(Blanco v.Parilla, GR 180164, June 17, 2008)
1.Lucio Barro run for the mayoralty position during the May 1995 election in Bulacan. He was disqualified through an administrative case filed by his rival on a charge of vote-buying. His proclamation was declared null and void. In the 2008 election, he ran again as mayor, this time another disqualification case is filed against him by reason of his vote buying docket in the 1995 election.
Question: a. Is he qualified to run in the 2008 election?
b.Will your answer be the same if he was convicted in a criminal case for B.P. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court?
CAYAT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165736, April 24, 2007
2.Cayat run as a mayoralty candidate in the May 2008 election in Benguet. He won by a landslide vote of 9,500 as against Dalut who garnered only 2,500 votes. Before the date of the election however, a disqualification was filed against Cayat considering his previous conviction of Acts of Lasciciousnes. The conviction became final and Cayat filed a petition for probation. The disqualification case was decided on March 2008 against him before the COMELEC. He received the decision which was promulgated on March 15, 2008. He filed a motion for reconsideration on March 25, but the same was denied for failure to pay the docket fee of 300 pesos, as his lawyer only paid 200 pesos.
Questions: a) Is Cayat qualified to run as mayor ?
b) Is his proclamation by virtue of his landslide vote valid?
c) Is the Comelec correct in dismissing his motion for reconsideration for not filing the correct amount of the docket fee?
d) Can Dalut be declared the mayor of Benguet based on the above facts of the case?
Magno v. Comelec, G.R. 147904, October 4, 2002
3. Nestor Magno was mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections.A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that on July 25, 1995, he was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, he applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision declaring that he was disqualified from running for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In ruling against him, the COMELEC cited Section 12 of the BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
On May 10, 2001, he filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC in its resolution dated May 12, 2001.
He argues that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar, not BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said provision reads:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
QUESTIONS: A) Is he correct in saying that bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude? What is a crime involving moral turpitude then?
(B) There seems to be an inconsistency of the COMELEC provision and the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE provision. How would you reconcile the two?
(C) Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, what do you understand by this principle?
(D) Do you agree that Nestor Magno is disqualified to run as mayor?
Moreno v. COMELEC, GR. NO. 168550, August 10, 2006
4. Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. In fact he was discharged from probation on Dec. 18, 2000.
QUESTIONS:
(A) Is Moreno qualified to run for public office?
(B) Explain the previous ruling of the Supreme Court in the cases of Baclayon v. Mutia and De la Torre v. COMELEC.
(C) Explain the principle: Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
5. In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.
QUESTION: Under the circumstances, is the motion of execution pending appeal proper?
6. After the results of the May 8, 1995 elections were canvassed in 73 precincts in the Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, petitioner Gerry B. Garay, a candidate for vice-mayor, was credited with 5,411 votes and private respondent Jaime Gata, Jr., his rival, 5,391 or a margin of twenty (20) votes in favor of petitioner. The said results, however, excluded the votes from precinct 30-A of Barangay Culasi, Matnog, where armed men forcibly took the ballot box together with the election returns, other election papers, documents and/or paraphernalia.
Because the votes in precinct 30-A would obviously affect the standing of the said candidates, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) did not proclaim the winner. Failing to convince said Board to proclaim him by virtue of a certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) showing he garnered 116 votes against 68 votes for Garay in said precinct, respondent Gata brought the matter to the respondent Commission. In his appeal, 3 respondent Gata included a copy of the Tally Board, duly authenticated by the BEI, showing the same count as the Certificate of Votes: that is, Gata 116 votes and Garay 68 votes. If these were added to the already canvassed votes, Gata would win by a 28-vote margin.
In the meantime, while the said appeal was pending, respondent COMELEC upon recommendation of Comm. Julio Desamito conducted a special election in precinct 30-A, 4 on the ground of failure of election due to the loss of the ballot box and the election documents. Both petitioner Garay and respondent Gata actively participated in the election which was held on June 7, 1995. Petitioner won handily in the said election and was thereafter proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Matnog.
The Comelec First Division denied due course to the appeal because of appellant's (Gata) failure "to furnish the Commission all pertinent documents necessary for the latter to rule on the matter." Respondent Gata's motion for reconsideration of this Comelec action is still pending before the Comelec First Division. Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution promulgated on August 7, 1995 annulling the special election and directing the MBC to reconvene and to include "in the canvass, the votes reflected on the Tally Board submitted by the Board of Election Inspectors . . . ." As a result, respondent Gata was declared winner. The Commissioner En Banc said that it was "convinced without taint of any doubt that the votes shown in the tally board and certificate of votes reflect the true and genuine will of the electorate. . . ."
