G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.
Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The
Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this
petition — the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement
(TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the
concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del
Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents
filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious
violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the
herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages
against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three
grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2)
the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3)
the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2
The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of
Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4,
1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
The
Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances
approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent
court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the
urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The
lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of
Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest
Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request
remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares,
including the area requested, was given to petitioner.
Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by
the logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation not
only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian
City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan
River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the
logging operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area
than that feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of
Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested
areas years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the grant
of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . .
It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places
adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p.
5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be
stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the court intervenes.
Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the
council's request seven years back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec.
1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance,
approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions,
licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection
with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or
development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
This
was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7
where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for
divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first
to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8
which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional.
Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground
for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as
if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the
reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference
with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the
competence of the other departments. The theory is that the
administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if
given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that
administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are
allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of
the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded
dockets. 9
As
correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number
of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial
action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases
are:
1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11
3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13
5) when the claim involved is small; 14
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15
7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16
8) when strong public interest is involved; 17
9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18
and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. 19
The
private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the
exceptions because forestry laws do not require observance of the
doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they
are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause
great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it
be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort
to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if
nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if
such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit
language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function
"to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and
use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction"
in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20
and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest
Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws
aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies
at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first
instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the
courts of justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the
petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private
respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the
DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the
TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge
involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting
evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative
authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and
the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise
their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial
action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national
interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have
satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify
deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and
immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular
submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested
contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA
in compliance with the order of the DENR.
In the
Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner
alleged that its logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a
telegram 22
received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as
follows:
PAGADIAN CITY
QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22,
1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT
REPORT ASAP.
RED BATCAGAN
The
petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for
cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending up to this date and
that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the
Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23
In
the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed
that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended petitioner's logging
operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force
up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24
These
statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their
pleadings before the respondent court and this Court and are therefore
deemed admitted.
There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes
within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the
wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of
the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary
first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and
regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis,
determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the
Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise
of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a
condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of
the same question by a court of justice.
In view of
the above observations, we find that there was no need for the
respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD
605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided
where the case can be decided on some other available ground, 25
as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same
question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites
of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily
established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make
the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such
action is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution dated
September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated
December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
2 Ibid., p. 48.
3 Rollo, p. 23; Penned by Melo, J. with Herrera M. and Imperial, JJ., concurring.
4 Ibid., p. 29.
5 14 SCRA 269.
6 63 SCRA 193.
7 149 SCRA 305.
8 Pineda v. Court of First Instance of Davao, 1 SCRA 1020; Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Mendoza, 2 SCRA 1064; Pestanas v. Dyogi, 81 SCRA 574; Aboitiz and Co. Inc. v. The Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265; Abe-Abe v. Manta, 90 SCRA 524.
9 Cruz, Carlo L., Philippine Administrative Law, 1991 ed., op. cit., pp. 85-96.
10 Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256.
11 Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377.
12 Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377.
13 Aquino v. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177.
14 Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291.
15 De Lara v. Cloribel, supra.
16 National Development Company v. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429.
17 Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation, supra.
18 Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116.
19 Corpus v. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749.
20 Paragraphs 12 and 15, Section 4, Chapter I, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292.
21 Section 5 of P.D. 705.
22 CA Rollo, p. 7.
23 Rollo, p. 17.
24 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
25 Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615.
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