Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452 provides:

SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall, within two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.

The COMELEC shall dismiss without need of hearing all other cases which are not found in the enumeration and which were disposed of according to the guidelines set forth under paragraphs one to five of the dispositive portion of Resolution No. 7257.

The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 7257 reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of its powers under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act Nos. 6646 and 7166, and other election laws, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. All cases which were filed by private parties without timely payment of the proper filing fee are hereby dismissed;

2. All cases which were filed beyond the reglementary period or not in the form prescribed under appropriate provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Act Nos. 6646 and 7166 are hereby likewise dismissed;

3. All other pre-proclamation cases which do not fall within the class of cases specified under paragraphs (1) and (2) immediately preceding shall be deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R.A. 7166 except those mentioned in paragraph (4). Hence, all the rulings of boards of canvassers concerned are deemed affirmed. Such boards of canvassers are directed to reconvene forthwith, continue their respective canvass and proclaim the winning candidates accordingly, if the proceedings were suspended by virtue of pending pre-proclamation cases;

4. All remaining pre-proclamation cases, which on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, appear meritorious and/or are subject of orders by the Supreme Court or this Commission in petitions for certiorari brought respectively to them shall likewise remain active cases, thereby requiring the proceedings therein to continue beyond 30 June 2004, until they are finally resolved; and

5. All petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases, not being pre-proclamation controversies and, therefore, not governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and particularly, by the second paragraph of Sec. 6, Republic Act No. 7166, shall remain active cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June 30, 2004, until the issues therein are finally resolved by the Commission.

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered that the proceedings in the cases appearing on the list annexed and made an integral part hereof, be continued to be heard and disposed of by the Commission.

This resolution shall take effect immediately.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 165736 April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FELISEO K. BAYACSAN, Intervenor.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For our resolution are two petitions for certiorari filed by Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat (Cayat). G.R. No. 163776 is a petition for certiorari¹ of the Resolution dated 12 April 2004² and of the Order dated 9 May 2004³ of the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC First Division) in SPA Case No. 04-152. The 12 April 2004 Resolution cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Cayat as mayoralty candidate of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. The 9 May 2004 Order denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee.

G.R. No. 165736 is a petition for certiorari⁴ of the Order dated 25 October 2004⁵ of the COMELEC First Division also in SPA Case No. 04-152. The 25 October 2004 Order granted the motion for execution of judgment filed by Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. (Palileng) and annulled Cayat’s proclamation. The 25 October 2004 Order also directed (1) the COMELEC Law Department to implement the dispositive portion of the 12 April 2004 Resolution; (2) the Regional Election Director of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC); (3) the new MBOC to convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet by deleting Cayat’s name and to proclaim Palileng as the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Feliseo K. Bayacsan (Bayacsan), duly elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed a petition-in-intervention in G.R. No. 165736.

The Facts

Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004. On 26 January 2004, Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC Regional Election Office in Baguio City. Docketed as SPA (PES) No. C04-001, Palileng’s petition alleged that:

3. On January 05, 2004, [Cayat] filed his Certificate [of] Candidacy for Mayor for the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet, Philippines alleging among others as follows:

"I AM ELIGIBLE for the office [I] seek to [be] elected, x x x. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge."

x x x (Underscoring supplied).

Copy of his Certificate of Candidacy is hereto attached and marked as ANNEX "A";

4. The truth of the matter being that [Cayat] is not eligible to run as Mayor having been convicted by final judgment for a criminal offense by the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Philippines, Branch 2, for the Crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness docketed as Criminal Case Number 110490. Copies of the Information and the Order of conviction dated October 03, 2003 is [sic] hereto attached and marked as ANNEX "B" and "C";

5. In fact, [Cayat] is still under probation at the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on January 05, 2004 after the Honorable Court granted his application for probation on November 06, 2003. Copies of the Application for probation date[d] October 07, 2003 and the Order granting the probation is [sic] hereto attached and marked as ANNEXES "D" and "E";

6. Despite assumption of obligation imposed by this oath that the facts stated in his Certificate of Candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge, [Cayat] made misrepresentations and committed acts of perjury when he declared that he is eligible for the said office while in truth and in fact, Respondent was convicted in the above-mentioned Criminal Complaint;