QUESTION: 1.Discuss whether the COMELEC EN BANC is correct in its action.
7. : "It appears that Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R. Gallardo were both candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the positions of congressmen and governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political factions and were in a bitter electoral battle.
"On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections, Cong. Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as respondents. In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain the respondents from undertaking and/or pursuing certain public works projects and from disbursing, releasing, and/or spending public funds for said projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881); that the public works projects were commenced without the approved detailed engineering plans and specification and corresponding program of works; that the expenditures of the 20% development fund for projects other than for maintenance violated the Local Government Code; that locally funded projects had been pursued without the provincial budget having been first approved, and reviewed by the Department of Budget and Management; and that the illegal prosecution of the said public works projects requiring massive outlay or public funds during the election period was done maliciously and intentionally to corrupt voters and induce them to support the candidacy of Gov. Gallardo and his ticket in the May 11, 1992 elections.
"In the afternoon of the same day that the petition was filed, Judge Tabamo issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for by the petitioner Cong. Romualdo, as follows:
'It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner as candidate and taxpayer, such damage or injury taking the form and shape occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be heard on notice, the respondents are hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting the project itemized in Annexes 'A' and 'A-1' of the petition; from releasing, disbursing and/or spending any public funds for such projects; from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods, or other things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with the said projects.'
"In the same Order of April 10, 1993 the judge gave the respondents ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the petition to answer the same, and set the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for hearing on April 24, 1992 at 8:30 A.M.
"Gov. Gallardo testified that when he received a copy of the restraining order and reviewed the petition filed, being a lawyer, he at once saw that the same was not within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. He said that the elections were nearing and all their projects were suspended, the laborers could not get their salaries, and the judge had set the hearing of the injunction on April 24, 1992 or very close to the elections of May 11, 1992. Believing that he could not get justice from the respondent court, he decided to go to the Supreme Court where he filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. L-104848) questioning the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the jurisdiction of the court over Special Civil Action No. 465.
QUESTION: 1. From your point of view, was the Judge correct in taking cognizance of the case and was his act of issuing the Temporary Restraining Order correct under the circumstances? Or would you agree with Gov. Gallardo that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case? Reason out your answer.
8. This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213 1 dismissing the petition for disqualification against private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint 2 for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended Petition 4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, 5 the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties and functions of the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations 7 for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996 Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that
1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed . . . .
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu propio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the electionlaws . . . .
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case was filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and the Silvestre v. Duavit ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted under any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election but was still pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed after the election but before the proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case was filed after the election and after the proclamation of the winner.
QUESTIONS: 1.The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad.On the basis of the facts, didthe COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion?
2.Trinidad further avers that the COMELEC was correct in summarily dismissing the disqualification case because the docket fees were not duly paid. Is the contention correct?
3.Sunga claims that, in the event of Trinidad’s disqualification, he should be proclaimed as mayor? Is he correct?
4.In this case who should be the rightful mayor? Explain.
9. Manuel Milla and Regina Balmores-Laxa were candidates for councillor of Gerona, Tarlac in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 18, 2001, Manuel Milla was proclaimed as the 8th wining candidate by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) based on the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass. One month after his proclamation or on June 18, 2001, Regina filed a petition with the COMELEC against Manuel and the BOC for correction of entries in the Statement of Votes based on fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of votes, specifically the entries for the 4 precincts in the Statement of Votes did not correspond to the election returns for the respective precincts.
On June 29, 2001, Manuel took his oath of office and assumed office.
The BOC admits the erroneous tally, and prays that it it be allowed to reconvene to effect the correction of entries in the Statement of Votes, inorder to give way for Regina’s winning as the eight councillor of Gerona.
In its Resolution of December 18, 2001, the COMELEC EN BANC, denied the BOC’s motion to reconvene, declared Manuel’s proclamation as null and void and proclaimed Regina as the eight winning candidate.
Manuel argued that: 1) the petition of Regina was filed beyond the reglementary period of five days from proclamation 2) pre-proclamation cases should be terminated after proclamation and assumption of office 3) padding of statement of votes isnot a proper subject of a pre-proclamation case 4) that the COMELECen banc did not have jurisdiction over the petition of Regina.
QUESTION: Resolve the issues raised by Manuel.
10.Discuss the scope and limits of a pre-proclamation controversy.
