condonation of an administrative offense takes place only when the public official is re-elected despite the pendency of an administrative case against him
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168309 January 29, 2008OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated January 6, 2004 and the Resolution3 dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69749.
The case arose from an administrative complaint for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0926)
by then Barangay Chairman Romancito L. Santos of Concepcion,
Malabon, against Edilberto Torres (Edilberto), Maricar D. Torres
(Maricar), and Marian D. Torres (Marian), then Municipal Councilor,
Legislative Staff Assistant, and Messenger, respectively, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malabon. Maricar and Marian are daughters of Edilberto.
Maricar was appointed as Legislative Staff Assistant
on February 16, 1995, while Marian was appointed as Messenger on May 24,
1996. At the time of their public employment, they were both enrolled
as full-time regular college students – Maricar, as a full-time student
at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and Marian as a dentistry-proper
student at the College of Dentistry of Centro Escolar University. During
the period subject of this case, they were able to collect their
respective salaries by submitting Daily Time Records (DTR) indicating
that they reported for work every working day, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m.
After due proceedings held in the Office of the Ombudsman, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Moreno F. Generoso, in the Decision4
dated November 9, 2001, found Maricar and Marian administratively
guilty of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and
recommended the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The charge against Edilberto was dismissed, having become moot and
academic in view of his re-election on May 14, 2001 in accordance with
the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos5
that "a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates
as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor." Upon recommendation of
Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
affirmed the findings of GIO Generoso but tempered the penalty to one
(1) year suspension from service without pay.
Aggrieved, Maricar and Marian went to the CA via a petition6 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision dated January 6, 2004, the CA granted
the petition. While affirming the findings of fact of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the CA set aside the finding of administrative guilt against
Maricar and Marian ratiocinating in this wise:
It is undisputed that petitioners are confidential
employees of their father. As such, the task they were required to
perform, is upon the instance of their father, and the time they were
required to report may be intermittent. To our mind, the false entries
they made in their daily time records on the specific dates contained
therein, had been made with no malice or deliberate intent so as to
constitute falsification. The entries made may not be absolutely false,
they may even be considered as having been made with a color of truth,
not a downright and willful falsehood which taken singly constitutes
falsification of public documents. As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera inexactud no es bastante para integrar este delito."
In the present case, the daily time records have already served their
purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or third
person because under the facts obtaining, petitioners may be said to
have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
permission from their superior.
It may be true that a daily time record is an
official document. It is not falsified if it does not pervert its avowed
purpose as when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be
different in the case of a public document with continuing interest
affecting the public welfare, which is naturally damaged if that
document is falsified when the truth is necessary for the safeguard and
protection of that general interest. The keeping and submission of daily
time records within the context of petitioners’ employment, should be
taken only for the sake of administrative procedural convenience or as a
matter of practice, but not for reason of strict legal obligation.
Assuming that petitioners are under strict legal
obligation to keep and submit daily time records, still we are disposed
to the view that the alleged false entries do not constitute
falsification for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent.
The following pronouncement in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan
may serve as a guidepost, to wit: "[I]f what is proven is mere
judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice
or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily,
evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general
rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will
exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of course
is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences,
which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the
element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and
imprudence. In the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good
faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of petitioners."
As a final note, there may be some suspicions as to
the real intention of private complainant in instituting the action
before public respondent, caution should be taken to prevent the
development of circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of
the public office. Private complainant is a government official himself,
as such he should avoid so far as reasonably possible, a situation
which would normally tend to arouse any reasonable suspicion that he is
utilizing his official position for personal gain or advantage to the
prejudice of party litigants or the public in general. For "there may be
occasion then where the needs of the collectivity that is the
government may collide with his private interest as an individual."
In closing, it must be borne in mind that the evident
purpose of requiring government employees to keep a daily time record
is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid
accordingly. Closely adhering to the policy of no work no pay, a daily
time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or
loss to the government as would result in instances where it pays an
employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an
official document, however, remains untarnished if the damage sought to
be prevented has not been produced. The obligation to make entries in
the daily time records of employees in the government service is a
matter of administrative procedural convenience in the computation of
salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and
strict measure of professional discipline, efficiency, dedication,
honesty and competence. The insignificant transgression by petitioners,
if ever it is one, would not tilt the scales of justice against them,
for courts must always be, as they are, the repositories of fairness and
justice.7
Petitioner moved to reconsider the reversal of its
Decision by the CA, but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated
May 27, 2005. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE FILLING-UP OF ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL DAILY TIME
RECORDS (DTRs) IS NOT A MATTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CONVENIENCE,
BUT RATHER REQUIRED BY CIVIL SERVICE LAW TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPER
LENGTH OF WORK-TIME IS OBSERVED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES,
INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES LIKE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. THE
FALSIFICATION OF DTRs WOULD RENDER THE AUTHORS THEREOF ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT FOR THE DAMAGING FALSE
NARRATION AND THE COLLECTION OF FULL COMPENSATION FOR INEXISTENT WORK.