7. At the time of filing his Certificate of Candidacy, [Cayat] is disqualified to [sic] said office as Mayor as he is still serving his sentence and/or disqualification was not yet removed or cured[.]⁶ (Emphasis in the original)

Atty. Julius D. Torres (Atty. Torres), COMELEC Provincial Election Supervisor for Baguio-Benguet, served summons on Cayat by telegram through the Telecommunications Office on 26 January 2004. However, Cayat did not personally receive the telegram. The Telecommunications Office of Abatan, Buguias delivered the telegram to Ferdinand Guinid (Guinid). Atty. Torres also instructed Mr. Francis Likigan, Election Officer of Buguias, Benguet, to personally inform Cayat to file his answer within three days from receipt of notice. Cayat did not file an answer.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

Despite Cayat’s non-participation, Atty. Torres proceeded with SPA (PES) No. C04-001. Palileng filed his position paper on 16 February 2004. Atty. Torres then resolved the issues based on available records. Atty. Torres also submitted the entire record of the case together with his findings and recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the COMELEC on 24 February 2004. Pertinent portions of Atty. Torres’ report read:

It is important to note that based on the petition, [Palileng] seeks to disqualify [Cayat] for material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. This can be deduced from the fact that the petitioner cited in his petition that the respondent declared that he is eligible for the office he is seeking to be elected where in fact, [Cayat] is not eligible due to his conviction of a criminal offense. This being [the case,] the petition should have been a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy which should have been filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. Obviously, a petition to deny due course could no longer be filed at the time the petition was received.

However, it is important that the petition alleged the disqualification of the respondent by reason of his conviction of a criminal offense, which is the main reason why the petitioner filed this case. On this note, the applicable provision of law is now Sec. 40(a) of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Said provision of law reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running fro [sic] any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within [two] (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) xxx xxx xxx

With this, the issue of disqualification rests on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code and not on the material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.

The issue now to be resolved is whether or not the crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, to which [Cayat] was convicted by final judgment, is a crime involving moral turpitude so as to bring the issue within the coverage of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

The conviction of [Cayat] was never questioned. In fact [Cayat] accepted his conviction by applying for probation which was granted on November 6, 2003. It is already well settled that a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation. This brings us to the issue of moral turpitude.

Based on the Information filed, [Cayat] was convicted of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness when he, with lewd desire and/or with intention to obtain sexual gratification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold the complainant’s [AAA] arm which he placed on his crotch, grab[bed] and embraced her, as well as kiss[ed] her on the lips and mashed her breasts and performed similar acts of indecency, with force and intimidation and against the will of complainant.

Moral turpitude had been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (IRRI vs[.] NLRC, May 12, 1993)

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It is not merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but those initially lies in their being positively prohibited (Dela Torre vs[.] COMELEC and Marcial Villanueva, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996).

From the definition of moral turpitude, it can be determined that the acts of [Cayat] involved moral turpitude. His acts fell short of his inherent duty of respecting his fellowmen and the society. This was aggravated by the fact that [Cayat] is a priest. The crime of acts of lasciviousness clearly involves moral turpitude.

Therefore, the respondent is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Applying Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is recommended that [Cayat] be disqualified from running as Mayor of the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet.⁷

In its Resolution of 12 April 2004 of the case docketed as SPA Case No. 04-152, the COMELEC First Division found no compelling reason to disturb Atty. Torres’ findings and consequently cancelled Cayat’s certificate of candidacy. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent REV. FATHER NARDO B. CAYAT.

The Law Department is directed to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT as mayoralty candidate in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections.

SO ORDERED.⁸

On 13 April 2004, Cayat received a telegram from the Telecommunications Office through an unnamed person. Apparently, the Telecommunications Office asked the unnamed person to deliver the telegram to Cayat. In his affidavit, Cayat stated that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I received. Said telegram which I read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila."⁹

The officer in charge of the Telecommunications Office in Buguias, Benguet, Mr. Rufino G. Cabato, certified that he delivered the telegram to Guinid. He further stated that Guinid, Cayat’s cousin, voluntarily accepted to deliver the telegram to Cayat.

Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc on 16 April 2004. Cayat argued that the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 is void because the COMELEC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. Cayat also argued that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 (Resolution No. 6452) allowing service of summons by telegram is void.

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat’s name remained on the COMELEC’s list of candidates. In the Certificate of Canvass of Votes dated 12 May 2004, Cayat received 8,164 votes.¹⁰ Palileng, on the other hand, received 5,292 votes.¹¹ Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of office on 17 May 2004.

Meanwhile, on 13 May 2004, Cayat received a photocopy of the 9 May 2004 order of the COMELEC First Division denying his motion for reconsideration for his failure to pay the filing fee. On 26 May 2004, Cayat filed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 163776 before this Court.

On 29 July 2004, pending the resolution of G.R. No. 163776, Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation with a prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief, docketed as SPC No. 04-043, against the MBOC of Buguias and Cayat before the COMELEC Second Division. On 28 August 2004, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Palileng’s petition pursuant to COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 7257 (Resolution No. 7257). Resolution No. 7257 enumerated the cases which survived from among those filed before the Clerk of the COMELEC in the 10 May 2004 elections and which required proceedings beyond 30 June 2004.¹²

On 29 July 2004, pending resolution by the COMELEC of SPC No. 04-043, Palileng also filed a motion for execution of judgment in SPA Case No. 04-152. On 10 August 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued an order setting on 18 August 2004 the hearing on the motion for execution. Only Palileng’s counsel appeared during the hearing. The parties were instructed to file their respective memoranda within five days. In an order dated 25 October 2004, the COMELEC First Division granted the motion for execution and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) hereby GRANTS the instant Motion for Execution of Judgment and ANNULS the proclamation of Respondent Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat. Accordingly, it directs as follows:

1. For the Law Department to implement the disposition of this Commission (First Division) in its Resolution promulgated last April 12, 2004 and affirmed when it denied Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Order of May 9, 2004, for it to "CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of Rev. Father Nardo B. Cayat as mayoralty candidate in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections["];

2. For the Regional Election Director of Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal Board of Canvassers;

3. After due notice to the parties, for the Board to convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for mayor of Buguias, Benguet deleting therefrom the name of disqualified candidate Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat and immediately proclaim petitioner Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. as the duly elected mayor of Buguias, Benguet.¹³

Cayat filed an omnibus motion before the COMELEC First Division on 3 November 2004.1ªvvphi1.nét Cayat prayed for the recall of the 25 October 2004 order and for the suspension of further proceedings while the resolution of G.R. No. 163776 remains pending before this Court. The hearing on the motion was set for 12 November 2004.¹⁴

However, on 4 November 2004, Atty. Armando Velasco, Regional Director for the CAR, sent a notice that the new MBOC would convene on 12 November 2004 for the implementation of the COMELEC First Division’s 25 October 2004 order. On 10 November 2004, Cayat filed a petition for certiorari before this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 165736. Cayat prayed that (1) a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin COMELEC and its agents from enforcing the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice; (2) an order be issued reversing and setting aside the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice; and (3) an order be issued directing the COMELEC to suspend proceedings in SPA Case No. 04-152 until G.R. No. 163776 is resolved by this Court with finality.

On 12 November 2004, the new MBOC executed the COMELEC First Division’s order of 25 October 2004 and proclaimed Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Palileng took his oath of office on the same day.

Bayacsan, elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed his petition-in-intervention in G.R. No. 165736 on 17 November 2004 before this Court. For his part, Bayacsan prayed that the 25 October 2004 order and the 12 November 2004 proclamation be nullified and that he be declared as the rightful Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.

