willful non payment of debt

THIRD DIVISION

TEOPICIO TAN,                     Complainant, -  versus  - SALVACION D. SERMONIA, CLERK IV, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,  ILOILO CITY,                     Respondent.

A.M.  No.  P-08-2436 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 06-2394-P) Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,        Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA,   PERALTA, and BERSAMIN,* JJ. Promulgated: August 4, 2009

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R E S O L U T I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, ­J:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed by Teopicio Tan (Tan) against Salvacion D. Sermonia (Sermonia), Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City, for willful failure to pay just debts and conduct unbecoming a court employee.

According to the Complaint dated 23 January 2006, sometime in February to March 2000, Sermonia purchased on credit from Tan various construction materials amounting to P15,145.50, promising to pay for the same within 30 days.  However, after the lapse of the said period, Sermonia failed to pay her debt.  Everytime Tan demanded payment from Sermonia, the latter got angry and uttered bad words against the former.  Tan made his final demand on 21 November 2000, but Sermonia still refused to pay her debt.  Hence, on 16 January 2002, Tan filed before the MTCC a civil complaint against Sermonia for collection of sum of money, docketed as Civil Case No. 20730.  A Decision was rendered by the MTCC in Civil Case No. 20730 on 29 December 2003 ordering Sermonia to pay Tan P15,145.50, plus 12% interest per annum, from the date of demand until full payment, and 25% of the amount payable as attorney’s fees, as well as to pay the costs of the suit.

            On 9 March 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required Sermonia to file her comment within 10 days.  However, Sermonia failed to comply, and a 1^st Tracer dated 30 June 2006 was issued to her.

            In response, Sermonia sent the OCA a letter dated 21 July 2006 requesting an extension of 30 days within which to file her comment since she had yet to secure the services of a counsel.  The OCA granted her request on 30 August 2006.  Despite the lapse of the extended period granted her, Sermonia still failed to submit her comment.  Consequently, then Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted an Agenda Report on 23 May 2007, informing the Court of Sermonia’s refusal to file her comment on Tan’s Complaint.

          Acting on said Agenda Report, the Court issued a Resolution dated 9 July 2007 directing Sermonia to file her comment within a non-extendible period of 10 days from notice, and to show cause why she should not be administratively dealt with for her failure to file the same comment despite the extended period previously granted her.

          Sermonia filed her Comment only on 26 September 2007.  Sermonia explained in her Comment that she did not pay her debt to Tan because she opposed the accuracy and justness of the amount he had demanded.  Sermonia claimed to have already made partial payments of her debt, but she misplaced the papers/receipts evidencing her payments.  She failed to make subsequent payments due to severe financial difficulties, since she was the principal provider for an extended family of elders, nephews, and nieces, plus she was incurring spiraling expenses brought about by her obesity.  She did acknowledge, however, that she had moral and legal responsibilities to settle her financial obligation to Tan.

On 14 January 2008, the OCA submitted its Report with the following recommendation:

           

            PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Court that respondent Salvacion Sermonia, Clerk IV, MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for willful failure to pay just debts and for failure to comply with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

          On 3 March 2008, the Court required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.  Since both parties failed to submit such manifestations, the Court considered that they were deemed to have submitted the case for deliberation based on the pleadings filed.

The Court agrees in the findings of the OCA, except in the recommended penalty.

A review of the records would reveal that Sermonia was indeed guilty of willful failure to pay a just debt.

“Just debts” refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor.

In the case at bar, there is no question that Sermonia admitted her debt to Tan when the former stated in her Comment that:

3. [Sermonia], while refusing to pay the debt subject of Civil Case No. 20730, did not do so willfully. Rather, she was only constrained and found difficulty to do so as she was in disagreement with the accuracy and justness of the amount that was being demanded of her by [Tan]. In fact, she had actually made partial payments thereon but has misplaced the small pieces of paper that was issued to her to prove the same. She was just biding for time during which she could have found these small pieces of paper and, thereby, reduce her liability.

4. When [Tan] filed Civil Case No. 20730, [Sermonia] did not file a responsive pleading anymore knowing that without those misplaced small pieces of paper she, nevertheless, would not succeed in reducing her liability anyway. In this regard, in one occasion she just approached the counsel of [Tan] and told him, that she is just submitting herself to the usual course of the proceedings without interposing any defense, in effect, acknowledging the existence of her subject indebtedness. In doing so, she was of the honest belief that she will even make matters much easier for [Tan], who would as a consequence quickly obtain a favorable judgment from the court, which he could cause to be executed for satisfaction anytime. (Emphasis supplied.)

