SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79886 November 22, 1989QUALITRANS LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE, LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 79887 November 22, 1989
QUALITRANS LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC.,
vs.
ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE, JUDGE PERPETUA COLOMA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
These two petitions, in the nature of appeals by certiorari,
from a joint judgment of the Court of Appeals, were brought by
Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., grantee of a certificate of public
convenience issued by the defunct Board of Transportation to operate a
"garage (tourist) air-conditioned service" 1
in Manila to any point in the island of Luzon. By our Resolution of
September 7, 1988, we consolidated the twin cases. We also gave due
course thereto.
The facts, never disputed, are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
On June 22, 1982, the then Board of Transportation,
now the Land Transportation Commission, rendered a Decision granting
petitioner a certificate of public convenience to operate a garage
(tourist) air-conditioned service within the City of Manila and from
said place to any point in Luzon, and vice-versa (Annex A, CA-G.R. SP
No. 10049).
On June 25, 1982, said Decision was amended by
converting petitioner's certificate of public convenience for garage
service into one for limousine tourist service for the transportation of
all outgoing passengers of the Manila International Airport (Annex B,
CA-G.R. SP No. 10049).
On October 14, 1985, a Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex
I of both Records) was executed by private respondent with Transcare,
Inc., a duly licensed limousine service operator and likewise, a holder
of a certificate of public convenience (Annex 2 of both Records). By
virtue of said sale, the franchise granted to Transcare, Inc. for the
use of 40 units of tourist cars was sold to private respondent.
On December 27, 1985, upon application filed for the
approval of aforementioned sale, an Order was issued by the Land
Transportation Commission granting a provisional permit in favor of
private respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049); Annexes B
and 3 CA-G.R. No. 10370-SP). The prefatory portion thereof states:
The application filed in this case is for the
approval of sale made by TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS
LIMOUSINE SERVICE of the Certificate of Public Convenience issued in
Case Nos. 81-4405 and 82-415 authorizing the operation of a TOURIST CAR
(AIR-CONDITIONED) SERVICE within the New Manila International Airport
and from said place to any point in the Island of Luzon accessible to
motor vehicle traffic and vice-versa, involving the right to operate forty (40) units authorized therein. ... (Emphasis supplied).
On June 17, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration before the Land Transportation Commission to correct the
route specified in the prefatory portion of its December 27, 1986 Order
(Annex 4 of both Records). Petitioner argues that the application filed
by private respondent was for the route from the "New Manila
International Airport to hotels and from said hotels to any point in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic and vice-versa", and not from the
"New Manila International Airport ... to any point in the Island of
Luzon ... " (ibidem). Petitioner claims that respondent has been
soliciting passengers from the New Manila International Airport to
transport them to any point in Luzon to the prejudice of petitioner's
business.
On September 1, 1986, petitioner filed Civil Case
No. 4275-P before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court for damages with
prayer for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against private
respondent (Annex D, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049: Annex 5, CA-G.R. SP No.
10370).
On same date, Hon. Fermin A. Martin. Jr.,
Vice-Executive Judge of the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, issued a
Restraining Order directing private respondent to desist from ferrying
passengers from the New Manila International Airport to their residences
(Annex E, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049; Annex 6, CA-G.R. SP No. 10370). The
petition for preliminary injunction was set for hearing on September 5,
1986.
On September 3, 1986, private respondent, defendant
in Civil Case No. 4275, filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve/Lift
Restraining Order issued by Hon. Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (Annex F, CA-G.R.
SP No. 10049). Thereafter, same respondent filed an Opposition to
petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(Annex G, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049).
In the hearing of September 5, 1986, respondent Hon.
Perpetua D. Coloma, in whose Branch the civil case was raffled, gave
petitioner up to September 8, 1986 within which to file an opposition,
if any, to respondent urgent motion.
On September 8, 1986, petitioner filed the required
opposition (Annex 1, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049). On that same date,
respondent Judge ruled on said urgent motion and petitioner's earlier
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. Pertinent
portions of respondent Judge's Order read as follows:
After a careful examination of the arguments of both
parties to support their respective claims, this Court believes that
the defendant's contention finds justification under the doctrine of
exhaustion of Administrative remedies.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, this Court doesn't have jurisdiction over this case under Sec. 19 BP Blg. 129.
