government-owned or controlled corporation.
(2) Whether PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex (LFPC).

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:


PFDA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax.
It has a capital stock but it is not divided into shares of stocks. Also, it has no stockholders or voting shares, hence it is not a stock corporation. The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which is defined as an agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
PFDA is not liable for the real property tax. Under Sec. 133 of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government. The LFPC is a property of public dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real property tax under Sec. 234 of the Local Government Code, thus rendered the said tax assessments void.

morandarte

G.R. NO. 154243             March 6, 2007

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, Petitioners,
vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, Respondent.

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Inspector General of the PNP for abuse of authority/harassment against the respondent. The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother Lamberto Asayo, one of the suspects in the shooting of petitioner’s son. The complaint was referred to the Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, respondent did not appear but filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) which had jurisdiction over the case. Meanwhile, the Inspector General submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the commencement of summary dismissal proceedings against respondent. Upon approval of said recommendation, the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service for summary hearing. The PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a decision dismissing respondent from police service.

ISSUES:

·         WON the respondent failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies prior to the filing of his petition.

·         WON the chief of the philippine national police has the authority or jurisdiction under republic act no. 6975 to hear and try the citizen's complaint against respondent.

HELD:

·         With regard to the first issue, the respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all the administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as when the issue involved is a purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him. Said issue being a purely legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case.

·         Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which took effect on 1 January 1991, x x x delineates the procedural framework in pursuing administrative complaints against erring members of the police organization. Section 41 of the law enumerates the authorities to which a complaint against an erring member of the PNP may be filed. It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP member which would warrant dismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section 41 should be read in conjunction with Section 42 of the same statute. Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors.

Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although other disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly declares this point.

The Court further declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and regional directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer."

Webster defines "unbecoming" conduct as "improper" performance. Such term "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method." Obviously, the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties fall within the scope of conduct unbecoming a police officer. Clearly, the charges against respondent in this case are also covered by paragraph (c), Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, vesting the PNP Chief with jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint against respondent.

Verily, the assistance of counsel was not required for respondent to validly waive his right to cross-examine the witnesses in the administrative case against him.

In sum, the charges against respondent fall well within the scope of paragraph (c), Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, thus, the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint against respondent; and the summary hearing officer accorded respondent due process and never deprived respondent any of his rights.