morandarte

G.R. NO. 154243             March 6, 2007

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, Petitioners,
vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, Respondent.

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Inspector General of the PNP for abuse of authority/harassment against the respondent. The latter allegedly obstructed police officers from arresting his brother Lamberto Asayo, one of the suspects in the shooting of petitioner’s son. The complaint was referred to the Inspector General for pre-charge investigation. When summoned, respondent did not appear but filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) which had jurisdiction over the case. Meanwhile, the Inspector General submitted a report to the PNP Chief recommending the commencement of summary dismissal proceedings against respondent. Upon approval of said recommendation, the administrative complaint was referred to the PNP Legal Service for summary hearing. The PNP Chief, then Deputy Director General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a decision dismissing respondent from police service.

ISSUES:

·         WON the respondent failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies prior to the filing of his petition.

·         WON the chief of the philippine national police has the authority or jurisdiction under republic act no. 6975 to hear and try the citizen's complaint against respondent.

HELD:

·         With regard to the first issue, the respondent rightfully invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all the administrative remedies because the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, such as when the issue involved is a purely legal question. The only issue presented by respondent in his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by a private citizen against him. Said issue being a purely legal one, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case.

·         Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which took effect on 1 January 1991, x x x delineates the procedural framework in pursuing administrative complaints against erring members of the police organization. Section 41 of the law enumerates the authorities to which a complaint against an erring member of the PNP may be filed. It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP member which would warrant dismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section 41 should be read in conjunction with Section 42 of the same statute. Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional directors.

Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although other disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly declares this point.

The Court further declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and regional directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer."

Webster defines "unbecoming" conduct as "improper" performance. Such term "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method." Obviously, the charges of neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties fall within the scope of conduct unbecoming a police officer. Clearly, the charges against respondent in this case are also covered by paragraph (c), Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, vesting the PNP Chief with jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint against respondent.

Verily, the assistance of counsel was not required for respondent to validly waive his right to cross-examine the witnesses in the administrative case against him.

In sum, the charges against respondent fall well within the scope of paragraph (c), Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, thus, the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint against respondent; and the summary hearing officer accorded respondent due process and never deprived respondent any of his rights.