The Issues

The present petition seeks to determine the legality of the orders cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy, nullifying Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, and declaring Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Late Filing of Cayat’s Motion for Reconsideration

Cayat learned about the promulgation of the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 and its contents through two separate telegrams. He narrates the circumstances of his receipt of these telegrams as follows:

10. On April 13, 2004, I took a jeepney ride to Loo, Buguias, to attend a farmers’ congress. When the jeep I was riding in made a stop in front of the Lino’s Grocery in Abatan, somebody (who was not an employee of the Telecom Office) came rushing to give me a telegram which I received. Said telegram, which I read later, informed me that the Comelec will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila;

11. I could not make a trip to my lawyer in Baguio City until April 15, 2004, because he was appearing with Attorneys Samson Alcantara and Rene Gorospe before the Supreme Court which was holding oral arguments in Baguio City;

12. On April 15, 2004, at about 3:00 o’clock, I received a text message in the office of my lawyer that a telegram was served to Mr. Simon Guinid. The message was forwarded. It gave information that my Certificate of Candidacy (COC) had been canceled by the First Division of the Comelec;

x x x x¹⁵

On 16 April 2004, Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2004 before the COMELEC en banc. Cayat alleged that although the Resolution was promulgated on 12 April 2004, he was notified by telegram only on 13 April 2004. Hence, Cayat posits, he had until 16 April 2004 to move for reconsideration.

Cayat claims that he was not served the advance notice of promulgation required in Section 7 of Resolution No. 6452,¹⁶ stating:

Promulgation. — The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram or fax.

The three-day period¹⁷ from promulgation of the resolution in Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452, within which to file a motion for reconsideration, presupposes that the advance notice in Section 7 was served on Cayat.

The COMELEC sent the advance notice to Cayat by telegram to "Bayoyo, Buguias, Benguet," the address Cayat wrote on the blank space provided beside "RESIDENCE" in the Certificate of Candidacy he filed with the COMELEC.¹⁸ The COMELEC sent the telegram to Cayat before the date of promulgation. Cayat, who was traveling throughout Buguias at the time, admitted in his affidavit that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I received. Said telegram which I read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila."¹⁹

Clearly, by the wordings of the telegram, the COMELEC sent the telegram to the residence address of Cayat before 12 April 2004, the date of promulgation. It is immaterial if Cayat personally received the telegram after 12 April 2004 as long as the telegram was sent and delivered before 12 April 2004 to the residence address Cayat indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy.

However, there is no point belaboring this issue, which need not even be resolved. Whether the telegram reached the residence address of Cayat before or after the date of promulgation will not affect the outcome of this case. Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee when he filed his motion for reconsideration on 16 April 2004. There is no dispute that the failure to pay the filing fee made the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, as if Cayat did not file any motion for reconsideration at all.

Thus, the disqualification of Cayat became final three days after 13 April 2004, based on Cayat’s own allegation that he received the telegram only on 13 April 2004 and that he had until 16 April 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy due to disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, or 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections.

On Cayat’s Failure to Pay the Filing Fee
for His Motion for Reconsideration

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. Cayat made a fatal error: he failed to pay the required filing fee for his motion for reconsideration.

Although there is nothing in Resolution No. 6452 which mentions the need to pay a fee for filing a motion for reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 40 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure imposes a fee of P300 for filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or resolution. The succeeding section further provides that the COMELEC may refuse to take action until it is paid.

Cayat’s motion for reconsideration is merely pro forma because Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee within the prescribed period.²⁰ This brings us to the conclusion that it is as if no motion for reconsideration had been filed, resulting in the 12 April 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division attaining finality. The COMELEC First Division’s 12 April 2004 Resolution declaring Cayat’s disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, long before the 10 May 2004 local elections.

On Palileng’s Proclamation

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004²¹ when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty–three days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,²² which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases²³ because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases²⁴ had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.

Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law. In Labo, the Court applied the second sentence of Section 6, and even italicized the second sentence for emphasis, thus:

x x x In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case, Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.²⁵ (Italicization in the original)

Cayat’s proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s disqualification when they cast their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes "shall not be counted." There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and "shall not be counted."

To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the elections and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had long become final before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidate’s disqualification had become final before the elections.