II
THE ELEMENT OF DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT A
REQUISITE FOR ONE TO BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR DISHONESTY AND
MISCONDUCT. ASSUMING IT IS FOR ARGUMENT’S SAKE, DAMAGE WAS CAUSED THE
GOVERNMENT WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FALSIFIED THEIR DAILY TIME RECORDS
IN ORDER TO COLLECT THEIR SALARIES.
III
THE ELEMENT OF INTENT OR MALICE APPLIES TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, NOT TO AN OFFENSE OF DISHONESTY AND MISCONDUCT.8
Petitioner’s first submission is that the filling-up
of entries in the official DTR is not a matter of administrative
procedural convenience but is a requirement by Civil Service Law to
ensure that the proper length of work-time is observed by all public
officials and employees, including confidential employees such as
respondents. It argues that DTRs, being representations of the
compensable working hours rendered by a public servant, ensure that the
taxpaying public is not shortchanged. To bolster this position,
petitioner cited Rule XVII on Government Office Hours of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws, to wit:
SECTION 1. It shall be the duty of each head of
department or agency to require all officers and employees under him to
strictly observe the prescribed office hours. When the head of office,
in the exercise of discretion allows government officials and employees
to leave the office during the office hours and not for official
business, but to attend socials/events/functions and/or
wakes/interments, the same shall be reflected in their time cards and
charged to their leave credits.
SEC. 2. Each head of department or agency shall
require a daily time record of attendance of all the officers and
employees under him including those serving in the field or on the
water, to be kept in the proper form and, whenever possible, registered
in the bundy clock.
Service "in the field" shall refer to service
rendered outside the office proper and service "on the water" shall
refer to service rendered on board a vessel which is the usual place of
work.
SEC. 3. Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of agencies who
are appointed by the President, officers who rank higher than these
chiefs and assistant chiefs in the three branches of government, and
other presidential appointees need not punch in the bundy clock, but
attendance and all absences of such officers must be recorded.
SEC. 4. Falsification or irregularities in the
keeping of time records will render the guilty officer or employee
administratively liable without prejudice to criminal prosecution as the
circumstances warrant.
SEC. 5. Officers and employees of all departments and
agencies except those covered by special laws shall render not less
than eight hours of work a day for five days a week or a total of forty
hours a week, exclusive of time for lunch. As a general rule, such hours
shall be from eight o’clock in the morning to twelve o’clock noon and
from one o’clock to five o’clock in the afternoon on all days except
Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.
SEC. 6. Flexible working hours may be allowed subject
to the discretion of the head of department or agency. In no case shall
the weekly working hours be reduced in the event the department or
agency adopts the flexi-time schedule in reporting for work.
SEC. 7. In the exigency of the service, or when
necessary by the nature of the work of a particular agency and upon
representations with the Commission by the department heads concerned,
requests for the rescheduling or shifting of work schedule of a
particular agency for a number of working days less than the required
five days may be allowed provided that government officials and
employees render a total of forty hours a week and provided further that
the public is assured of core working hours of eight in the morning to
five in the afternoon continuously for the duration of the entire
workweek.
SEC. 8. Officers and employees who have incurred
tardiness and undertime regardless of minutes per day exceeding [at
least] ten times a month for two (2) consecutive months or for 2 months
in a semester shall be subject to disciplinary action.9
Petitioner posits that, by reason of the above
provisions, making false entries in the DTRs should not be treated in a
cavalier fashion, but rather with a modicum of sacredness because the
DTR mirrors the fundamental maxim of transparency, good governance,
public accountability, and integrity in the public service pursuant to
the constitutional precept that "public office is a public trust."
Consequently, the officer or employee who falsifies time records should
incur administrative liability.
On its second and third submissions, petitioner
assailed the position of the CA that respondents cannot be held guilty
of falsification because they did not cause any damage to the government
and there was no intent or malice on their part when they made the
false entries in their respective DTRs during the questioned period of
service. According to petitioner, respondents were not criminally
prosecuted for falsification under the Revised Penal Code, but were
being held administratively accountable for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official documents; thus, the elements
of damage and intent or malice are not prerequisites. It further claimed
that for this purpose, only substantial evidence is required, and this
had been strongly established. Petitioner also argued that, even if the
element of damage is mandatory, respondents had caused damage to the
government when they received their full salaries for work not actually
rendered.