RTC shall have Exclusive jurisdiction.— SEC. 19, BP Blg. 129.
6. In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of a any Court, Tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court is
constrained to Lift as it does lift the Restraining Order dated
September 1, 1986 and hereby denies the Issuance of Preliminary
Mandatory. (Sic) (Annex H, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049; Annex 8, CA-G.R. SP No.
10370).
On September 16, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Annex J, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049) which was denied by
respondent Court on September 19, 1986.
In the meantime, private respondent filed in
respondent Commission a Petition for Declaratory Relief (sic)
requestioning the latter to declare the extent of its rights under its
provisional authority (Annex C, CA-G.R. SP No. 10370).
On September 17, 1986, petitioner was able to secure
from respondent Commission an Order directing private respondent "to
immediately cease and desist from operating its units from the New
Manila International Airport to any point in Luzon" (Annexes D and 9,
CA-G.R. SP No. 10370). Two days later, however, this Order was lifted by
respondent Commission upon motion of private respondent (Annex 5,
CA-G.R. SP No. 10049; Annexes 10 and 11, CA-G.R. SP No. 10370).
On September 23, 1986, petitioner filed before this
Court CA-G.R. SP No. 10049 praying, among others, that a Restraining
Order issue to prevent implementation of the September 8, and 19, 1986
Orders of respondent Court and to direct said Court to grant the
injunction prayed for therein.
On October 1, 1986, petitioner filed its Opposition
to private respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief pending before
respondent Commission (Annex F, CA-G.R. SP No. 10370).
On October 9, 1986, respondent Commission acted on
private respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief ruling that the
provisional authority granted to private respondent was "to transport
passengers from the New Manila International Airport and from said place
to any point in the Island of Luzon ...." (Annex G, CA-G.R. SP No.
10370).
On October 15, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for respondent Commission
to reconsider its Order of October 9, 1986 (Annex H, CA-G.R. SP No.
10370). This was denied by said Commission in its Order dated October
17, 1986 (Annex I, CA-G.R. SP No. 10370). 2
xxx xxx xxx
The Court
of Appeals dismissed both of Qualitrans' petitions and directed it to
respect the issuance of a certificate of public convenience (CPC) in
favor of Royal Class Limousine Service. The petitioner now holds the
Appellate Court to be in error, in these respects:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LAND
TRASPORTATION COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF,
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS PROPER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
DECISIONS OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION IN CASES NOS. 81-4405
AND 82-416 ARE VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO MINISTRY ORDER NO. 81-054.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION DENIED PETITIONER DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
BECAUSE IT ADVANCED THE TIME OF THE HEARING WITHOUT NOTICE TO
PETITIONER.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDERS
OF OCTOBER 9 AND 17, 1986 OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION WAS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, WHEN NONE WAS EVER ADDUCED.
VI
THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS DIRECTLY FROM THE MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO DESTINATIONS OTHER THAN HOTELS. 3
Anent the said Appellate Court's affirmance of the Regional Trial Court's Order 4 dismissing Qualitrans' complaint for injunction and damages, Qualitrans assigns the following errors:
I
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 4275-P.
II
THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
III
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 5
We sustain the Court of Appeals in both cases.
I (G.R. No 79886)
1. As to claims that the Land Transportation
Commission can not entertain suits for declaratory relief, there is
merit in the ruling under question to the effect that the Commission,
under its enabling law, Executive Order No. 1011, has ample powers to
modify certificates of public convenience, including the grant of
latitudinarian franchises in favor of public utilities. We quote:
... The (Land Transportation) Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions:
(a) Quasi-judicial powers and functions which require notice and hearing—
xxx xxx xxx
(2) To issue, amend, revise, suspend or cancel Certificates of Public
Convenience or permits authorizing the operation of public land
transportation services provided by motorized vehicles, and to prescribe
the appropriate terms and conditions therefor; 6
xxx xxx xxx
Royal
Class' application is, quintessentially, a petition for an expanded
route, over which the Board exercises jurisdiction under its charter. If
it seemed like an "action for declaratory relief", it is only a
coincidence, for the nature of an action is to be determined by what the
petition alleges and not by the appellation the parties have attached
to their pleadings. 7
Whether it is a petition for declaratory relief or for revision or
grant or cancellation of an existing CPC, the authority of the
Commission to act is justified, so long as it has been properly invoked.