As can be gleaned above, Sermonia does not deny she has an unpaid debt to Tan.  Sermonia, though, alleges that she refused to pay the amount demanded by Tan, because she disagreed with the accuracy and justness thereof, given that she had already made previous partial payments of her debt.  This is a matter, however, which this Court can no longer take cognizance of in the resolution of the present administrative case. 

It must be remembered that Tan already instituted Civil Case No. 20730, an action for collection of sum of money, against Sermonia, before the MTCC.  It was in Civil Case No. 20730 where Sermonia could have appropriately assailed the amount being demanded by Tan and raised the defense of previous payments made.  Yet, Sermonia chose not to file an answer to Tan’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 20730, because she purportedly lost the receipts which could prove the previous payments she had made on her debt.  Sermonia deemed it best to just let Civil Case No. 20730 proceed without opposition from her part.  The MTCC rendered its Decision on 29 December 2003, ruling against Sermonia and ordering her to pay Tan’s total demand of P15,145.50, plus 12% interest per annum, 25% attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.  Even with this final and executory judgment of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 20730, Sermonia has still failed to finally settle her obligation to Tan.

In consideration of the foregoing, Tan’s claim against Sermonia is a just debt, not only because its existence and justness are admitted by the latter, but also because it was already adjudicated by the MTCC.  It is a just debt that remains unpaid by Sermonia.

Sermonia’s averment of financial difficulties is not a sufficient excuse for failing to pay her debt to Tan.  Nonpayment is not Sermonia’s only option.  Instead of meeting Tan’s demands for payment with anger and foul utterances, Sermonia could have just humbly requested a readjustment of the terms of her debt to something more manageable for her to comply with, given her financial circumstances.

Having incurred a just debt, Sermonia had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle it when it became due.  In the words of this Court in In Re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts Against Esther T. Andres:

            

The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of court employees.  “While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office.” Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect.  Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum. x x x.

Indeed, when Sermonia backtracked on her promise to pay her debt, such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction, for any act that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence reposed in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.  Sermonia’s unethical conduct has diminished the honor and integrity of her office, stained the image of the judiciary and caused unnecessary interference, directly or indirectly, in the efficient and effective performance of her functions. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards.  Like all other court personnel, Sermonia is expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her court’s albatross of infamy. 

The gravamen of Sermonia’s offense is her unwillingness to pay a just obligation.  The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Sermonia’s private life, but at her actuation unbecoming a public official.

Section 22(1), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, provides that willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, punishable by reprimand for the first infraction, suspension for one to 30 days for the second transgression, and dismissal for the third offense.

Sermonia has been previously charged twice for nonpayment of debts in Madia-as Lending Corporation v. Salvacion Sermonia and GRIO Lending Services v. Salvacion Sermonia, and was reprimanded by the Court in both instances.  Thus, this is Sermonia’s third case of willful failure to pay a just debt, which would have called for her dismissal from service.   

          Nevertheless, Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty.  The Court has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.  It is not only for the law’s concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.

As a result, in several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from strictly imposing the penalties provided by the law or rules, in the presence of factors such as the offending court employee’s length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, advanced age, and other humanitarian and equitable considerations. 

          In the case at bar, the Court, taking into consideration Sermonia’s more than 30 years in government service, her voluntary acknowledgment of her indebtedness to Tan,  her financial and health difficulties, and the not so substantial amount of her unpaid obligation, finds that suspension for six months without pay is already sufficient penalty.

As a final matter, the Court resolves the show-cause order it issued against Sermonia for her failure to timely file her Comment as directed by the OCA.

         

Sermonia claims that she has the highest respect for this Court and has no intention of disregarding her duty to obey its orders and processes without delay.  She explains that she did not file a comment as directed because she believed, in all honesty and good faith, that while she was civilly liable for a just debt, her failure to settle the same did not amount to an administrative charge for “willful refusal to pay just debt amounting to conduct unbecoming of a court employee.”  In this regard, she asks for the understanding and compassion of this Court, again taking into consideration her 30 years of continuous and dedicated service in the judiciary.

          The Court is not persuaded.  The Court finds Sermonia’s defense of honesty and good faith utterly baseless.  It should be recalled that Sermonia, at first, asked for, and was granted by the OCA, an extension of time to file her comment because she had yet to engage the services of a counsel.  This was evidently inconsistent with her subsequent assertion that she did not immediately file her comment, believing in good faith that she did not need to file at all, since she could not be held liable for the administrative charge against her.