In their Comment,10
respondents claimed that the CA correctly dismissed the administrative
charges against them as the integrity of their DTRs had remained
untarnished and that they acted in good faith in making the entries in
their DTRs. They said that the CA clearly elaborated the legal basis for
its ruling in their favor. They even argued that the administrative
charges lodged by Romancito Santos were based on mere conjectures and
conclusions of fact, such that it was not impossible for college
students to work eight (8) hours a day and attend classes. They further
claimed that petitioner failed to prove that they actually attended
their classes which they were enrolled in.
Respondents also argued that petitioner erred in not
having dismissed outright the administrative charges against them
because, at the time the complaint was filed, the charges had already
prescribed under Section 20 (5) of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989), to wit:
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
They said that the acts complained of occurred in
1996 to 1997, while the case was filed only on February 2000, or after
the lapse of more or less three (3) years.
Respondent Maricar also asseverated that the doctrine laid down in Aguinaldo v. Santos11
should also apply to her considering that she was elected as City
Councilor of Malabon City in the 2004 elections. She also claimed that
the instant case adversely affected their lives, particularly in her
case, for while she graduated from the University of the East College of
Law in 2004, she was only able to take the bar examinations in 2005 due
to the pendency of the administrative case against her. She also cited
the fact that the criminal case involving the same set of facts was
dismissed, insinuating that, as a result of this, the administrative
case should have likewise been dismissed.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that this is an
administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification
of official document. To sustain a finding of administrative culpability
only substantial evidence is required, not overwhelming or
preponderant, and very much less than proof beyond reasonable doubt as
required in criminal cases.12 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The following facts are borne out by the records: (1)
Maricar was appointed as Legislative Staff Assistant in the Office of
then Councilor of Malabon, Edilberto Torres, on February 16, 1995;13 (2) Marian was appointed as Messenger in the same office on May 24, 1996;14
(3) at the time of Maricar’s appointment to and employment in her
position (1995-1997), she was a full-time regular college student at
UST;15
(4) at the time of Marian’s appointment and employment as messenger in
her father’s office (1996-2000), she was a full-time regular
dentistry-proper student at the College of Dentistry of Centro Escolar
University;16
(5) during the employment of respondents in government service, they
submitted DTRs indicating that they religiously reported for work from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. during work days;17
(6) by reason thereof, respondents collected their full salaries during
the entire time of their employment in their respective positions;18 and, (7) these all occurred with the full knowledge and consent of their father.19
It is also worthy to note that the factual finding
made by petitioner, i.e., that respondents made false entries in their
respective DTRs for the period subject of this case, was affirmed by the
CA in the assailed Decision dated January 6, 2004.20
On the basis of these established facts, petitioner
was correct in holding respondents administratively guilty of dishonesty
and falsification of official document. Dishonesty is defined as the
"disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack
of integrity."21
Falsification of an official document, as an administrative offense, is
knowingly making false statements in official or public documents. Both
are grave offenses under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, which carry with it the penalty of dismissal on the
first offense.22
Falsification of DTRs amounts to dishonesty.23
The evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep a time
record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid
accordingly. Closely adhering to the policy of no work-no pay, a DTR is
primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the
government as would result in instances where it pays an employee for no
work done.24
Respondents’ claim of good faith, which implies a
sincere intent not to do any falsehood or to seek any undue advantage,
cannot be believed. This Court pronounced –
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and
abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and
it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own
mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the
validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. x x x25
In this case, respondents knew fully well that the
entries they made in their respective DTRs were false considering that
it was physically impossible for them to have reported for full work
days when during those times they were actually attending their regular
classes, which undoubtedly would take up most of the daytime hours of
the weekdays. With this knowledge, respondents did not bother to correct
the DTR entries to honestly reflect their attendance at their workplace
and the actual work they performed. Worse, they repeatedly did this for
a long period of time, consequently allowing them to collect their full
salaries for the entire duration of their public employment as staff
members of their father.
Respondents’ protestations that petitioner failed to
prove their actual attendance in their regular classes and thus, suggest
that they may not have been attending their classes, is preposterous
and incredible, simply because this is not in accord with the natural
course of things. The voluminous documentary evidence subpoenaed by
petitioner from UST and Centro Escolar University showing the schedule
of classes of respondents during the questioned period, along with the
certificates of matriculation painstakingly perused by GIO Generoso,
strongly militates against this claim. It would be the height of
absurdity on the part of respondents to voluntarily enroll in their
respective courses, pay school fees, and not attend classes but instead
report for work. Even if this was remotely possible, such a situation
would be irreconcilable with the respondents having graduated from their
respective courses.
Without doubt, the scrutiny of the numerous school
documents, the DTRs submitted, and the payrolls from the office of the
then Municipal Accountant of Malabon overwhelmingly revealed that the
classes in which respondents enrolled for several school years were in
stark conflict with the time entries in the DTRs, and several payroll
sheets showed that respondents collected their full salaries
corresponding to the DTR entries. These findings of fact made by
petitioner, being supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive;26 more so that the finding of false entries in the DTRs was affirmed by the CA.