The fact
that Qualitrans had, meanwhile, commenced suit in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) does not oust the Commission of its jurisdiction. The
Commission had a primacy of authority to take cognizance of Royal Class
'inquiry. It is to be noted, indeed, that the very trial court, by its
order of September 8, 1986, 8
denied the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief sought by
Qualitrans, in deference, precisely, to the Board's primal and
preferential jurisdiction.
2. Of course, the Commission's action must have been preceded by due notice and hearing, 9
and precisely, it is Qualitrans' complaint that it had been deprived of
due process for failure of the transportation body to give it notice
and hearing (in particular, of Royal Class' motion to lift cease and
desist order). The records show, however, that the decision of the Board
is founded on substantial evidence. 10
Moreover, in administrative cases, notice" is not indispensable, but
the deprivation of opportunity to be heard. That is not the case here.
The reality is that on October 1, 1986, Qualitrans opposed Royal Class'
application for "declaratory relief." 11
It can not therefore be heard to say that the Commission had acted
without giving the petitioner an avenue to air its side of the story.
3. Anent charges that the Commission issued the
questioned certificate of public convenience without evidence, suffice
it to say that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . .the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee said:
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial
review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable. 12
The records also reveal that there were sound reasons for the lifting of the Commission's cease and desist order, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Complaint's (sic) Motion for Reconsideration of
the order dated December 27, 1985, in Case No. 85-9619 filed on June 17,
1986, has not yet been resolved by this Commission;
2. Respondent's Petition for Declaratory Relief filed on September 15, 1986, is still pending resolution by this Commission;
3. Considerable losses and irreparable injury will
be sustained by respondent, not to mention the loss of income of its
drivers/employees whose only source of livelihood is dependent on the
present and continuous operation of respondent; and
4. Above all, public interest and convenience will
suffer and be prejudiced if respondent is restrained from ferrying
passengers from the New MIA directly to their respective residences;
5. Likewise, a restraining order should be granted only where there is a
clear showing that there is indeed a flagrant violation on (sic) the
property right of another. Absence of which or in case of ambiguity, a
restraining order is unavailing. And in the present case there is really
that ambiguity attendant to the issues involved, which this Commission
shall have to resolve on the merits so as not to prejudice either party.
13
3. As to charges that the certificate of public convenience of the
private respondent had allowed it to transport clients from the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport only to hotels but not to any other
destination, the Court is agreed that the controlling jurisprudence is Carmelo and Oriol v. Monserrat, 14 in which we held:
xxx xxx xxx
Everything else being equal, the real, primary
question involved is whether it is better and more convenient for the
travelling public in the City of Manila to have two taxicab companies in
operation than it is to have one, and whether in truth and in fact the
granting of another similar license to the petitioners would operate as a
real injury to Monserrat. He is the first in the field and so long as
he maintains good and efficient service and meets the demand of the
public, it is fair to assume that he will hold his present customers and
would have nothing to fear from the granting of a license to the
petitioners, and if for any reason he does not give the required kind of
service or satisfy the needs of the public, then he would have no right
to complain.
xxx xxx xxx
That is to say, taxies are not operated on any schedule or over any
certain route or between certain points or in any direction, and that
the certificate granted to Monserrat is in the nature of a blanket
franchise to operate a taxicab service over any and all of the streets
and alleys of the city, in any direction, from any place, and at any
time, subject to the call and wish of the customer only both as to time,
place, and route of travel. That is to say, it is in the sole
discretion of the person desiring to travel whether he shall call a taxi
or an auto garage car, and as to when he shall call it, and where he
shall go, and in the operation of an autobus line, the operator must
maintain a fixed schedule over a specified route between certain points,
and must make his trips with or without passengers. 15
The abovestated doctrine applies with equal force to the case under consideration. For although Monserrat
involved a fleet of taxicabs, the taxicab business is no different,
fundamentally, from a limousine service because both have very broad
destinations.