          Sermonia’s failure to comply with the OCA’s directive to submit her comment on Tan’s Complaint constitutes a clear and willful disrespect, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the OCA.  In fact, it can be said that Sermonia’s non-compliance is tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself.  After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely.  Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive.  This contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has, likewise, been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system.  Sermonia’s insolence is further aggravated by the fact that she is an employee of the Judiciary, who, more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of her duty to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme Court without delay.  For her failure to timely file her comment on Tan’s Complaint as directed by the OCA, Sermonia should be admonished.

WHEREFORE, respondent Salvacion D. Sermonia, Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, is adjudged guilty of willful failure to pay a just debt, for which she is SUSPENDED for 6 months without pay.  She is further ordered to pay complainant Teopico Tan P15,145.50, plus 12% interest per annum, 25% attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit, as decreed in the MTCC Decision dated 29 December 2003 in Civil Case No. 20730, within six (6) months from receipt of this Resolution.

Additionally, Sermonia is ADMONISHED for her repeated failure to promptly file her Comment as directed by the Office of the Court Administrator.

Finally, Sermonia is WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future, including a violation of this Resolution, shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Sermonia’s 201 file.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice    

Chairperson

   ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA              DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                           Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                                                Associate Justice

*               Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin was designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. per Raffle dated 28 July 2009.

              Rollo, p. 1.

              Id. at 7.

              Id. at 8.

              Id. at 9.

              Id. at 12-13.

              Id. at 14.

              Id. at 15-19.

              Id. at 35-41.

              Id. at 42.

            Id. at 28

            See Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.

            Rollo, p. 16.

            Id. at 17.

            493 Phil. 1, 11 (2005).

            Villaseñor v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 457, 464 (2003).

            In Re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts Against Esther T. Andres, supra note 14.

            Villaseñor v. De Leon, supra note 15.

            Grio Lending Services v. Sermonia, 463 Phil. 14, 17 (2003), citing Uy v. Magallanes, Jr., 430 Phil. 211, 214 (2002).

            A.M. No. P-02-1563, 27 February 2002 (Resolution).

            Supra note 18.

            CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, 14 September 1999.

            Re: Habitual Absenteeism of Mr. Fernando P. Pascual, A.M. No. 2005-16-SC, 22 September 2005, 470 SCRA 569, 573.

            Mendoza v. Navarro, A.M. No. P-05-2034, 11 September 2006, 501 SCRA 354, 364.

            In Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I, and Angelita C. Esmerio, Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division (A.M. No. 2001-7-SC & 2001-8-SC, 22 July 2005, 464 SCRA 1), where therein respondents were found guilty of dishonesty, the Court, for humanitarian considerations, in addition to various mitigating circumstances in respondents' favor, meted out a penalty of six-month suspension instead of imposing the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.  In imposing a lower penalty on respondents, the Court took note of the following mitigating circumstances: (1) for ELIZABETH L. TING: her continued long years of service in the judiciary amounting to 21 years; her acknowledgment of her infractions and feelings of remorse; the importance and complexity of the nature of her duties (i.e., the preparation of the drafts of the Minutes of the Agenda); the fact that she stays well beyond office hours in order to finish her duties; and her Performance Rating which has always been "Very Satisfactory" and her total score of 42 points, which is the highest among the employees of the Third Division of the Court; and (2) for respondent ANGELITA C. ESMERIO: her continued long years of service in the judiciary amounting to 38 years; her faithful observance of office rules and regulations from the time she submitted her explanation-letter up to the present; her acknowledgment of her infractions and feeling of remorse; her retirement on 31 May 2005; and her family circumstances (i.e., support of a 73-year old maiden aunt and a 7-year old adopted girl).                       

In Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr. (A.M. No. P-99-1342, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 218), the penalty of dismissal imposable against therein respondent Norberto V. Doblada, Jr., was reduced by the Court to six-month suspension without pay for the attendant equitable and humanitarian considerations, to wit: Doblada, Jr. had spent 34 years of his life in government service, and he was about to retire; this was the first time that he was found administratively liable per available record; Doblada, Jr. and his wife were suffering from various illnesses that required constant medication, and they were relying on Doblada Jr.'s retirement benefits to augment their finances and to meet their medical bills and expenses.

                                In Civil Service Commission v. Belagan (G.R. No. 132164, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 578, 601), Allyson Belagan, who was charged with sexual harassment and found guilty of Grave Misconduct, was meted out the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one year, instead of the heavier penalty of dismissal, given his length of service, unblemished record in the past, and numerous awards.