Thus, the CA gravely erred when it exonerated
respondents from administrative guilt based on the findings of fact of
petitioner which it even affirmed. The jurisprudence27
adopted by the appellate court in laying the legal basis for its ruling
does not apply to the instant case because said cases pertain to
criminal liability for Falsification of Public Document under the
Revised Penal Code. The element of damage need not be proved to hold
respondents administratively liable.
But it cannot even be said that no damage was
suffered by the government. When respondents collected their salaries on
the basis of falsified DTRs, they caused injury to the government. The
falsification of one’s DTR to cover up one’s absences or tardiness
automatically results in financial losses to the government because it
enables the employee concerned to be paid salaries and to earn leave
credits for services which were never rendered. Undeniably, the
falsification of a DTR foists a fraud involving government funds.28
Likewise, the existence of malice or criminal intent
is not a prerequisite to declare the respondents administratively
culpable. What is merely required is a showing that they made entries in
their respective DTRs knowing fully well that they were false. This was
evident in the many documents viewed and reviewed by petitioner through
GIO Generoso.
On the issue of prescription, we agree with
petitioner’s contention that the Office of the Ombudsman is given by
R.A. No. 6770 a wide range of discretion whether or not to proceed with
an investigation of administrative offenses even beyond the expiration
of one (1) year from the commission of the offense.29
Likewise, the dismissal of the criminal case
involving the same set of facts cannot benefit respondents to cause the
dismissal of the administrative charges against them. As we held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan30 --
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public
officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold
responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or
omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if
such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the
public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. x x x
Hence, there was no impropriety committed by
petitioner when it conducted the administrative investigation which led
to the finding of guilt against respondents.
As regards the applicability of Aguinaldo, our
pronouncement therein is clear that condonation of an administrative
offense takes place only when the public official is re-elected despite
the pendency of an administrative case against him. In the case of
Maricar, prior to her election as Councilor of now Malabon City, she
held an appointive, not an elective, position, i.e., Legislative Staff Assistant, appointed by her very own father, then Councilor Edilberto Torres.
As mentioned above, falsification of a DTR (an
official document) amounts to dishonesty. Thus, respondents should be
held administratively liable. While dismissal was originally recommended
for imposition on respondents, the penalty was eventually tempered to
suspension of one (1) year without pay.
We agree with the imposition of the lower penalty considering that respondents’ public employment with the then Sangguniang Bayan
of Malabon, even while they were regular college students, was of a
confidential character, and the arrangement was with the full knowledge
and consent of their father who appointed them to their positions.
While this Court recognizes the relative laxity given
to confidential employees in terms of adjusted or flexible working
hours, substantial non-attendance at work as blatant and glaring as in
the case of respondents cannot be countenanced. Collecting full salaries
for work practically not rendered is simply, downright reprehensible.
Inevitably, this leads to the erosion of the public’s faith in and
respect for the government.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman dated November 9, 2001 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 10-37.
2 Id. at 39-45.
3 Id. at 48-52.
4 Id. at 219-232.
5 G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768, 773.
6 Rollo, pp. 181-197.
7 Id. at 42-44.
8 Id. at 17-18.
9 Id. at 22-23.
10 Id. at 169-180.
11 Supra note 5.
12 Apolinario v. Flores, G.R. No. 152780, January 22, 2007, 512 SCRA 113, 119; Resngit-Marquez v. Judge Llamas, Jr., 434 Phil. 184, 203 (2002), Mariano v. Roxas, 434 Phil. 742, 749 (2002), and Liguid v. Camano, Jr., 435 Phil. 695, 706 (2002).
13 Finding of fact of petitioner and not denied (therefore, admitted) by respondents.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 The Court of Appeals stated, "We may agree with the findings of fact made by public respondent, but the inference made in relation to the offense committed that will merit suspension from service is manifestly mistaken." Rollo, pp. 41-42. (Emphasis supplied)
21 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1990).
22 CSC Resolution No. 991936 (1999), Rule IV, Section 52 (A) (1) & (6).
23 Re: Falsification of Daily Time Records of Maria Fe P. Brooks, A.M. No. P-05-2086, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 483, 488; Administrative Circular No. 2-99 (Re: Strict Observance of Working Hours and Disciplinary Action for Absenteeism and Tardiness ), item II, 15 January 1999, viz.:
25 PNB v. De Jesus, 458 Phil. 454, 459-460 (2003).
26 R.A. No. 6770, Section 27, 5th paragraph.
27 Beradio v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24; Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890 (1999).
28 Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337, 353.
29 Section 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman MAY not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. (Emphasis supplied)