That Royal Class had, itself, admitted that its
franchise covered the NAIA-hotel route alone, does not weaken the
Commission's ruling. The yardstick, so Monserrat tells us, is that:
xxx xxx xxx
In the granting or refusal of a certificate of public convenience, all
things considered, the question is what is for the best interests of the
public. 16
Like Monserrat, the Court finds it "hard to conceive how it would be for the best interests of the public" 17,
to have one line only, "and how the public would be injured by the
granting of the certificate in question, for it must be conceded that
two companies in the field would stimulate the business..." 18
It is
simply bellyaching to say that Royal Class had transcended the bounds of
the certificate of public convenience granted to it. What Qualitrans is
plainly carping about is the threat the Royal Class' certificate of
public convenience poses on its foothold in the "limo" service business.
This is monopolism, plainly and simply, and we can not tolerate it. The
constitutional mandate is for "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth" 19 and for the State to regulate or prohibit monopolies." 20
As we have held furthermore, a provisional authority is given on showing of public need. 21 Thus, it may be issued ex-parte.
II (G.R. No. 79887)
1. For the same reasons, the above appeal must also
fail. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) had acted correctly in dismissing
Qualitrans' damage suit.
Ramos v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 22
in which we sustained the jurisdiction of the CFI (now, RTC) at the
expense of Public Service Commission (now, the Land Transportation
Commission), has no application. In that case, the aggrieved party had
denounced his adversary's action before the PSC. The latter, however,
had failed to act. We stamped our imprimatur on the CFI's jurisdiction
because of temporal constraints. ("Damages pile up day by day as
infringement continues. The Public Service Commission has been afforded
an opportunity to give relief and has not done so." 23
In addition, there is a need to square the functioning of administrative bodies vis-a-vis
contemporary realities. As we have observed, the increasing pattern of
law and legal development has been to entrust "special cases" to
"special bodies" rather than the courts. As we have also held, the shift
of emphasis is attributed to the need to slacken the encumbered dockets
of the judiciary and so also, to leave "special cases" to specialists
and persons trained therefor.
There is no merit in the claims that Royal Class has
been guilty of unfair competition. For starters, its CPC has been duly
issued. It (CPC) can not therefore be said to have been acquired through
duress or deceit to warrant such a charge.
2. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is arrayed against Qualitrans. Hence, it can not validly revoke our ruling in Arrow Transportation Corp. v. Board of Transportation. 24
That case was impelled by urgent need, which the courts could address
more swiftly. It is not the case here. Not much is at stake in the
"limo" business. We hold that the Commission should have better been
left alone to discharge its duty without court interference.
3. We
are not impressed that Qualitrans has successfully shown that it is
entitled to the injunctive writ. Its appeal to "ruinous competition" 25
is not well-taken. Under the Constitution, the national economy stands
for, "competi[tion] in both domestic and foreign markets." 26
Obviously, not every kind of competition is "ruinous competition". All
things considered and all things equal, competition is a healthy thing.
Besides, there is no showing that Qualitrans stood to lose its capital
investment with the approval of Royal Class' franchise. 27
Our considered opinion is that Qualitrans should improve its services
as a counter-balance to Royal Class' own toehold in the market. And let
that be its challenge.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.
2 Id., 70-73, id., 51-54; emphasis in the original.
3 Id., 13.
4 Id., 44-47.
5 Id .,17-18.
6 Exec. Order No. 1011, sec. 5.
7 See Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil.. 674 (1949); Aquino v. COMELEC, No. L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. 79887, id., 44 - 47.
9 See Exec. Order No. 1011, sec. 5, supra.
10 Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
11 Rollo, id., 73; Id., 54.
12 Saavedra, Jr. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, No. 80879, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 57; also Abejo v. Dela Cruz, Nos. 63558, 68450-51, May 19, 1987, 149 SCRA 654; also Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico, Jr., No. L-47501; July 29, 1988,163 SCRA 716.
13 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 79886, 52-53.
1 4 55 Phil. 644 (1931).
15 Supra, 648; 649.
16 Supra, 649.
17 Supra.
18 Supra, 649-650.
19 CONST. (1987), art. XII, sec. 1.
20 Supra, sec. 19.
21 Arrow Transportation Corp. v. Board of Transportation, No. L-39655, March 21, 1975, 63 SCRA 193.
22 58 Phil. 374 (1933).
23 Supra, 377.
24 Supra.
25 Rollo, id., G.R. No. 79887, 26.
26 CONST., supra, art. XII, see. 1.
27 Vda. de Lat v. Public Service Commission, No. L-34987, February 26, 1988,158 SCRA 180.
No comments:
Post a Comment