                                In Buntag v. Pana (G.R. No. 145564, 24 March 2006, 485 SCRA 302), the Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Ombudsman when they took into consideration Corazon G. Buntag's length of service in the government and the fact that this was her first infraction. Thus, the penalty of dismissal for Falsification of Official Document was reduced to merely one-year suspension.

                                   

                               

            Tugot v. Judge Coliflores, 467 Phil. 391, 402 (2004).  

            Parane v. Reloza, A.M. No. MTJ-92-718, 7 November 1994, 238 SCRA 1.   

quizzer

QUESTION: Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action against him or in a civil action for damages against him?

Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical considerations, where the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the preliminary investigation stage of the criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed by the law, its unconditional terms and provisions notwithstanding. It is a situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court. 

Otherwise, if the Solicitor General who represents the state on appeal in criminal cases can appear for the accused public official in a preliminary investigation, then by the same token a provincial or city fiscal, his assistant or any government prosecutor who represents the People of the Philippines at the preliminary investigation of a case up to the trial thereof can appear for an accused public official at the preliminary investigation being conducted by another fiscal, prosecutor or municipal judge. The situation would simply be scandalous, to say the least.

There is likewise another reason, as earlier discussed, why the Office of the Solicitor General cannot represent an accused in a criminal case. Inasmuch as the State can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say and do must be lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the State, but is the mere wrong or trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and act in its name. 28 Therefore, the accused public official should not expect the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to defend him for a wrongful act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. In the same light, a public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful act, much less commit a crime.

This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him. 30 Any pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages.

 (ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, RAMON BARCELONA and AMY LAZARO-JAVIER, respondents. EN BANC[G.R. No. 87977.  March 19, 1990.])

QUESTION: Applicability of PD 1818, prohibiting courts from issuing TROs to infrastructure projects of government instrumentalities>

In the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.(MALAGA V. PENACHOS,September 3, 1992)

Administrative law prelim

Administrative law prelim

Instruction; Each question is worth 5%.The passing mark is 75%, hence you need to answer correctly at least 15 questions. Answer responsively and briefly. If you know the case, cite and you get an extra 3%.

1. State whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in the following cases:

            a. The Housing Land Use Regulatory board issues a memorandum stating that effective January 1, 2006, all housing units with unpaid premium for two years, shall be deemed foreclosed and shall be sold at public auction. John’s house is affected, and he questions the validity of said memorandum.

            b.The Kapisanan ng mga Konserbatibong Linang, a non-governmental organization which monitors the flooding incidents in Quezon City, files a complaint before the RTC to cancel all Timber Licensing Agreements issued for the past five years, as they caused the flash floods. They questioned the DENR’s passivity and inaction on the matter, despite the pendency of the administrative complaints, which they filed in the said office.

            c. The DAR declared John’s riceland as covered under the Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to PD 27.John received the valuation, which he objected as it was very low. The DAR informed him that he can appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform about the matter. John did not take heed. He filed his complaint directly to the Regional Trial Court.

            d. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform ruled that the coverage of X’s land under agrarian reform was validly undertaken by the DAR Provincial Director. Not agreeing thereto, he filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary.

            e. Jose Mabini, the principal of Olingan Elementary School was dismissed and ousted by the Superintendent of Schools by reason of abuse of authority, gross immorality and corruption. He was then replaced by Maria Bonifacio.He filed a quo warranto proceeding before the RTC.

2. Aquilino Larin was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in 1995.He was charged with malversation before the Sandiganbayan and was convicted. Meanwhile the BIR Commissioner furnished the President of the copy of the Sandiganbayan decision. The president then organized a committee and on the basis of the committee’s recommendation, dismissed Larin from the service.

            Larin appealed his Sandiganbayan conviction to the Supreme Court, which reversed the conviction.

            Larin wrote a letter to the president praying that he should be reinstated with backwages, as the Supreme Court acquitted him of the criminal charge.

            The president denied his prayer. She argued that the criminal case is different from the administrative case, and besides, pursuant to her control powers, she had already reorganized the bureaus and appointed another assistant commissioner in Larin’s stead. The president emphasized that Larin has no more place in the bureaucracy.

            You are hired as Larin’s counsel, how would you argue his cause for reinstatement.

3. At the height of an oil crisis, the Energy Regulatory Board approved without any hearing the application of SHELL, PETRON and GRANEX to increase oil prices to 20%, on the basis of the unrebutted applications filed by the said companies. The people complained as said increases spelled in capital letters their hardships. Senator Pangmasa filed a petition in Court to stop the increases, reasoning that the same are violations of administrative due process, as no hearing, consultations, or even an opportunity to be heard was even made.

