EN BANC
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari
and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be
formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on
Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may
the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated
otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within
the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for
purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights
take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of
hearing and adjudication?
The facts
narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence
taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal
questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On
September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and
highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged
at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as
a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass
actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions
were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to
work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more
teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among
those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the
MPSTA. 4
2.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants
(private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the
principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They
were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,
Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to
hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3.
In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which
CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo,
Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6
the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation,
and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending
resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance
of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their
motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the
Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for
reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their
intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7
The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as
the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which
was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to
the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers"
right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other
teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly
situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In
the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements
dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6.
Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended
by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775."
In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on
October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his
attendance therein. 11
On
the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain
whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his
office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and
Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to
hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his
clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To
be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly
guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering
that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their
wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school
superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High
School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with
them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated
herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the
Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants'
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7.
Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought
and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion
to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds
therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR
has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8.
Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss,
judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2)
cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a)
The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in
Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario
Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo; 15 and
b)
The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos.
95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to
the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful
for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file
administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them,
and issue decision on those charges." 17
9.
In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after
which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the
merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18
It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; .
. . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and
political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and
while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the
facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by
the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's
joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of
December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner
Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its
position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in
G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied
due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative
disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the
cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they
(CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate,
that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness,
the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary
of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned,
declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil
Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The
threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court
of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20
it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try
and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23
Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1)
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As
should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure
as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly
understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." 27
The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established
by the inquiry.
The legal
meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly
or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as
"to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case
of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence
it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if
there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the
merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant
rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions,
or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it
appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved
parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has
had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it
is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings
themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents
due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth
committed "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a
motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself,
and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil
Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in
this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the
jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground
traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the
complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against
them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any
event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve
no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions
contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only
by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The
only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño
was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government
agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of
December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent
Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are
prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.
Separate Opinions
I concur in
the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means
to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers
but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be laid off because
of financial repercussions.
The defense
of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the
Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers
defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL
AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and
JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human obligations."
I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.
# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be
blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary
act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers
but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be laid off because
of financial repercussions.
The defense
of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the
Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers
defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL
AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and
JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human obligations."
I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.
# Footnotes
2 G.R. No. 95445 (Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v. Hon. Perfecto Laguio, Jr., etc., et al) and G.R. No. 95590 (Alliance of Concerned Teachers [ACT], et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cariño, etc., et al.).
3 (Joint) Resolution, G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, prom. Aug. 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.
4 Rollo, p. 7.
5 Id., p. 7.
6 Also impleaded as respondents were other teachers, Adelaida dela Cruz, Ma. Teresa Rizardo, Rita Atabelo and Digna Operiano (Rollo, p. 77).
7 Rollo, pp. 77-78.
8 Id., pp. 77-81.
9 Id., pp. 7-8, and 47-50 (Annex "I," petition: Decision of Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio in Civil Case No. 90-54468 of the RTC of Manila [Branch 18] entitled Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cariño and Hon. Erlinda Lolarga).
10 Id., pp. 8; 51-52 (Annex J, Petition: Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of 7 affiants including respondents Budoy, Babaran, and del Castillo), and 53-54 (Annex K, petition: sworn statement given by Apolinario Esber under questioning by Nicanor S. Agustin, CHR).
11 Id., p. 56: Order in Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90-775, 1st par., p. 1.
12 Id., 1st and 2nd pars., p. 1.
13 Id., pp, 56-57.
14 Id., pp, 11-58-76 (Annex M, petition).
15 SEE footnote 8 and related text, supra.
16 SEE footnote 3, supra.
17 Rollo, p. 11.
18 Id., pp. 12-13.
19 Including Regional Trial Courts designated and acting as Special Agrarian Courts, and the Court of Tax Appeals. SEE Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 eff. April 1, 1991.
20 Vested with judicial authority or quasi-judicial powers are such agencies, boards or officers like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform, Government Service Insurance System, Employees' Compensation Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission. SEE Circular No. 1-91, supra. Also possessed of quasi-judicial authorities are department heads and heads of office under the Civil Service Law, and the Ombudsman.
21 The nature of a "judicial function" was inter alia described in Republic of the Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 90478 as follows: "The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitively and finally."
. . . "It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially." . . . Mun. Council of Lemery v. Prov. Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 270, citing State ex rel. Boards of Commrs. v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 304.
It has been held that a special civil action of certiorari "would not lie to challenge action of the "Integrity Board" set up by Executive
Order No. 318 of May 25, 1950, because that board, like the later Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, was not invested with judicial functions but only with power to investigate charges of graft and corruption in office and to submit the record, together with findings and recommendations, to the President." Ruperto v. Torres G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 (Unrep., 100 Phil. 1098) (Rep. of the Phil. Digest, Vol. 1, Certiorari, Sec. 22, p. 430).
Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., treating of "jurisdiction" in relation to a criminal case, states it to be "the power of a court to inquire into the fact, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceeding . . ." In Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed., "adjudge" is defined as: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment (emphasis supplied).
22 A distinguished Member of the Constitutional Commission that drew up the 1987 Constitution, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., citing the Commission's official records, states that the "principal function of the Commission (on Human Rights) is investigatory. In fact, in terms of law enforcement, this pretty much is the limit of its function. Beyond investigation, it will have to rely on the Justice Department which has full control over prosecutions. Thus, under Section 18 (9) it can only request assistance from executive offices." (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a Commentary, 1988 ed., Vol. II p. 503/).
23 Art. XIII, Sec. 17. (1).
24 Id., Sec. 17. (3).
25 Id., Sec. 18.
26 E.g.: the prosecution of persons guilty of crimes, or institution of civil or administrative proceedings; exercise of visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; the submission of recommendations to the Congress of measures to promote human rights provide for compensation to victims of violations thereof, etc.
27 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is: "To search or inquire into; to examine (a matter) systematically or in detail; to make an inquiry or examination into." The American College Encyclopedic Dictionary (1959 ed.) defines (a) "investigate" as "to search or examine into the particulars of; examine in detail;" and (b) "investigation," an act or process of investigating; a searching inquiry in order to ascertain facts; a detailed or careful examination.
28 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
29 Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.
30 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is "To adjudge; to award; "to give something controverted to one of the litigants, by a sentence or decision. . . . To try and determine judicially; to pronounce by sentence of court. . . . To sit in judgment and pronounce sentence; to act as a judge, or court of judgment."
31 Id., the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is "To settle, determine, or decide judicially; to adjudicate upon; . . . To pronounce or decree by judicial sentence . . . To award judicially; to grant, bestow, or impose by judicial sentence . . . ."
32 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.; in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, "adjudicate" is defined as: "To give judgment; to render or award judgment," and "adjudge" as: "To give judgment; to decide, to sentence." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary Third Revision (8th Ed.), "adjudication" is defined as "A judgment; giving or pronouncing judgment in a case. Determination in the exercise of judicial power."
33 SEE footnotes 6 to 8, and 15, and related text, supra.
34 SEE footnotes 16 and 17 related text, supra.
35 SEE footnote 26, supra.
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