QUESTION: Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public
officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action
against him or in a civil action for damages against him?
Accordingly,
there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical
considerations, where the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the
public official, defends the latter in the preliminary investigation stage of
the criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the case is brought
on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and
allowed by the law, its unconditional terms and provisions notwithstanding. It
is a situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Otherwise,
if the Solicitor General who represents the state on appeal in criminal cases
can appear for the accused public official in a preliminary investigation, then
by the same token a provincial or city fiscal, his assistant or any government
prosecutor who represents the People of the Philippines at the preliminary
investigation of a case up to the trial thereof can appear for an accused
public official at the preliminary investigation being conducted by another
fiscal, prosecutor or municipal judge. The situation would simply be
scandalous, to say the least.
There
is likewise another reason, as earlier discussed, why the Office of the
Solicitor General cannot represent an accused in a criminal case. Inasmuch as
the State can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say and do must be
lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the State, but is
the mere wrong or trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and
act in its name. 28 Therefore, the accused public official should not expect
the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to defend him for a
wrongful act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. In the same light,
a public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his
personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author
of a wrongful act, much less commit a crime.
This observation should apply as well to a public
official who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a
felony allegedly committed by him. 30 Any pecuniary liability he may be held to
account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The
State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General
likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages.
(ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO,
petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, RAMON BARCELONA and AMY LAZARO-JAVIER,
respondents. EN BANC[G.R. No. 87977.
March 19, 1990.])
QUESTION: Applicability of PD 1818, prohibiting courts from issuing
TROs to infrastructure projects of government instrumentalities>
In
the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar
prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned.
It was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro
Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this
dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D.
No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial
scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the
anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not
improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary
injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private
respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been
"100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli
has made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.(MALAGA V.
PENACHOS,September 3, 1992)
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