            Comment on the validity of the contention of Senator Pangmasa.

4. The administrative Code provides for a definition of some of the president’s powers such as the ordinance and residual powers. What is your understanding regarding these powers?

5.What do you mean by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies? State at least five exceptions to the doctrine.

6.Distinguish quasi-judicial power from quasi-legislative power.

7.State the requirements of procedural due process in administrative investigations.

8. [G.R. No. 86695.  September 3, 1992.]The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE C-1) ** was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 1

Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.

In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project.

On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818. 

The decree reads pertinently as follows:

Section 1.         No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.

QUESTION: Is the issuance of the TRO by the Judge improper? Explain your answer.

9. [G.R. No. 122338.  December 29, 1995.] In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."  5 Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.  6

On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Secretary of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment  against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntiniupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment thru a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Secretary of Justice and the President gravely abused their discretion in ordering his arrest without due notice and hearing.

            Question: Is the contention of  Wilfredo Sumulong Torres correct? Explain your answer.

10. [G.R. No. 87977.  March 19, 1990.]Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action against him?  Would your ruling be the same in a civil action for damages against him? Explain your answer.

11. [G.R. No. L-23523.  November 18, 1967.]The record shows that on March 7, 1963, Guadalupe C. Adaza, then Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, instituted Administrative Case No. 3 against Roberto P. Poculan who was then serving on his first term of office as municipal mayor of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, charging the latter with abuse of authority, oppression and maladministration. Basis for the charge was an incident that took place on February 23, 1963, during which, allegedly, the mayor, "with grave abuse of authority and taking advantage of his position, with intent to oppress, did then and there, wilfully, illegally, and feloniously, assault, maul and attack with the use of his fist and a home-made gun, locally known as `paliuntod,' one ANTONIO ARAPOC," inflicting upon him physical injuries which caused his death two days later.

On the same day, Governor Adaza issued Executive Order No. 1, ordering the suspension from office of Mayor Poculan for thirty days, pursuant to sections 2188-2189 of the Revised Administrative Code. After the lapse of said period of suspension, however, the mayor was reinstated.

At the close of Mayor Poculan's term of office, the administrative case against him was still pending, the Provincial Board having failed to act upon it to its finality.

Then came the 1963 local elections. Poculan was re-elected mayor of the municipality of Rizal. Felipe Azcuna was elected governor, replacing Adaza, and there was also a change in the composition of the Provincial Board.

The new members of the Provincial Board proceeded to investigate the administrative case against Poculan, and on February 14, 1964, rendered decision and passed Resolution No. 42-A, ordering his suspension for a period of two years. The decision was appealed by the Mayor to the President on March 6 of that year. On March 13, the Provincial Governor issued Executive Order No. 7 supplementing Resolution No. 42-A, designating the Vice Mayor to act as Mayor of Rizal. On the same day also, the governor directed the commander of the Philippine Constabulary unit detailed in the province to serve his order upon the suspended Mayor.

Meanwhile, Mayor Poculan had filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte an action for Prohibition, later amended, for Certiorari and Mandamus, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, to restrain the Provincial Board from enforcing its resolution. The petition, however, was dismissed on the ground, among others, that it was not the proper remedy.

Whereupon, Mayor Poculan filed the present action for Injunction, praying once more that the Provincial Board be restrained from enforcing its order of suspension. As prayed for, a preliminary injunction writ was issued at the commencement of the proceedings. The case was submitted for decision on the pleadings. On July 3, 1964, the court, finding the petition to be meritorious, rendered judgment declaring null and void the Board's resolution suspending the Mayor, on the principle that his reelection had purged him of the administrative charges filed against him during his first term of office. Motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, the Provincial Board filed the instant petition.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether or not the Provincial Board of Zamboanga del Norte may proceed with the administrative investigation of reelected mayor Roberto P. Poculan for misconduct, allegedly committed by the latter during his prior term of office.

Resolve said issue.

12.  [G.R. No. 83578.  March 16, 1989.]Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force. — The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall have the following powers and authority:

a)         Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;

b)         To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation;

c)         To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, oath oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;

d)         To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and To adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

"f.        After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country.

Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.

The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.

The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20%) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40%) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force." 

            QUESTION: After reading the above-outlined powers : (a) Is the anti-dollar Salting Task force a quasi-judicial body? (b) Would you consider it of co-equal rank to the Regional Trial Court? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

13.  [G.R. No. 81510.  March 14, 1990.] Facts:      On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

"04.      T:         Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay.

