FIRST CASE
LARRAZABAL(petitioner) vs
COMELEC and DE LA CRUZ(respondents) G.R. No. 100739 September 3, 1991
ABELLA(petitioner) vs COMELEC and
LARRAZABAL(respondents) G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991
FACTS:
SPC Case No. 88-546 (Petition
for disqualification of ADELINA
Y. LARRAZABAL)
In line with the
Court's directive, the COMELEC conducted hearings in SPC Case No. 88-546 to
resolve the qualification of Larrazabal on the basis of two (2) legal issues
raised by Silvestre T. de la Cruz namely, Larrazabal's lack of legal residence
in the province of Leyte and her not being a registered voter in the province,
as required by Title II, Chapter I, Section 42, B.P. Blg. 337, in relation to
Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 42. Qualification. — (1) An
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such
in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected,
a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any
other local language or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Cities that are
highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,
whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their
right to vote for elective provincial officials.
…the COMELEC found that petitioner
Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter
thereat. With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor
of the province of Leyte.”
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the COMELEC in reliance on the provisions of
the Family Code was proper?
2) Whether in the matter of determining the RESIDENCE is more on
the principle of INTENTION, the ANIMUS REVERTENDI rather than anything else?
3) Whether or not petitioner is a registered voter in the said
province?
RULING:
The
Court affirmed COMELEC’s ruling.
In
quoting some of its decision dated February 14, 1991:
“For the purpose of running
for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence
or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from
time to time.
The Civil Code is clear that
'[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
Arts. 68 and 69 of the
Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also provide as follows:
Art. 68. The husband and
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and
wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for
the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Husband and wife as a matter
of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of
abode. (COMELEC decision, pp. 21-23; Rollo – 100710, pp. 67-69; Emphsis
supplied)”
“As regards the principle of ANIMUS
REVERTENDI we ruled in the case of Faypon
v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]):”
xxx xxx xxx
“... [M]ere absence from
one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or
practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile
largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities
and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his
residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly such abandonment or
loss.”
xxx xxx xxx
“... A citizen may leave the
place of his birth to look for 'greener pastures' as the saying goes, to
improve his life, and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice
of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for
any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional
or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity
to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin, has not forsaken him. ... (at pp. 297-300)”
“As can be gleaned from the questioned
decision, the COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the required
residence…. she has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the
present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her
residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to
qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the province of Leyte
clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident of Ormoc City. In
the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on the provisions
of the Family Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. The
petitioner did not present evidence to show that she and her husband maintain
separate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.”
“…there is no evidence to
prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in
1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she
established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself
a resident therein. The intention of animus
revertendi not to abandon her
residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she
occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an
intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to
often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left
friends and relatives therein although for intents and purposes we have already
transferred our residence to other places.”
QUERY:
WHAT IS THAT PRINCIPLE, IN
DETERMINING THE RESIDENCE OF A CANDIDATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF RUNNING FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE?
ANS:
“The intention to return” under the principle of ANIMUS
REVERTENDI is required for the purpose of running for public office, the
residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any
place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time.”
“The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence.”
_______________________________________________________________________________
SECOND CASE
AQUINO(petitioner) vs COMELEC, BEDON and ICARO(respondents)
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political
party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May
8, 1995 elections.
After
hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, declaring Aquino ELIGIBLE
to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of
Makati City.
On
May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation
of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of
the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Which was later
lifted upon motion of petitioner on June 2, 1995 where “…the Commission
RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept
the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of
jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more reflection
and judiciousness.”
On
the same day June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued
a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995.
The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6,
1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of
the constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the order of
suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning
number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers
of the City of Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
completed canvass of election returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates, who shall be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
ISSUE:
Whether
or not Agapito A. Aquino is ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for
the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City
in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of
residence?
RULING:
In ruling against petitioner
the court agreed with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City
the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
“The Constitution requires that a person
seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of the district in which
he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence,
for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.”
“In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term "residence" has
always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The
Court there held:
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile,… The framers of the
Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.”
“Clearly, the place "where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this
deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is
"to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong
with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate
falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That
purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same
area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner
actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by
the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or
whether or not he was domiciled in the same.”
“Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in
the case at bench. Domicile of origin
is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's
claims of a change ofdomicile from
Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive
proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly met
by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of
domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear
and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.”
QUESTION:
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE OF RESIDENCE IN
RELATION TO A CANDIDATE, FOR ELECTION PURPOSES?
In the case supra “…the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The
manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in
law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the
practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is
to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of
residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously
best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by
choice.”
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