In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy, on the ground that he is disqualified for having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, became final on 17 April 2004. This constrains us to rule against Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat’s petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on Elections dated 12 April 2004 and the Orders dated 9 May 2004 and 25 October 2004.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.¹ A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,² threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.³

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"⁴ (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.⁵

By Order of July 25, 2007,⁶ the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.⁷ The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.⁸

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests⁹ at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel¹⁰ the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court.¹¹ Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former custodians.¹²

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.¹³

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.¹⁴

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.¹⁵

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.¹⁶ (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,¹⁷ or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.¹⁸

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua,¹⁹ is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied.²⁰ The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail²¹ or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,²² justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense²³ applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,²⁴ it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:²⁵

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.²⁶ (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.²⁷

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.²⁸

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.²⁹

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"³⁰ proves that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.³¹ In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.³²

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo³³ to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,³⁴ was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."³⁵ At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,³⁶ the Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."³⁷ Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment³⁸ of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.³⁹

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.⁴⁰ The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.⁴¹ Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."⁴²

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,⁴³ the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison."⁴⁴

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,⁴⁵ it is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.⁴⁶ (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest,⁴⁷ yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.⁴⁸ That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office⁴⁹ on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around,⁵⁰ petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.⁵¹

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice	CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice	ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice	MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice	TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts¹ is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of the first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that —

1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.

Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that —

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos², which states, inter alia, that —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,³ it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.⁴

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:⁵

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.1âwphi1.nêt

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."⁶ This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.⁷ The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.⁸

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.⁹

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.¹⁰

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.¹¹

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.¹² The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.¹³ Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion¹⁴ and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."¹⁵

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society.¹⁶ Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.¹⁷

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and also in separate opinion of Justice Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., I concur in the main and separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate opinion.
Puno, J., I concur with the main and separate opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the separate opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions

GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;

For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted by the trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant claims that his constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration pending appeal of the judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his legislative functions, including attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings.

I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-appellant's motion is bereft of any legal merit.

The Bill of Rights provides —

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.¹ (emphasis supplied)

This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz —

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina² we held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.

Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. The Constitution states that —

A Senator of Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.³

I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the general principles of official immunity support an expanded interpretation of such privilege.

Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution⁴ limited the privilege from arrests to "all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This provision was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in turn based upon the American Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the word "treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been construed to include all indictable offenses.⁵ Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest only encompassed civil arrest.

Under the 1973⁶ and the 1987 Constitution, the privilege was broadened to include arrests for crimes punishable by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress immunity from arrest remained the same — to ensure that they are not prevented from performing their legislative duties.⁷ In fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members to expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike arrest, it was not demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of Congress from discharging their legislative functions.⁸

It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary adjunct to the vigorous and effective performance of official functions. Members of Congress in particular, who are called upon to exercise their discretion and judgment in enacting laws responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly be impeded in the exercise of their legislative functions if every dissatisfied person could compel them to vindicate the wisdom of their enactments in an action for damages or question their official acts before the courts.⁹

It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoing. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offenses of which the accused is charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe,¹⁰ "when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same"

The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in order.

It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.

Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec,¹¹ Aguinaldo v. Santos¹² and in Salalima v. Guingona¹³ we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term.¹⁴ The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal liability.1âwphi1.nêt

Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an express constitutional grant.

I vote to deny the motion.

Footnotes

¹ RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.

² 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].

³ 19 Phil, 208, 212.

⁴ Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].

⁵ 44 SCRA 37 [1972].

⁶ Art. III, Sec. 1.

⁷ Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

⁸ Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.

⁹ See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.

¹⁰ See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155: Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.

¹¹ Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.

¹² 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.

¹³ Ibid, p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.

¹⁴ Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Gas. 1084, 1087.

¹⁵ Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.

¹⁶ Sheldon, Krantz, 1088 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.

¹⁷ Ibid.

GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;

¹ 1987 Constitution, Art. III, sec. 13.

² 221 SCRA 209 (1993).

³ Art. VI, sec. 11.

⁴ Art. VI, sec. 15. — The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treasons, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from the arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

⁵ Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425.

⁶ Art. VIII, sec. 9. — A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privilege from arrest during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A member shall not be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Batasan or in any committee thereof.

⁷ 1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.

⁸ Ibid., 178-185.

⁹ Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.

¹⁰ Supra.

¹¹ Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.

¹² 212 SCRA 768 (1992).

¹³ 257 SCRA 55 (1996).

¹⁴ Salalima v. Guingona, id.