            S:         Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang akmg PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05.       T:         Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

            S:         Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06.       T:         Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

            S:         Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag-9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko.

.On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:

"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."

            On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

"HORTY SALAZAR

No. 615 R.O. Santos St.

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —

(1)        No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2)        Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

 This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987."

On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.) However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

QUESTIONS: (a) Is the act of the team in confiscating the assorted costumes valid?

                        (b) would you consider the ORDER of closure and seizure issued by ACHACOSO valid?

                        ( c) If you were the counsel of Horty Salazar, what would you do to protect her interests?

14. In the case of Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission (1995) it was held that the Civil Service Commission cannot abolish the Career Executive Service Board. What is the ratiocination of the Supreme Court regarding said ruling?

15.Give the meaning of the following latin maxims as applied in administrative law:

a.       ex dolo malo non oritus actio

b.      in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus

c.       ubi jus, ubi remedum

d.      quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibitur et per obluquum

e.       in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis

16. [G.R. No. 112497.  August 4, 1994.]The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. 

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila (A)revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, (B) it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.

QUESTION: Is the decision of the RTC of Manila valid? Explain.

17. (A)Does the ombudsman have the power to prosecute public officers who have committed election offenses?

 (B)Does it have the power to investigate the President, Chief Justice  and Comelec Chairman for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment?

 (C) Does it have the power to prosecute before the Sandiganbayan the Chairman of the COA?

18. In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner Delano Padilla seeks to set aside the resolution  1 of public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) which confirmed the decision of respondent Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) dismissing petitioner from the service after finding him guilty of the charges in the administrative complaint filed by the Land Transportation Office (LTO) of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Resolution No. 92-1849 dated November 17, 1992 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration is likewise assailed here.

The relevant antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On November 2, 1988, an administrative complaint  2 for gross dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties and gross violation of the law, rules and reasonable office regulations was filed against petitioner Delano Padilla, former officer-in-charge of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) of Bacolod City. It was alleged that petitioner succeeded in having caused and approved the registration and/or transfer of ownership of twelve (12) carnapped and stolen vehicles despite prior knowledge that existing laws, rules and regulations were violated in the registration and transfer thereof. As contended by complainant LTO, petitioner failed to require confirmation of the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipts corresponding to the subject vehicles from the LTO district offices which issued the same. Had he done so, no registration and/or transfer of the vehicles would have been possible because all the supporting documents pertinent to them were spurious. LibLex

Petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt thereof to answer the charges filed against him.

Accordingly, petitioner filed his answer  3 dated December 26, 1988 vehemently denying the charges against him. He contended that the twelve (12) motor vehicles were covered by proper clearances, certificates and similar documents issued by the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG). He claimed that the charges were baseless and were filed only to maliciously taint his good name and reputation.

The matter was set for hearing on April 20, 1989. However, only prosecutor Ramon Cuyco and his witness, Alfonso Alianza, were present. Petitioner and his counsel failed to appear despite due notice. Consequently, the case was heard ex-parte and was considered submitted for decision.

After considering the evidence on record, respondent Administrative Action Board (AAB) of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) through then DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes rendered a decision,  4 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing respondent Delano T. Padilla is hereby found guilty of the charges filed against him, and accordingly sentenced as follows:

(a)        That he is hereby dismissed from the service;

(b)        That he is disqualified for reemployment in the government service;

(c)        That his leave credits and retirement benefits are hereby declared forfeited; and

(d)        That his civil service eligibility is hereby recommended to be cancelled.

Petitioner contends that his constitutional right to due process or administrative due process was violated when on April 20, 1989 the scheduled hearing proceeded despite his, and his counsel's absence. He claims that nobody testified during the hearing and that the supporting documents were not presented or marked in evidence.

Rule on the contention of petitioner: was there a violation of due process?

19. [G.R. No. L-76633.  October 18, 1988.] The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates.

Question: Is the move of the Solicitor General correct? Explain.

20. Given the following  terms:

"public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, the "sense and experience of men"  in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.

What do you have in mind when confronted with such terms? What is their relevance in administrative law?

 21.  In the case of Corona v. UHPA, an issue was raised on the validity of  the PPA Administrative Order which limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. It is claimed that said order (1) violates due process because it was issued without prior consultation or hearing and (2) it amounted to deprivation of property rights. State how the Supreme Court ruled on the two issues.